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ABSTRACT 
Nietzsche contradicts himself. He revels in that manner; so, we clearly invite 
ridicule upon ourselves if we earnestly pull him up on his manifest 
inconsistencies. In cornering us in this way Nietzsche gives us something only 
we can do. Suppose Plato revels in the same kind of appearance of ridiculousness 
(compare the conclusion to his Republic image of the cave 7.517a; also 
Symposium 221e). Now forgo the comfort of pulling him up on that appearance. 
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PREFACE 
This work is in two parts: Part I briefly surveys a number of dialogues. In those chapters, I 
attempt to illustrate an approach to understanding Plato that portrays him as an indirect rather 
than a direct communicator. I argue that Plato cannot directly state what he genuinely 
communicates. According to this reading, in order to get a handle on Plato, we must recognise 
a necessary connection between the form and the content of his work. As soon as we 
understand why Plato communicated in the way that he did, we at once also understand what 
Plato sought to communicate. 
We reach such an understanding only upon gathering the form of his dialogues and 
instantiating that meaning as constitutive of our own understanding. According to this method, 
Plato is able to prevent us rightly saying things along the lines: while Plato believes that x, I do 
not believe that x. Plato's peculiar way of communicating demands something from us. 
Because of this, it turns out that the sufficient conditions for us believing that x have been met 
in our discovery that Plato believes that x. Plato does not allow us to read him as a spokesman 
for a position, which we can in tum reject. For he has us implicate our own understandings as 
intrinsic authorities in those beliefs we find ourselves justified in attributing to him. 
Part II very briefly discusses some other thinkers. In a somewhat oblique way these 
discussions seek to explain why some readers will see little promise or no promise in that 
approach to Plato outlined in Part I. In short, I blame those readers. I conclude that the cause 
for their frustration is not a theoretical issue but rather a practical one. Consequently-
because, in this work, I do not adopt Plato's form of communication - there is nothing I can do 
to address their disappointment; those disappointed readers must do something themselves in 
order to check their frustration. (It turns out that I am not really justified in blaming those 
disappointed readers; for, there is something that I have failed to do regarding the form of this 
work. Only Plato can unproblematic ally blame his readers - though, because of the form of 
his work, such a direct attribution of blame by him must remain unstated.) 
II 
Combined, Part I and Part II do not form a whole; neither does each part on its own constitute 
a whole. Consequently, from a certain perspective, both parts look quite inadequate. Consider 
Part I: (1) it deals with only a small number of dialogues, and its discussions sweep across 
those dialogues too rapidly to survey much of their detail. (2) None of the discussions 
(explicitly) engages with any of the vast amount of scholarship on those works. (3) Even 
though Part I chooses to discuss only the primary texts, it concerns itself with English 
translations of those works and not with the kind of scholarly regard for them that must be 
based on knowledge of the Greek language. 
There is a perspective from which none of those apparent deficiencies is a genuine 
cause for worry. The reader (if he or she is to recognise any worth in Part 1) must discover that 
perspective. 
ILl 
Over against the concern that its discussion of the dialogues is incomplete, Part I simply does 
not aim to present an introduction to either Plato's works or anyone of those works. Part I 
merely attempts to show a way of approaching Plato; it does not seek at any level to exhaust 
that way. This constraint, or manifest incompleteness, ought to allow the reader to see some 
promise to that approach. 
11.2 
Over against the concern about my lack of engagement with extant scholarship (that is, even 
though the detail of Part 1's discussions, along with its conclusions, will, in places, coincide 
with and, in other places, detract from what numerous scholars variously say about those 
dialogues, Part I does not critically engage with those other voices nor does it rehearse those 
points of contact and dispute), Part I aims merely to show a method. An additional discussion 
centring on how the results of that method match or fail to match the results poured out from 
other methods would be (from the perspective of that method) uninteresting and misplaced. 
Such an engagement would immediately detract from Part 1's showing. 
The inclusion of a discussion in Part 1 of the more interesting issue of what those 
disagreements mark, namely, far more basic methodological disagreements, would also be 
misplaced. The presence of such a discussion would imply that something can be done (i.e., 
shown), which Part 1 concludes cannot be done (i.e., shown). One conclusion from Part 1 is 
that, if one's communication is direct, then communication is possible only if there is prior 
methodological agreement. 
Part I argues that Plato is well aware of this problem of incommensurability and he 
presents a solution. He creates a necessary connection between the form of his communication 
and what he seeks to communicate. With this manifest necessity, Plato is able practically to 
resolve the threat of methodological disputes. But, that practical solution relies not merely on 
Plato doing something quite particular it also relies on his readers doing something quite 
particular. Thus, there is no stateable solution only a doable one. Consequently, it is only a 
solution for those who find it. Plato's solution is also Plato's Socrates' solution. And within 
the dialogues, Plato shows that his solution is not quick-fire. For he shows Socrates, after a 
lifetime of attempting to communicate in this way, dying misunderstood as much by his friends 
as by his foes. (After the spirit of Part 1, Part 11 questions the possibility of a theoretical 
resolution for disputes over method. Part II concludes that such disputes arise from something 
deeper or more primary than theory.) 
11.3 
Over against the concerns that are raised by my attention just to English translations of Plato's 
works, the reader should assume that a philological engagement with the texts at the level of 
Greek language lexical disputes regarding historically received meanings of various terms, 
would immediately detract from, and most likely positively frustrate, the progress of that 
approach shown in Part 1. Such a focus on the given elements of the text, promises only to 
upset the downward determination of meaning worked by the method shown in Part 1. That is 
to say, a preoccupation with the problems of translation, together with an insistence that 
scholars engage with the original language of the text, is to take on board an analytic method 
unsuited to the form of the dialogues. 
On this issue, Part I shows how Plato introduces his readers to a method that creates 
rather than receives meaning; following this method, something internal rather than external 
verifies meaning (that is to say, for Plato form rather than primarily content determines 
meaning). Of course, this is not to deny that adequate translations of the dialogues are 
necessary before non-Greek speakers can gather their meaning; rather, it is merely to assert that 
the accuracy of translations is not as important as some approaches will insist. The approach 
presented in Part I suggests that the more preoccupied we become with problems in translation 
the more we will distance ourselves from the method towards which Plato invites us. For the 
more we become concerned with the historically received meaning of particular terms the more 
we will be drawn to assume that meaning is upwardly determined from the base elements of the 
text. On the other hand, if we (along with Part 1) assume that meaning is downwardly 
determined, then a translation does not need to be as accurate as it would have to be to support 
an understanding that assumes the opposite method. This is all just to suggest that the question 
concerning the importance of translations is a methodological rather than a theoretical issue; to 
assume otherwise is to beg the question against the method presented in Part 1. 
III 
Part II broadly discusses the problem of method; it concludes that it is an aesthetic-practical, 
rather than a theoretical, issue. 
PART I 
LOVE 
EUTHYPHRO 
PIETY AND INVENTING THE DIVINE 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.1 COMMUNICATING UNDERSTANDING AND UNDERSTANDING COMMUNICATION .................................... 3 
1.2 FORM OF COMMUNICATION AND FORM OF UNDERSTANDING ....................................................................... 4 
1.3 EUTHYPHRO'S RECEPTIVITY AND THE CHASE OF AUTHORITy ...................................................................... 4 
1.4 SLAVES AND VALUE ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 EXTRINSIC VALUE AND DEICIDE ............................................................................................................................... 7 
1.6 INVENTING THE DIVINE AND THE FORM OF PIETy .............................................................................................. 7 
1.7 VALUERS AND VALUE .................................................................................................................................................... 8 
NOTES ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 
ABSTRACT 
Thematically, Euthyphro and Apology make a tight pair. In the former, 
Euthyphro, whose understanding is merely receptive, cannot gather the necessary 
nature of the divine. In the latter dialogue, Meletus accuses Socrates of making 
or inventing gods and forsaking 'the gods in whom the city believes'. Direct 
communicators, such as Euthyphro and Meletus, confuse inventions with lies. In 
tum, they suppose that only an appropriate type of receipt can guarantee truth. 
Socrates shows that direct communicators bear false witness to truth. Their 
passive method of receipt is antithetical to the active and necessary nature of the 
divine. Thus, Socrates agrees with the supporting claims of Meletus' indictment. 
However, he denies what Meletus concludes. Socrates essentially concludes that 
because they refuse to invent the divine Euthyphro and Meletus cannot avoid 
impiety. 
1.1 COMMUNICATING UNDERSTANDING AND UNDERSTANDING 
COMMUNICATION 
Euthyphro appears to be a work centring solely on the nature of piety. For this reason, the 
relevance of the dialogue's discussion and resolution might seem limited. However, such a 
conclusion would be a mistake. For in that work, Socrates essentially charges: if you cannot 
make (coherent) sense of the nature of piety then you are bound not to make appropriate sense 
of anything else, for you will be unable to recognise what is true. 
Throughout the dialogue, Socrates and Euthyphro wage a battle over the nature of 
piety. Clearly, Socrates wins. However, what that may mean for our understanding of piety 
may be less clear. For the dialogue appears to end somewhere close to where it begins. At its 
close, Socrates says: '[s]o we must investigate again from the beginning what piety is' (15c). 
Euthyphro entered into that foregoing discussion all too willing to expound his understanding; 
however, when Socrates invites him to revisit that ground he quickly excuses himself (15e). 
In that earlier discussion, Socrates embarrasses Euthyphro's understanding. However, 
it may appear that Socrates offers no alternative in its place. If this is how things appear, then 
we show ourselves beholden to something of Euthyphro's way of looking at things. That is to 
say, we implicitly suppose that Socrates will communicate his understanding in a certain way; 
we read Plato in the same way Euthyphro reads Homer. 
Such a misreading of the discussion leaves us with Euthyphro's dilemma: '[i]s the 
pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the 
gods?' (lOa). Resolving this requires us to transform our understanding of the way in which 
Socrates communicates. As Euthyphro prepares to leave (forgoing Socrates' invitation to 
continue their discussion), Socrates offers him a clue concerning the nature of that 
transformation. Socrates says: 
[w]hat a thing to do, my friend! By going you have cast me down from a great 
hope I had, that I would learn from you the nature of the pious and the impious 
and so escape Meletus' indictment by showing him that I had acquired wisdom in 
divine matters from Euthyphro, and my ignorance would no longer cause me to 
be careless and inventive about such things ... (15e-16a) 
Here, Socrates identifies both the ground of Euthyphro's muddle and what he must do in order 
to free himself from it. In the foregoing discussion, Euthyphro attempts to teach Socrates. 
Consequently, he goes astray even before he begins; for he assumes that he can directly transfer 
an understanding to Socrates. With that presumption, Euthyphro misconceives both what it is 
to understand and what it is to communicate. 
If an understanding is not the kind of thing that one person can give to another, then 
there is but one alternative: people must author or invent an understanding for themselves. 
Thus, according to Socrates, an understanding must come from within, rather than from 
without. That is to say, it must arise from its own motion rather than from an impinging motion 
from without. This distinction between Euthyphro's merely receptive understanding and 
Socrates' inventive understanding (an understanding that seeks to know itself) is the key to 
understand aright Socrates' positive view of piety. 
Throughout the dialogue, Socrates chases the contents of Euthyphro's receptive 
understanding through Euthyphro (as a reader of the epics), straight through the apparent 
authors of the epics, to the nature of the divine, where he is able finally to comer its flight. A 
dilemma results. Euthyphro can only genuinely escape that bind by changing the way he 
understands. That is to say, he can only escape by becoming more godlike himself. By the 
dialogue'S end, however, Euthyphro, wrongly but consistently conceives that the problem with 
which Socrates confronts him is external to him. So rather than pulling himself together (cf. 
12a) he merely seeks to escape the presence of Socrates. With that flight (and its associated 
externalisation of blame - see Protagoras chapter), Euthyphro (passively) maintains his 
distance from the nature of the divine. Here, Euthyphro presages the events of the Apology: 
there Socrates' accusers and the jury think they can escape a similar kind of bind by eliminating 
Socrates. 
1.2 FORM OF COMMUNICATION AND FORM OF UNDERSTANDING 
The dialogue opens as Euthyphro and Socrates run into each other as each heads to court. In 
some sense, both of their cases concern the nature of piety. In one, Meletus indicts Socrates on 
the charge of impiety; in the other, because he thinks it is the pious thing to do, Euthyphro 
prosecutes his father for murder. From this perspective however, even though both of their 
cases concern piety, Euthyphro's and Socrates' situations appearquite opposite. 
Nevertheless, Euthyphro sees a similarity. For even though no one actually prosecutes 
him, Euthyphro nevertheless considers himself persecuted. He confesses, '[ w ]henever I speak 
of divine matters in the assembly ... they laugh me down as if I were crazy' (3bc). 
Furthermore, regarding his initiative to prosecute his father, his relatives rebuke him and 
suggest that his actions are impious (4e). Euthyphro thinks that his fellow Athenians persecute 
him in this way for precisely the same reason Meletus indicts Socrates. For according to 
Euthyphro, people are, for the most part, not only ignorant of divine matters but also jealous of 
those who have superior wisdom (4e-5a). Socrates playfully runs with at least half of 
Euthyphro's analysis, and suggests that Euthyphro teach him about godliness and ungodliness. 
Euthyphro begins by telling Socrates that the best way to respond to the assaults of his 
advisories is to 'meet them head-on' (3c). He is thus a direct communicator; and with that 
method, he seeks to 'make ... others to be like himself' (3c). Direct communicators, such as 
Euthyphro, assume that their method transfers value. However, with such a passive take on 
what it is to communicate, to understand and to value Euthyphro cannot appreciate the 
essentially active nature of the divine. He thus unwittingly associates piety with ungodliness 
(i.e., passivity) rather than godliness (i.e., activity). Consequently, he fails to appreciate what 
Socrates communicates. 
1.3 EUTHYFHRO'S RECEPTIVITY AND THE CHASE OF AUTHORITY 
Euthyphro claims to know more about divine matters than the majority of people (4e-5a). 
However, it quickly becomes apparent that his wisdom is quite mundane. The ordinariness or 
godlessness of Euthyphro's supposed knowledge follows from the way he acquires it. When 
Socrates asks him to show his understanding (5d), Euthyphro begins to rehearse his memory of 
the poets. Socrates quickly stops him and states that he did not ask for a list, but for an 
understanding (6cd). Because Euthyphro uses his understanding in a merely receptive way, it 
contains only what is alien to it. Consequently, even though Euthyphro in some sense 
possesses many things, he does not rightly possess an understanding. He thus does not 
understand Socrates' demand. 
Because of the way in which Euthyphro uses his understanding, he does not claim to 
be the source of what he knows - he receives that supposed knowledge from the poets. 
However, in this respect, the poets are no different from him; for they, like Euthyphro, 
supposedly merely conveyor pass on what they receive. The epic poets write what is 
multitudinous (see 6c, 7b+), and for this reason nothing intrinsic to their production marks it as 
veridical. Thus, if the poets claim to speak the truth we must look beyond them to find the 
source of what they say. In order to secure their authority, what they say must originally 
emanate from a different type of source: a source that is intrinsically, rather than merely 
extrinsically, authoritative. The chain must therefore terminate in something godlike. 
However, causally anchoring the authority of the poets in the gods will do nothing to 
shore up Euthyphro's understanding. For even assuming that the gods could be direct 
communicators (which turns out to be a contradiction) they cannot after that method pass on an 
understanding. For no matter how accurately the poets relate what the gods say, that bare 
description, of itself, is of no use. Euthyphro thinks it is however; he wrongly assumes that it is 
a trivial matter to introduce an 'ought' into that account. 
Socrates points out that, according to the poets, there is 'war among the gods, and 
terrible enmity and battles' (6b, also see 7b+). Euthyphro agrees. This conflict therefore forces 
Euthyphro to introduce the 'ought' into a particular place in the account and he must decide 
where. He inserts the 'ought' before the description of what Zeus does. Zeus, Euthyphro 
rehearses, 'bound his father because he ... swallowed his sons, and ... he in tum castrated his 
father' (6a). 
However, it is not clear why Euthyphro places the injunction there rather than in front 
of the description of what Zeus' father does. Necessity must attach to the 'ought.' Euthyphro 
cannot accomplish this transformation merely by introducing an 'ought' before (or outside) a 
particular understanding (or, before what a particular actor does). He must rather go into that 
understanding to discover an 'ought' (or an inner necessity). That is to say, he will only find the 
'ought' in what constitutes an understanding. 
Socrates offers to look away from the many supposed disagreements amongst the gods 
(9c). And Euthyphro seizes upon that option: following Socrates' lead, he attaches the 'ought' 
to that on which all the gods concur (9d). However, this will not do either. With this move, 
Euthyphro is still no closer to gaining an understanding of piety. Just as he cannot rightly 
locate authority in what is multitudinous and at enmity, neither can he establish authority upon 
concurrence across what is multitudinous; for such concurrence is still extrinsic. That is to say, 
Euthyphro still deals with what lies essentially outside of, or between, understandings, not with 
what constitutes an understanding. There can be no necessity or completion in mere 
concurrence. 
Here we see the intimate connection between on the one hand the method by which 
Euthyphro comes to "know" (what he claims to know) and on the other hand the nature of what 
he claims to know. The method by which he comes to his supposed knowledge determines the 
character of what he claims to know. Thus, because he uses his understanding in a merely 
receptive way, he can never come to an understanding himself. What is multiple does not 
confront him merely because Homer refers to many gods rather than to a single god; he would 
face the very same problem if Homer only wrote about a single god who always acted 
consistently. It is not because of what Homer writes that Euthyphro cannot get beyond 
multiplicity and extrinsic authority. Rather, Euthyphro is in this state because of the way in 
which he reads Homer. 
Even if Homer had written of but a single god, and had quoted that single god 
concerning the nature of piety (i.e., telling us that the god says that x is what is pious), 
Euthyphro's receptive understanding still faces the same problem. For, Homer does not thereby 
directly transfer to him an understanding of what is pious, he merely transfers what promises to 
be regulative, rather than constitutive, of an understanding. Even if Homer records the god (in 
an even more ungodly way) engaging in reason giving, listing argument after argument, again 
Euthyphro faces the very same problem. For whatever Homer can directly convey is at most 
only regulative of a merely receptive understanding; it can never combine to be constitutive of 
an understanding (that is to say, such reason giving can never constitute unity). In other words, 
mere regulations cannot produce a practice (which completes a form). Thus, no matter what the 
content of Homer's production is, with it he cannot directly transfer an understanding. Neither 
can even a god transfer an understanding. 
Because Euthyphro only uses his understanding in a receptive way, everything he 
claims to know must be derivative. However, there can be nothing derivative about a god. 
Thus, Euthyphro's way of knowing is antithetical to the nature of the divine. Consequently, 
with his merely receptive use of his understanding, Euthyphro can never recognise an 
understanding. An understanding is something singular or unified (i.e., something that 
manifests necessity). 
However, if Euthyphro transforms his understanding from its merely receptive or 
containing use to an inventive activity, he will move from rehearsing something essentially 
alien to the activity of the understanding to manifesting a form inseparable from the activity of 
his understanding - thereby, he will show (rather than merely attempt to tell) an 
understanding. Euthyphro can thus only recognise the unity or necessity of an understanding on 
having his understanding instantiate that form (which constitutes the understanding). That is to 
say, to understand (or to recognise an understanding) Euthyphro must engage in an activity or 
invention rather than merely a receipt. Only at that point of activity (which reaches completion) 
does authority move from being extrinsic to being intrinsic. 
Socrates wants Euthyphro to show such an understanding; he asks him to show 
something singular not manifold (see 6d). What is singular differs from what is manifold as 
self-motion differs from motion from without. Thus, to show an understanding is to manifest 
self-motion; it is not to transfer a motion (via a telling).! 
1.4 SLAVES AND VALUE 
Because Euthyphro does not know what it is to have a practice, his understanding is merely 
receptive rather than inventive. Consequently, he does not know how to go into an 
understanding. That is to say, he does not know how to have an understanding. For this reason, 
his explanations remain extrinsic. Thus, even though he tries to imitate Zeus, he does not 
thereby draw any closer to the divine. He imitates the gods in a similar way to the way a 
painter imitates the work of a carpenter (Republic 10.597e). In the latter case, producing a 
picture of a bed does not make the painter any more like the carpenter who builds the bed. The 
painter according to Plato does not engage in a practice. Similarly, Euthyphro becomes no 
more divine with his imitation of the gods. If anything, Euthyphro further removes himself 
from the divine; for, both the form and the content of his actions are un-godlike - the gods do 
not imitate. 
It may appear that unlike Socrates, Euthyphro does not believe that piety involves 
becoming like a god. For he believes that the pious are to the gods what slaves are to their 
masters (see 13 d). Thus to be pious is precisely not to be like a god. However, this separation 
between masters and slaves involves no separation involving anything intrinsic to their natures. 
Rather, the difference is merely extrinsic: each merely plays a different role in relation to the 
other. The salient difference therefore is that masters possess objects of extrinsic value while 
slaves do not - or more specifically: masters are the possessors, slaves, the possessions. 
By dialogue'S end, Euthyphro has cast himself as a slave to the gods. His service is to 
give them 'honor, reverence and gratitude' (l5a). Thus, he supposes that the gods value what 
he most values, but what he fails to secure (cf 3bc). Because Euthyphro has a merely receptive 
take on value, it turns out that he can never be in genuine control of what he values. Plato 
shows this throughout the dialogue. Everything that Euthyphro values, is out of his control. 
First, he confesses that people pay him no respect. Then, he describes how his own slave, in a 
drunken rage, kills his father's slave. In tum, he tells how his murderous slave dies of neglect. 
Further, while Euthyphro boasts of his wisdom of divine matters, it is not long before he 
confesses that his propositions refuse to stay where he puts them (l1b) - they eliminate each 
other. In the first case, he blames others for not honouring him in the way that they should. In 
the second case, he blames his father for the neglect of his slave. In the third case, he blames 
Socrates for making his beliefs fly out of his control (l1c). Just as Euthyphro's propositions 
annihilate each other, so his take on value defeats itself. The only way that he can seize 
genuine control over what he values is for him to start valuing in a radically different way - it 
is for him to start blaming himself (see Protagoras chapter). 
1.5 EXTRINSIC VALUE AND DElCIDE 
Because Euthyphro uses his understanding in a merely receptive way, he automatically and 
unwittingly strips the intrinsic meaning away from what Socrates says. Thus, even though at 
times, he more or less repeats Socrates, in doing so he not only fails to preserve Socrates' 
meaning, he inverts it. With this imitation, or replication, he transforms what is intrinsic into 
what is extrinsic.2 Thus, when Socrates first suggests that 'what [the gods] love is pious' (9d) 
he expresses what is for him a truism. However, when Euthyphro repeats it (ge), he strips it of 
its necessity, leaving something incoherent. Socrates confronts his understanding with the 
dilemma: 
[i]s the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it 
is being loved by the gods? (lOa) 
Both horns promise to equally compromise Euthyphro's extrinsic take on value. The 
former keeps the nature of piety extrinsic but quickly leads to a reductio. Following this hom, 
Euthyphro supposes that with his servitude to the gods he can provide what they value. With 
his 'honor, reverence and gratitude' he supposes that he gives the gods what they want. He 
thereby deprives the gods of control over what they value. Consequently, the gods becomes 
slaves to their slave. Here Euthyphro fashions the gods in his own image: in prosecuting his 
father Euthyphro becomes his (dead and murderous) slave's servant (see 9a). When Socrates 
confronts Euthyphro with the ungodly dependence of the gods on their servants, Euthyphro 
quickly recants and admits that the gods cannot benefit from the pious (see lSb). With this 
move, he catches himself on the other horn of the dilemma. Because he can give no extrinsic 
content to what is pious he is left with an empty (i.e., contentless) concept. 
1.6 INVENTING THE DIVINE AND THE FORM OF PIETY 
That dilemma is only a dilemma for Euthyphro's receptive understanding; it is no dilemma at 
all for Socrates' inventive understanding. With Socrates' intrinsic understanding of what it is to 
be pious, what it is to love, and what it is to be divine, both horns of the supposed dilemma 
harmlessly echo, or reiterate, each other. They both express the same necessary truth. What 
Socrates is bound to deny is not one of the horns but merely what they contain for the receptive 
understanding: namely, that 'there is something loved and - a different thing -loving' (lOa). 
Piety for Socrates involves one becoming 'as much like a god as a human can' 
(Republic 1O.S13b). This definition is unhelpful to Euthyphro. For here Socrates offers no real 
content for him to receive. Euthyphro's receptive understanding can contain no real notion of 
the divine (he assumes the gods are like himself, merely receptive). Thus, Euthyphro just 
becomes bewildered when Socrates challenges him to locate the genuine source of his 
authority. He looks right past the divine when looking for that source. 
When Socrates turns Euthyphro's understanding back to the gods in order to find some 
content for piety, he essentially demands that Euthyphro discover what is intrinsic, not what is 
extrinsic. Socrates chases Euthyphro's conception of authority and value back to the gods. 
Here he summons Euthyphro's understanding to the task of recognising a unity. Thereby he 
challenges Euthyphro to discover that different sense of authority, which promises to make 
sense of his own claim of authority. Of course, no sense can be made of Euthyphro and 
Homer's reports concerning enmity between the gods. However, in following that fictitious 
chain of extrinsic authority back to its supposed source, Socrates invites Euthyphro to discover 
and manifest that antithetical conception of authority and value; thereby he invites him to 
discover the poverty or godlessness of his previous conception. 
Thus, in forcing that dilemma upon Euthyphro, Socrates summons him to go into the 
nature of the divine rather than pass over it. To achieve that end, Euthyphro can have no 
extrinsic markers to his success. Rather, he must force his own understanding to plot and 
decide its own success. Here the understanding comes to know itself. Thus, in its progress 
toward manifesting a singularity (of form), Euthyphro must forego his previous concept of truth 
as receipt and instead he must start in on an invention. With this responsibility, his 
understanding must keep itself in check. It must therefore invent a practice for itself; thereby 
his understanding becomes a product of its own activity and so it becomes godlike. With this 
practice, his understanding will come to know itself, and thereby, it will manifest a divine form. 
Thus, after pursuing the genuine authority of what his understanding formally 
contained, with genuine authority he will recognise that his former understanding possessed no 
authority whatsoever. Further, in his inventive search for a solution to escape that dilemma 
concerning the genuine source of authority for the receptive understanding, he will discover it is 
no dilemma at all. He will recognise that it was not what Socrates said that caused him the 
problem; rather it was how he received what Socrates said. (For Euthyphro reads Socrates in 
the same way he reads Homer.) 
With his peculiar form of communication, Socrates frustrates Euthyphro's mere receipt 
of content. For, the content is a contradiction to the receptive understanding. At the same time, 
Socrates leaves Euthyphro's receptive understanding to contest that content. With this, he 
invites Euthyphro to a practice, through which he will recognise the unity of what was formally 
incommensurable. The solution to the dilemma therefore is not to look to what the gods love to 
find out what is pious; rather, the solution is to become a god to recognise what it pious or 
godly. 
1.7 VALUERS AND VALUE 
Because Euthyphro separates off the object of value or knowledge from the act of valuing or 
knowing, he does not recognise what Socrates communicates. Objects of value or knowledge 
always impinge upon him from without. When Euthyphro takes the natures of value and 
agency in this way, he essentially consigns the nature of value to be always extrinsic to the 
nature of the valuer. Under this conception, the act of valuing is not itself a source of value. 
Euthyphro's muddle over the nature of value is grounded in his misunderstanding of the nature 
of the divine. This latter misunderstanding is precisely a misunderstanding of what it is to 
understand. For, according to Plato, to understand the divine aright is at once to manifest value, 
understanding, love and being. 
When Euthyphro looks to the gods he does not recognise intrinsic value. He goes 
straight through the gods as valuers to find an extrinsic object of value. Thereby, he separates 
off the object of the gods' love from their act of loving (ge). In making this disjunction, 
however, Euthyphro can ultimately make no sense at all of value. For at the end of any chain of 
extrinsic value there must be something of intrinsic value (cf. Ion 533d-535a). If the gods do 
not mark the end of such a chain in which they appear then nothing can act as a source of such 
value. Euthyphro's take on value thus leads to that dilemma (see lOa). 
Euthyphro's quite fundamental misunderstanding of the divine is thus a by-product of 
his own passive understanding. His understanding projects something old rather than gathers 
something new. Euthyphro does not recognise the gods as manifesting value because it is not 
possible to passively recognise intrinsic value. An understanding must itself become active to 
recognise, and, thereby, to manifest, intrinsic value. Because Euthyphro's understanding is 
merely receptive rather than inventive, he cannot recognise the gods as sources of value. 
Euthyphro can free himself from the dilemma only by ceasing to receive its meaning 
(from without) and instead by beginning to gather or invent an understanding. In other words, 
Euthyphro must deny that the gods value in the same way he values. To gather his 
understanding in this way Euthyphro would already himself be valuing in a different way; he 
would recognise or realise something actively rather than passively. With that activity, he 
would immediately collapse the divide between the valuer and the object of value. And, in 
doing so, Euthyphro himself would also manifest value.3 Thus, when Euthyphro comes to 
realise that the gods must value in a fundamentally opposite way to the way in which he values, 
he thereby in fact begins to value as the gods value. 
NOTES 
With each of his works, Plato completes a form and thereby shows something. However, he 
does not show all his narrators showing or manifesting an understanding. Apollodorus, for 
2 
example, does not engage in a practice as he recalls the events of the Symposium. 
Similarly, with his Parmenides Plato shows a practice for the understanding, however his 
narrator Cephalus, in merely recalling an account of those events, does not show his 
understanding; rather, Cephalus is comical or ridiculous. 
Compare how Cebes regurgites Socrates' argument from recollection and in doing so 
inverts its meaning (see Phaedo chapter). 
Socrates also invites Meno (who expresses the same failure of the understanding) to gather a 
new understanding of value. Socrates shows Meno how Meno's slave can manifest a type 
of possession antithetical to the type that Meno displays in owning that slave. He shows 
that Meno' s slave can possess something - an understanding - that Meno does not 
thereby possess (by his possession of the slave). Here, Socrates introduces Meno to a type 
of possession or value that is neither transitive nor directly transferable. This showing by 
the slave, thus, summons Meno to conflate, rather than separate, that activity that brings 
about or marks possession, and the object of value. Accordingly, Socrates invites Meno to 
associate value with an intrinsic form or activity rather than with extrinsic content. 
PROT AGORAS (NOTE) 
UNDERSTANDING UNDERSTANDING AND THE SEARCH FOR BEAUTY 
2.1 THE FORM OF REASON AND THE FORM OF POETRY 
Euthyphro shows a connection between the form of genuine communication and the form of 
being. Plato understands being itself in the same way as he understands the nature of the 
divine: they both essentially manifest (or are constituted by) self-motion (see Phaedrus 245c). 
Direct communication in contrast involves an opposite type of motion; for with direct 
communication, meaning impinges on the understanding from without. The form of direct 
communication thus frustrates the form that constitutes being. 
Socrates' interlocutors are almost invariably passive; 1 consequently, they are direct 
communicators. They not only deliver and receive arguments as direct communication. They 
also treat fables in the same way. As a result, for them, all communication is direct, all 
meaning and being is given; accordingly, all value, possession and authority are extrinsic. 
Initially the sophist Protagoras' approach looks like an exception to this rule; for he 
seems to differentiate between argument and poetry. In doing so, he seems to acknowledge two 
ways of communicating. Early on in the dialogue bearing his name, Protagoras suggests that in 
ancient times sophists disguised their teaching as poetry (316d). Protagoras considers that 
ancient approach misguided. He thinks that such masking prevents the majority of people 
receiving the sophists' teaching (317ab). He essentially concludes, if people are readily to 
understand teaching and communication, it must be pure in form and unadorned. 
According to this purity, Protagoras professes to teach only 'sound deliberation' 
(319a). Even so, he sees a close connection between sound deliberation (or, how he thinks we 
should reason) and how he thinks we should understand poetry. He claims: 
the greatest part of a man's education is to be in command of poetry, by which I 
mean the ability to understand the words of the poets ... and to know how to 
analyze a poem. (339a) 
In elevating the importance of our ability to understand poetry, Protagoras seems to put himself 
on side with Socrates. However, their understandings could not be more at odds. Plato quickly 
introduces us to this divide by showing Protagoras to apply to an ode what turns out to be his 
purely reductive (or analytic) operation of reason. 
With his method of analysis, Protagoras cannot recognise any meaning that does not 
merely rehearse or negate that with which he is already familiar. Thus, his method cannot 
reveal to his understanding any genuinely new meaning. For when Protagoras takes poetry as 
direct communication, when he reads a poem's meaning in a piecemeal way, he can recognise 
those pieces only as permutations of what he already knows. In other words, his understanding 
can recognise only what it already passively possesses. Here, recognition requires a match 
already lying in wait in memory. 
Applying this method, Protagoras accuses Simonides, the author of the ode, of 
inconsistency. For at one point Simonides asserts '[fjor a man to become good truly is hard', 
while further on in the ode Simonides denies the truth of Pittacus' claim, '[h]ard it is to be 
good' (339bc). In claiming that Simonides is inconsistant, Protagoras conflates and so destroys 
a crucial distinction between being and becoming to which Simonides means to draw our 
attention. In reading those two claims regarding being and becoming as inconsistent 
Protagoras, at least according to Socrates' lights, not only quite fundamentally misunderstands 
the ode but he also misunderstands the nature of, and the necessary connection between, being 
and value; with this Protagoras also misunderstands what it is to understand. 
Because of the way he reads Simonides, it is apparent that when Protagoras suggests 
that the ancient sophists disguised or masked their teachings as poetry, he does not thereby 
recognise their poems as indirect communication. Rather, he merely sees the form of those 
poems distracting most people from recognising what they directly communicate. Protagoras 
thus has no notion of indirect communication. 
In showing Protagoras how he reads over Simonides' distinction between being and 
becoming, Socrates also shows him a practice for his understanding.2 Once we recognise 
Socrates' practice, it is clear what Protagoras' understanding lacks. For because the content, 
rather than the form of Protagoras ' understanding determines his reading, his reading has no 
aim, and with no aim, it has no activity to complete, and thus no criteria for success (or failure). 
Accordingly, as soon as Protagoras passively recognises an inconsistency his understanding 
rests content as if it has thereby found what it ought to find. Protagoras' method is thus really 
no method at all. Rather than recognising what Plato counts as meaning or value, his method 
essentially annihilates that value. 
In contrast to Protagoras' way of reading, Socrates' method has a clear criterion for its 
success or failure. Before Socrates' understanding begins its work, he assumes that the other's 
communication is divine. Socrates thus searches solely for necessity; and he shows that the 
only way to discover (or recognise) necessity is through the understanding completing an 
activity. Thus, according to Socrates, it is the form of the understanding, rather than its 
received content, that determines meaning. Consequently, in order for the understanding to 
understand, it must be active rather than passive. 
According to this method, the form or 'the overall structure' of what Simonides 
communicates determines the meaning of what he says. The aim of this determination of 
meaning is for every element of that meaning to fit, or, in other words, for the meaning of every 
element to be determined such that it 'feels correct in its position' (344a-c). This feeling of 
fittedness is an aesthetic feeling of necessity. 
Socrates' search for meaning or necessity is thus his search for beauty. Because an 
object of beauty cannot be a mere aggregate, we cannot recognise beauty through any passive 
receipt of the understanding.3 Thus, objects of beauty necessarily employ an indirect mode of 
communication. With its search for beauty, an understanding must therefore actively gather, 
and so manifest, a beautiful form. Hence, an understanding can only recognise beauty, upon 
actively manifesting its form.4 There is thus doubleness to the understanding's endeavour. 
For Socrates, all meaning entails this unifying and so manifesting activity of the 
understanding. Thus, to seek an understanding is to seek unity. With that aim, the 
understanding is summoned to an activity through which it must transcend any express 
meaning, and through the completion of its activity, introduce or gather to itself new meaning 
(or new form). 
Thus, the only way for one to recognise that a work expresses or manifests necessity is 
to treat its communication as indirect, and, through the activity of the understanding, manifest 
the form of that necessity in one's own understanding. Socrates, thus, with his reading of 
Simonides, shows Protagoras a connection between practice, activity, or form, and meaning, or 
value. In doing so, he connects that activity that constitutes being with the activity that is 
involved in manifesting value or manifesting a beautiful form. 
2.2 BLAMING AND BECOMING 
As long as an understanding like Protagoras' remains passive, it will, when frustrated, project 
blame. For, even though, with such an understanding, the constitutive elements of meaning are 
always both given and historically familiar, those elements nonetheless always impinge upon 
the understanding from without rather than arising from within. Consequently, such an 
understanding, when it is unsatisfied, faults the other; for, in such cases, the other fails to 
impinge upon the understanding in what is believed to be a sufficient way. 
Under Socrates' method, where the understanding is active, the reverse form of blame 
is typical. For, when his understanding is frustrated, Socrates is obliged to blame himself. For, 
his frustration results from something his understanding fails to do or fails to secure. Thus, we 
repeatedly find Socrates blaming himself when he cannot make sense of what his interlocutors 
assert. With this self-rebuke, Socrates shows his interlocutors something that they must first 
put themselves through before they can give expression to something that Socrates can 
understand.5 
Even though blame is central to both the passive and active understandings, this does 
not mean both uses of the understanding are moral. For the blame that emanates from 
Protagoras lacks an agent. In contrast, the blaming of the active understanding is essentially 
moral, for its aim is agency (i.e., being). With that aim, it seeks to recognise the being of the 
other, and, in doing so, it identifies with the activity of that being.6 Simonides and Socrates do 
not take being as a given, for them 'to become good truly is hard'. For, they regard being as 
something that must be won through the unifying activity of the understanding. Until the 
understanding works that unity and so manifests value, it must continue to chastise itself. 
From this understanding of what it is to know, to value, and to be, we can gather how 
Socrates interprets the Delphic inscription: know thyself(see 343b; Phaedrus 230a). According 
to Socrates' showing, the call to self-knowledge, involves creating, through unifying practices, 
a self that can be both the subject and object of knowledge. According to this interpretation of 
the Delphic call to activity, beauty is all-important; for only beauty fails to defile being. Only 
beauty summons being. From this perspective, the Delphic inscription know thyself is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for fulfilling the demands of the other inscription nothing in 
excess (see 343b) - which is the negative condition for achieving the economy of beauty. 
NOTES 
4 
6 
In varying degrees, Plato shows Parmenides, Zeno, Meno's slave and Alcibiades to be 
exceptions to this rule (see Parmenides, Meno and Symposium). 
In Book I of the Republic, Socrates gives the same kind of instruction to Polemarchus in 
relation to his apparent misreading of Simonides (Republic 1.331d+). 
In his Republic discussion Socrates suggests that the eyes of a statue are not painted the 
most beautiful colour (purple) because what is at stake is the beauty of the entire statue and 
not merely of the eyes (Republic 4,420cd). Here, Socrates emphasises that beauty attaches 
to form and not merely to content. 
In Phaedrus, Socrates suggests that our fall from the presence of truth or beauty was our fall 
from being (Phaedrus 246c+). 
In Gorgias, Plato offers a variation on this pattern. First Polus (Gorgias 461bc) in relation 
to Gorgias and then Callicles in relation to Polus (Gorgias 482d-483a) blame Socrates for 
having his interlocutors contradict themselves. Callicles says 'if a person is too ashamed to 
say what he thinks, he's forced to contradict himself' (Gorgias 483a). Thus, both Polus and 
Callicles blame Socrates for manipulating his interlocuters to contradict themselves. 
According to the passive understanding, even their own conflicting expression merely 
points to something the other must change. 
When Socrates finishes explaining the ode to Protagoras, he says: '[a]nd that ... is what I 
think was going through Simonides' mind when he composed this ode' (347a). Thus, while 
Socrates aims at a unified understanding of a work he thereby not only aims to unify his 
own understanding, but he also seeks to engage with the unity (or being) of the other. He 
can only achieve this unity by thinking the very best of the other. 
APOLOGY 
BEAUTY AS THE LANGUAGE OF THE DIVINE AND IMPIETY AS DIRECT COMMUNICATION 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................................................. 14 
3.1 THE HARDEST SIN TO AVOID AND THE ONE UNFORGIVABLE SIN ................................................................ 14 
3.2 ARGUMENTS AND FABLES .......................................................................................................................................... 14 
3.3 JUDGING (FOR) ONESELF AND JUDGING (FOR) OTHERS ................................................................................... 14 
3.4 CONVICTIONS AND CONCURRENCE ........................................................................................................................ 15 
3.5 SHOW AND TELL ............................................................................................................................................................ 16 
3.6 TEACHING AND SUMMONING .................................................................................................................................... 17 
3.7 CONFESSING IMPIETY AND MANIFESTING PIETY ............................................................................................... 18 
3.8 MANIFESTING IMPIETY AND DIRECTLY COMMUNICATING ............................................................................ 19 
NOTES ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 20 
ABSTRACT 
Plato's Apology concerns itself with the nature of piety. However, nowhere in its 
pages does it tell us what piety is. Instead, it shows us - and this is significant. 
For, if it were to tell us, it would thereby cease to show us. For, according to 
Plato, if philosophers are to avoid impiety, they must be artists and so, must 
produce only (the economy of) beauty (and never the gratuity of commentary). In 
order to communicate this notion of divine communication as the manifestation 
of beauty, Plato shows us the self-mover, Socrates. 
3.1 THE HARDEST SIN TO A VOID AND THE ONE UNFORGIVABLE SIN 
For Nietzsche, the one unforgivable sin is committed when writers leave off showing for the 
sake of telling. If we read Plato in the expectation that he does not commit this sin - that is to 
say, if we read Plato in the expectation that he is an indirect rather than a direct communicator 
- it turns out that his quite determinate and indirectly related notion of impiety matches 
Nietzsche's notion. We can most clearly see this in the Apology, where, through a showing 
rather than a direct telling, Socrates, and indirectly Plato, defends himself against the charge of 
impiety. By dialogue's end, Plato firmly establishes himself, and his Socrates, as divine 
communicators. 
However, according to Plato's divine standard, almost everyone commits the 
metaphysical sin: not only are Socrates' accusers impious, but so are most of his friends. It 
turns out that impiety is the hardest sin to avoid; for, we can avoid it, only by becoming gods 
ourselves. Only in a godlike state do we cease to brutalise what it is to be (a god). For Plato, a 
negative criterion for becoming a god involves our expression never extending beyond our 
practices (cf. 22d). From Plato's own practices, we can gather that a god is like a great and 
supremely confident artist: that is to say, someone who manifests beauty and refuses to talk 
about it (cf. e.g. Phaedo 1 OOde). 
3.2 ARGUMENTS AND FABLES 
Plato is an artist-philosopher. That is to say, he primarily communicates his philosophy through 
a showing rather than a direct telling. According to this method - by which he seeks to 
conflate two apparently quite opposite modes of communication - Plato presents the fable of 
Socrates as the best of arguments. In making this implicit association - between the form of a 
life and the form of an argument - Plato invites us to rethink radically our understanding of 
what makes good arguments good; thereby, he also invites us to alter radically how we read his 
works. 
Plato essentially invites us to read his arguments as if they are good fables. This does 
not mean that we should expect their meaning to be any less determinate or specific. Rather, it 
means that as readers we must do something quite specific if we are rightly to gather their 
meaning. For, rather than directly telling us something, or judging something for us, good 
arguments, like good fables, and like good people, show us something; and with their showing, 
they can elevate and thereby transform our understanding. For in order to appreciate a showing 
as a showing we must gather its form. With that activity, we aim to complete something; if 
successful, we will manifest the nature or form of what we appreciate. In this way, with his 
showing, Plato invites us, through our own practices, into a position from which we can 
recognise (or 'recollect') and so manifest what he indirectly communicates. 
Plato's method of communication is not incidental to his philosophy. In fact, it is a 
manifestation and expression of his philosophy. For this reason we can understand Plato's 
thinking precisely through coming to understand why he communicates in the way he does. In 
the Apology, this thoroughgoing connection between his way of communicating and his 
philosophy is most clearly evident. 
3.3 JUDGING (FOR) ONESELF AND JUDGING (FOR) OTHERS 
Socrates' manner in the Apology differs markedly from his manner in other dialogues. For, the 
Apology marks the first and last time we hear Socrates address a crowd. In that address in 
which he defends himself against charges of impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, he 
shows an unerring confidence; he boldly asserts: I have wronged no one (cf. 37ab). In addition, 
he warns the jury: you will be guilty of 'mistreating the god's gift to you by condemning me' 
(30e). In the Apology Socrates quickly replaces his typical hyperbolic self-effacing manner 
with what appears to be an inflated estimation of himself. 
Socrates goes on to attack both his accusers and the jury. First, he explicitly claims to 
be a better person than his accusers: he warns them that they can do him no harm; 'for', he says, 
'I do not think it is permitted for a better man to be harmed by a worse' (30cd; also cf. esp. 26e-
27a, also cf. 18a, 24c, 25c, 34b). In a similarly acerbic, disparaging and lofty manner, Socrates 
attacks those serving on the jury: first, he rehearses an occasion in which at least some jurors 
egged on illegal action (32b); further, he suggests that any man who considers that 'acting as a 
good man ... [is] the most important thing', will not survive long in public life (32e). He 
continues to lay it on by accusing some jury members of committing 'pitiful dramatics' and 
behaving like cowards thereby bringing 'shame' on the city and making it a 'laughingstock' 
(34c-35b). 
After the jury finds Socrates guilty, and after one of his accusers, Meletus, asks for the 
death penalty, Socrates responds with his own counter-assessment: he instructs the jurors that 
they should reward him rather than punish him (36e-37a). When the jurors finally sentence him 
to death, Socrates passes his own damning judgement upon them. He addresses the jurors: 'I say 
gentlemen, to those who voted to kill me, that vengeance will come upon you immediately after 
my death ... ' (39c). 
Because of his unflinching criticism and condemnation of his accusers and the jury, the 
Socrates of the Apology does not seem to square with the humble and charitable (though 
undoubtedly ironic) Socrates of the other dialogues. In those other dialogues, in which Socrates 
prominently figures, Plato presents Socrates as an inversion of the character of his interlocutors. 
Thus, in many places, Socrates repeatedly professes complete ignorance when his interlocutors 
boast full and sure knowledge;! further, Socrates shows an exaggerated charity towards his 
conceited and muddled interlocutors. Socrates' interlocutors, on the other hand, are quick to 
attack and blame him when they show themselves unable to deliver on their boastings. 
Most of Plato's other dialogues (in which Socrates prominently figures) also 
essentially depict trials. However, in those works Socrates' interlocutors are on trial. Socrates, 
as self-appointed prosecutor, ironically takes on the part of pupil; his interlocutors play their 
self-professed roles of teachers or direct communicators. In their conceit, his interlocutors 
consistently suppose that they know far more than they do know. Socrates in a sense gives 
them the benefit of the doubt. Even when things invariably go badly for them, Socrates' 
confidence in them does not wane. In the ensuing confusion, rather than blaming them for 
talking nonsense, either Socrates blames himself for not following their explanations or he 
suggests that they are playing with him. His self-deprecating manner coupled with his 
recalcitrance as a passive receiver, are key elements to Socrates' form of indirect 
communication. For, rather than judging something for them, Socrates intends his interlocutors 
to judge (for) themselves. 
3.4 CONVICTIONS AND CONCURRENCE 
Something of this familiar form, Socrates imposes upon his own trial. For, even though 
Socrates is supposed to be the one on trial, he nevertheless makes it clear that the jury is on 
trial. Even though he is charged with impiety, he warns the jurors that they will be guilty of 
impiety if they convict him. After the jurors convict and sentence him, Socrates expressly 
indicts them. 
Unlike the play of those other dialogues however, in the Apology Socrates forces a trial 
on those who have no possibility of winning; for, the jury, being an aggregate, cannot genuinely 
act as a judge - it cannot act as its own judge and so the jury cannot judge another. 
Consequently, Socrates cannot genuinely communicate with it. He transforms his previously 
meek voice into one that is directly authoritative; and with it, he metes out to the jury what it 
cannot mete out to itself. Socrates (as someone who is able to judge) rightly portrays himself as 
superior to the jury. 
Rather than communicating with the jury, Socrates- expressly judges it. His direct 
judgement does not count as communication, for, according to Socrates, genuine 
communication requires all parties to that communication to participate in a practice that they 
can complete. Genuine communication must therefore summon. However, the problem with 
the crowd is that it forms an aggregate that can never be a whole (qua unity); and so, as one, it 
can never participate in a practice. For this reason, a crowd cannot express or manifest value. 
Consequently, a crowd cannot manifest love or 'backlove' (see Phaedrus 255d) - the 
possibility of which is a necessary condition for genuine communication. 
The jurors thus convict Socrates without themselves having reached a conviction - a 
slight weight of numbers decides the matter (36a). However, regardless of how many votes 
weigh in on a single side, there is no sense in which a jury can reach a genuine conviction? For, 
there can be no genuine unity in its vote. At most, its votes can express a concurrence. Such a 
concurrence is extrinsic rather than intrinsic and so it can never express a unity, with it, there is 
no sense in which anything is completed. The jury's vote cannot therefore express a value. 
Genuine unity - which beauty, understanding, love, backlove and value manifest - involves a 
form completed. In his trial, Socrates thus faces a conception of value he confronts in his 
earlier,..meeting with Euthyphro.3 Socrates lets the jurors know that they are powerless to decide 
what is pious and that they threaten to harm only themselves with their decision (30c-e). 
Thus, because Socrates does not think it is possible to communicate with a crowd, his 
manner in the Apology is hostile and condescending. In his speech, Socrates thus frustrates 
even the appearance of communication. 
3.5 SHOW AND TELL 
Even though Socrates does not think it is possible to communicate with the crowd, he 
nevertheless, it seems, sees himself having a duty to teach them (see 35c). However, there can 
be no teaching without communication. Furthermore, his duty to teach the jury seems to be in 
tension with what he asserts in his own defence. In fact, what Socrates claims in his own 
defence seems to deny his own history; for he denies ever having taught anyone anything. In 
addition, he goes so far as to label those who claim otherwise liars (33b). 
Socrates is clearly a teacher in more than the negative sense in which he portrays 
himself in his Apology defence - where, at most, he claims merely to disabuse people of their 
conceit (see 21b+). We cannot escape this positive aspect of Plato's Socrates; for Plato casts 
him in that positive role throughout the dialogues. The positive aspect of Socrates' teaching 
does not take the form of him directly transferring (or telling) something to his interlocutors 
(that is, it does not take the form of his jUdging something for them); but rather it involves 
Socrates showing his interlocutors something.4 Socrates thereby offers something for his 
interlocutors to gather. In this way Socrates invites others to participate in a practice whereby 
they (rather than Socrates) are able to tell themselves something. 
Given that Socrates is a teacher, how are we to understand his claim that he never 
taught anyone anything? We cannot resolve this question by simply admitting him as teacher 
and then, in tum, denying that he succeeded in that mission. For according to Plato's myth 
(within which Plato reflexively enfolds himself - as its author), Plato is Socrates' star pupil. 
Thus, we cannot deny that Plato intends us to believe that Socrates was a teacher who enjoyed a 
measure of success. There thus seems to be a genuine conflict between what Socrates does and 
what he denies he does. 
Such tensions are a mark of Socrates' indirect form of communication and are an 
essential element of his method of teaching. Thus, in asserting that he has never taught anyone 
anything, Socrates teaches; for he frustrates our passive receipt of that judgement. In this way, 
rather than judging something for us he invites or summons our understanding to resolve the 
apparent conflict and thereby judge something, or gather meaning, for ourselves.5 
Resolving the tension between Socrates' activity of teaching in his very denial of 
teaching is thus straightforward: Socrates merely denies teaching after the passive manner of 
which he is accused. (We can make no sense of Meletus' indictment if we read it as accusing 
Socrates of corrupting the youth of Athens by the teaching method Socrates actually employs.) 
Socrates thus eschews directly communicating judgements to people in that manner in which 
Meletus seeks directly to transfer his judgement (concerning Socrates) to the jury. 
3.6 TEACHING AND SUMMONING 
For Socrates, teaching requires indirect communication. Because of the gathering, and the 
subsequent manifestation of value or form, invited by indirect communication, it is not possible 
to teach a crowd - for, only wholes (insofar as they are unities), not aggregates, can manifest 
value. 
Nevertheless, after rebuking the jurors Socrates concludes his defence by pointing out 
his duty to teach them (35c). How are we to understand this claim? If Socrates means here what 
Meletus means by 'teaching', then Socrates seems to comer himself. For according to Socrates 
Meletus' way of teaching is counterfeit. And for this reason, it is inconceivable that Socrates 
thinks himself duty-bound to do what Meletus does. Moreover, if we are to understand 
Socrates' claimed duty in this way, Socrates seems to belie a claim implicit in his own defence 
- namely, his denial that he teaches after that manner. 
On the other hand, Socrates also comers himself but in a different way if he means 
here by 'teaching' what he regards as genuine teaching. For, in that case, he sees himself 
having a duty to do what he regards as impossible. For, he does not think it is possible to 
communicate with the jury. 
Socrates' criticism of the jurors, followed by his claim to teach them, is a summoning 
response to a sophistical manoeuvre expressed within Meletus' speech to the jury: Meletus 
warns the jury to 'be careful not to be deceived by an accomplished speaker like' Socrates 
(l7ab). Here Meletus rehearses an old accusation against Socrates: namely, that he makes 'the 
worse into the stronger argument' (l9b). In so doing, Meletus seeks to determine the jury's 
judgement. For, in making that charge against Socrates, Meletus essentially warns the jury: if 
you are persuaded by Socrates' defence, you have been deceived. Thus, regardless of whether 
or not Socrates persuasively defends himself, the jury must find him guilty. 
Socrates in his defence denies teaching (or directly transferring judgements to) people 
after the manner of which Meletus accuses him. However, on the heels of that denial Socrates 
harshly judges the jury and goes on to describe that very activity as teaching. Thus, Socrates 
appears to communicate directly a judgement not only to the jury but also for the jury. In doing 
so, Socrates falls in with the manner of communication and teaching of which Meletus accuses 
him (and so he falls in with that manner of teaching in which he denies participating). 
However, because Meletus calls no witnesses to support his claim that Socrates teaches 
(cf. 33d+), the jurors are cornered. And they are cornered precisely by Socrates' own claim to 
teach them. If they are to convict him, they must (if they are doing their duty - see 35c) base 
that conviction on evidence that Socrates teaches. And the jurors seem to have no direct 
evidence of this apart from what Socrates claims to do to them. However, if the jurors 
recognise that Socrates has taught - that is, if they accept his harsh judgement of them and his 
(bullying) warning to them that they will be guilty of impiety in convicting him - then the 
content of those judgements from Socrates, prevent the jury from convicting him. In other 
words, his jUdging for them, determines them to free him. However, because of the nature of 
Socrates' determination of them, he becomes guilty of that with which Meletus charges him; 
and for that reason he invites his own conviction. However, if the jurors convict him on that 
score, they at once lose the warrant for that verdict. For, in making that conviction, they 
practically deny Socrates has determined them; consequently, they do not recognise him as a 
teacher. 
Socrates, thus, catches the jurors between the form and the content of his (direct) 
teaching and thereby he introduces them to his own conception of communication. Given the 
content of Socrates' express claim to teach, he forces the members of the jury to judge 
something for themselves. Thus, while Meletus' sophism aims to pacify the jurors, Socrates' 
response aims to summon them to an activity. 
3.7 CONFESSING IMPIETY AND MANIFESTING PIETY 
The jurors therefore cannot passively receive Socrates' defence against Meletus' charge of 
teaching. Rather, with his admission that he is a teacher Socrates summons each member of the 
jury to an activity through which each will recognise his innocence. In addition, that activity 
will transform each member of the jury's understanding of what it is genuinely to teach. 
Socrates, through a showing rather than a telling, invites each member of the jury to a new 
understanding. Each juror will recognise that new meaning only upon his understanding 
(actively) manifesting its work. Socrates plays the same game in his defence against the charge 
of impiety. In this case, he summons each member of the jury to a new understanding of 'piety' 
and 'the divine'. 
Defending himself against the charge of impiety, Socrates once again appears to 
produce for the jury the evidence that Meletus' indictment lacks. Socrates' story begins with 
his friend Chaerephon asking the oracle at Delphi: is there anyone wiser than Socrates? '[T]he 
Pythian replied that no one [is] wiser' (21a). Socrates goes on to describe how he attempted to 
'refute the oracle' (2Ic). He therefore appears to confess to the charge of impiety; for in 
questioning the oracle's judgement Socrates questions the divine. 
However, there is a catch which prevents the jury from passively receiving Socrates' 
testimony as evidence on which to convict him of impiety. For if the jurors accept that Socrates 
questioned the judgement of the oracle, they must also accept as divine that which Socrates 
questioned. Thus, in accepting Socrates' testimony as self-incriminating, the members of the 
jury can only avoid impiety themselves by not doing what Socrates reports he did. The jurors 
must therefore accept without question the oracle's judgement: that no man is wiser than 
Socrates. However, with that concession, Socrates escapes the court's jurisdiction; for in 
acknowledging Socrates' superior wisdom, each member of the jury removes his authority to sit 
in judgement over him. For this reason, if, on Socrates' testimony, the jurors convict him, they 
indirectly indict themselves. 
This indirect aspect of Socrates' communication might appear purely negative. For 
Socrates appears to give the jurors something, but no sooner than they receive it, it disappears. 
For in the extension of their receipt Socrates indirectly forces the members of the jury to resolve 
or gather something, which in tum removes (or more correctly transforms) the content of what 
they previously received. If the jurors attempt to hold on to what they initially ( directly) 
received and if they in tum use it against Socrates, they thereby become guilty of that of which 
they convict him. Socrates rightly warns the jurors that they will be guilty of impiety if they 
convict him. 
However, this is not the end of Socrates' play. Socrates secretes something positive 
within the resolution invited by this indirect communication. He describes how he treated the 
oracle's judgement as a riddle. Because of this, Socrates' story is itself a riddle: the oracle 
judges Socrates as the wisest human being. Consequently, Socrates must also be the most 
pious. However, Socrates questions that divine judgement. Thus, the jurors cannot regard him 
as pious. For, his questioning seems to falsify the very judgement that he questions. Hence, it 
seems each juror can unquestioningly accept the oracles' judgement only if he denies that 
Socrates questioned it. However, in questioning it Socrates claims to be obeying rather than 
disobeying the oracle (23a; 29d). He boldly asserts: '[b]e sure that this is what the god orders 
me to do' (30a). 
Each juror can only make sense of Socrates' story by somehow transcending or 
resolving this apparent contradiction; and each juror can transcend the contradiction only by 
transforming something about his own understanding of 'piety' and 'the divine'. Socrates' key 
to accomplishing this task targets each juror's conception of how the divine communicates. 
For, Socrates describes how he treated the apparently clear judgement from the oracle as a 
riddle (2Ib); that is to say, Socrates does not regard the god as a direct communicator. (Or, in 
other words, Socrates thinks that meaning is something that must be gathered rather than 
directly received. In his questioning, Socrates thus shows something of the nature of wisdom: 
wisdom is active rather than passive.) Indeed, without each juror assuming that the divine 
communicates directly there is no ground in the story Socrates tells for supposing that Socrates 
is impious. However, what is important for each juror is not merely to identify Socrates' 
assumption about divine communication, but to recognise its necessity; that recognition will 
involve each juror gathering something about the (necessary) nature of the divine. 
One of Socrates' main targets throughout the dialogues is the sophists - or the self-
professed teachers of virtue. The foundation for the sophists' impiety or ungodliness is 
precisely the way they communicate. Sophists not only claim to know what virtue is but they 
also claim to be able to teach their knowledge directly to others; and through receiving that 
teaching, they claim, their pupils become better (cf. e.g. Protagoras 318a). However, this is a 
passive (and so incoherent) conception of betterment. 
This passivity is the result of the gratuity of the sophists' mode of direct 
communication. If the sophists were genuinely virtuous, then their knowledge would be 
sufficiently expressed in, and so communicated through, their practices. The gratuity of an 
additional telling would undermine that possible showing; for, virtuous people express necessity 
in the economical form of activity that constitutes their being. For this reason we cannot 
understand the divine to be a direct communicator; for direct communication is antithetical to 
(and so destructive of) the economy of divine expression. 
(Or, to put it another way: if Socrates received the judgement of the oracle as direct 
communication, he would thereby behave impiously. For, piety, according to Socrates, 
involves becoming as much like a god as is humanly possible (cf. Republic 5l3b). And, there is 
nothing divine about passive receipt - the divine does not directly receive anything from 
without. For, the divine is a source of motion rather than a recipient of motion (cf. Phaedrus 
245c+).) 
Within his Apology speech of defence, Socrates shows (rather than tells) the jury the 
type of activity to which he summons each juror. Consequently (because Socrates shows rather 
than merely tells), in order for the jurors each to recognise that activity as a gathering each must 
participate in the same kind of activity himself. Genuinely to recognise or to recollect - which 
is necessary in order truly to understand - involves manifesting something of the nature of that 
which is recognised. 
Within his defence speech, Socrates relates to the jury a story centring on his own 
activity of gathering. Socrates' story ends with him claiming to be under the direct orders from 
the god (30a). From the context of that claim, it is clear that that supposed order from the 
divine Socrates does not directly receive, but he rather gathers, completes and so delivers to 
himself. Socrates thus transforms that apparently clear but external judgement from the oracle 
- a jUdgement from without - into a divine command, which he issues to himself. Socrates 
thereby recognises something divine. In the case of his divine sign, Socrates must convert the 
negativity of its stipulations (the voice never tells Socrates what to do, only what not to do -
see 31 d) into something positive and so self-sanctioned.6 Thus, through his activity, Socrates 
comes to command himself; and thereby he comes to manifest something divine. Thus, because 
Socrates recognises the command as divine on completing (the form of) that very command, he 
shows himself to be divine. With this Socrates shows (rather than tells) the jury what activity it 
is that truly defines piety. 
Thus, Socrates shows what he had to do in order to understand or recognise the divine 
voice as divine. In transforming that judgement from the divine, Socrates shows the jury the 
nature of the divine; for he manifests the divine in his own nature. With this showing, Socrates 
shows each juror what he must do in order to understand or recognise Socrates' own divine 
voice. For just as the oracle's communication summoned Socrates, so too Socrates summons 
each juror. However, it is up to each juror to recognise the divine nature of Socrates; for in 
order to recognise the nature of the divine each juror must manifest (as backlove) something of 
the form of that nature himself. 
3.8 MANIFESTING IMPIETY AND DIRECTLY COMMUNICATING 
Apart from the jury, Meletus is of course the impious one of the dialogue. But his impiety does 
not arise merely from his indictment against Socrates. For ironically Meletus' charge of 
impiety against Socrates is justified if Socrates is a direct communicator. But Socrates is not a 
direct communicator. Thus, Meletus' impiety is grounded in him not appreciating Socrates' 
mode of communication; and that lack of appreciation (that is to say, his assumption that 
Socrates is a direct communicator) surely arises from Meletus' own direct or passive mode of 
communication. Thus, Meletus is impious precisely because he is a direct communicator. 
Without Meletus tying the content of what he says to a showing (or, in other words, 
without his communication resulting from a practice), he ends up asserting things that he cannot 
show. Consequently, Meletus removes himself furthest from the divine. (Socrates in contrast, 
shows or manifests something he cannot directly tell - thus, with this activity, Socrates is far 
closer to pure being.) 
Because direct communication is impious, it turns out that there is little difference in 
Plato's fable between Socrates' apparent friends and his foes. For Socrates' friends are just as 
much direct communicators as are Meletus and Euthyphro. In Crito and Phaedo, as Socrates 
awaits death, his friends continue to treat him as a direct communicator. In the Phaedo, 
Simmias and Cebes readily find fault with almost everything Socrates argues. They thereby, 
indirectly though quite unquestionably find fault with Socrates. (Here, Socrates' own friends 
indict him.) Socrates cannot counter this impiety with impiety - he cannot directly tell his 
friends where they go wrong lest he become guilty oftheir indictment. 
Socrates calls a halt to their ad hominem attack by warning: misology and misanthropy 
have a common passive cause (Phaedo 89d+). Simmias and Cebes continually find fault with 
Socrates not because of what Socrates says but because of the way they receive what he says. 
They find fault because they assume Socrates is a direct communicator; and that assumption 
entails cynicism or misanthropy - or, more precisely, it entails the implicit belief that Socrates 
is impious. Directly receiving communication is necessarily insufficient to the end of securing 
conviction because there can be nothing genuinely completed with motion from without. 
In connecting misology and misanthropy, Socrates summons his friends to an activity 
that will counter their impiety (or passivity): he summons them to gather the connection 
between the form of good people and good arguments. Thereby he invites his friends to stop 
directly receiving and instead to gather the meaning of his arguments. That is, he indirectly 
invites them to read his arguments as if they were fables. (Or, in other words, Socrates 
indirectly invites his interlocutors to recognise as stronger what they previously received as 
weaker arguments.) Thus, from the perspective of the active understanding, that of which 
Meletus accuses Socrates is correct: Socrates does invent the divine and he does make the 
weaker into the stronger argument. However, from the same (active) perspective, these claims 
cease to be grounds for his conviction; rather they establish his innocence. 
Throughout this play of the dialogues, Plato indirectly warns us - or, more correctly, 
he has us warn ourselves - that we will become his foes and will be guilty of impiety if we 
read him as a direct communicator. But, in order to recognise that warning we must have 
already recognised Plato as a divine communicator. 
NOTES 
2 
4 
We do not hear Socrates' claims of ignorance after the early and early-middle dialogues. 
However, this is not to say his method changes from indirect to a more direct form of 
communication - see fn. 4 below. 
Cf. Gorgias 473e-474b. 
Euthyphro believes that what is pious is decided merely by a concurrence between the gods 
(see Euthyphro ge). He thus has an extrinsic (and so ungodly and incoherent) conception of 
authority, love and value (see Euthyphro chapter). 
It may appear that Socrates descends from a showing in the early dialogues to a more direct 
telling in the middle dialogues. For example, in Phaedo and the final eight books of the 
Republic Socrates seems to directly tell his interlocutors various things. However, he 
introduces content to his apparently direct discourse that frustrates his interlocutors directly 
or passively receiving it. Compare, for example, Socrates' argument from recollection (see 
Phaedo chapter). 
For a discussion on the nature of summoners, see the Republic chapter. 
Also, compare Socrates' account of how he went about reinterpreting the meaning of his 
frequently recurring dream (Phaedo 60d+). 
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ABSTRACT 
Plato communicates through dialogues. He thus communicates by showing 
people communicating. This is not quite right however. For, it turns out that 
while Plato's works are full of dialogue he shows little successful 
communication. He thus communicates by showing repeated failures of 
communication. Plato's work thus manifests a conflict. This conflict is not 
accidental to his method. Rather, it, along with conflicts like it, forms the basis of 
Plato's peculiar mode of communication. With these conflicts, Plato gives his 
cave-dweller audience an appearance with which they cannot rest; he gives them 
something to transcend. 
4.1 CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATION 
The Republic opens with Socrates describing what befalls him on the road to Athens: after 
spending the day in Piraeus, Socrates heads towards home. Polemarchus, seeing him in the 
distance, sends his off his slave in hot pursuit. The slave, catching up, grabs hold of Socrates' 
cloak, and asks him to wait. In due course, Polemarchus arrives and charges: 'you must either 
prove stronger than we are, or you will have to stay here.' Socrates points out that he could 
persuade Polemarchus to let him go. Polemarchus continues: '[b Jut could you persuade us if 
we don't listen? .... we won't listen; you'd better make up your mind to that' (1.327c). 
Even though Polemarchus jests, he unwittingly identifies a genuine problem. Because 
people exhibit their way of valuing in the way they communicate, two people with radically 
different ways of valuing 'won't listen' to, or, more correctly, each will not be able to hear, 
what the other says. For this reason, it turns out Polemarchus really is deaf to the way Socrates 
communicates. For he, along with the long list of other interlocutors with whom Plato 
populates the dialogues, value, and so communicate, in a way that is radically different from the 
way in which Socrates values and communicates. Socrates' interlocutors essentially speak a 
language different from the one that Socrates speaks. Even though Socrates is aware of this 
divide, his interlocutors are not. l Accordingly, they implicitly assume he speaks their language; 
and on that assumption, they invariably misunderstand him. 
4.2 COMMUNICATION AND TRANSFER 
In the very fact that he possesses a slave, Polemarchus exhibits his way of valuing? he 
conceives of value as extrinsic. From this follows his direct mode of communication. For him 
communication like value concerns only what can be directly transferred and directly received. 
Thus, with his playful confrontational manner, Polemarchus unwittingly displays the real 
essence (i.e., an impinging motion from without) of his mode of communication. 
Polemarchus invites Socrates back to his father Cephalus' house, where the aging 
Cephalus enthusiastically greets him and confesses: 'as the physical pleasures wither away, my 
desire for conversation and its pleasures grows' (1.328d; see also 1.329cd). He goes on to 
celebrate his geriatric flight from the 'savage and tyrannical master' of his appetites (1.329c). 
However, no sooner than he strikes up this conversation, and just as Socrates presses him to 
explain his new understanding of value, Cephalus abandons their concourse to attend to more 
pressing matters. 
Cephalus disappears to tend his sacrifices to the gods (1.331d). However, with his exit 
he does not so easily escape Socrates' enquiry. For with his departure he shows how he values, 
and thereby, how he communicates. Like his son, Polemarchus, he has a conception of value 
and communication that merely involves transfer. Moreover, he assumes that the gods value 
and communicate in precisely the same way. Thus, while his appetite for 'sex, drinking parties, 
[and] feasts' has waned, his way of valuing and communicating essentially remains the same. 
Only the content, not the form, of his way of valuing has changed. For this reason, Socrates 
fails genuinely to communicate with him. 
This pattern of mock communication recurs throughout the remainder of the dialogue. 
Because communication for Socrates' interlocutors involves a direct transfer, the content of 
their communication is essentially external to them. When they speak they merely regurgitate 
or recite rather than show an understanding. They possess ideas or beliefs as they possess 
slaves and money. 
The way in which they possess their beliefs allows them to effortlessly abandon, or 
pass on their place in, their conversations; they thus do not genuinely participate in the 
conversation. Cephalus deserts the conversation to Polemarchus (1.331d). Thrasymachus 
wrests it from Polemarchus (1.336b). In tum, when Thrasymachus makes his escape, Glaucon 
is first to renew his argument (2.357a+) and then his brother Adeimantus takes it up (2.362d+). 
Plato shows this same kind of easy transfer in other dialogues: in Gorgias, for 
example, Polus takes over the argument from Gorgias; Callicles, in tum, takes it over from 
Polus (Gorgias 461c+, 482d+). In Euthydemus, the tag-team sophist brothers fall over each 
other as they try to pass the arguments back and forth. Philebus begins with Protarchus taking 
over from Philebus (Philebus 11 a+). Protagoras, in the' dialogue of the same name, attempts to 
escape Socrates' scrutiny by first taking on the voice of others and then by trying to leave the 
discussion altogether (Protagoras 333c, 333e, 338e, 347c-348a). 
As they effortlessly pass in and out of conversation, Socrates' interlocutors show their 
passive possession of ideas. Cephalus, for example, regurgitates Sophocles (1.329c), 
Themistocles (1.32ge) and Pindar (1.331 a), Polemarchus regurgitates Simonides (1.331 d). 
Glaucon, professing unbelief (2.358c), regurgitates a defence for Thrasymachus. Adeimantus, 
to the same end, regurgitates Homer, Hesiod (2.363+), Musaeus (2.363c) and Simonides 
(2.365bc). Thrasymachus appears to be the one exception. However, in an important respect 
he treats communication in the same way. For he hurls a speech at them; Socrates compares 
him with a bath attendant who empties a 'great flood of words into [their] ears' (1.344d, also cf. 
1.345b).3 
Elsewhere, Socrates' interlocutors communicate in the same way. They merely 
regurgitate or pass content rather show an understanding. For example, when Socrates asks 
Meno for his own views, and asks him to 'leave Gorgias out of it', Meno still merely goes on to 
regurgitate Gorgias' opinion (Meno 71d+). After the same habit, Phaedrus regurgitates Lysias 
(Phaedrus 230e+); Cebes collects arguments (amongst those he regurgitates is a garbled version 
of one of Socrates' arguments - see Phaedo 72d+, 63a+); Euthyphro and Ion regurgitate Homer 
(see Euthyphro 6+; Ion 530c+). (Socrates implies that) Protagoras recites Pericles (Protagoras 
329a). 
Plato even has his narrators regurgitate. For example, we hear the story of the 
Symposium as told by Apollodorus who has heard it from Aristodemus (Symposium 127c+). 
Similarly, we hear about the young Socrates' discussion with Parmenides and Zeno from 
Cephalus who heard it from Antiphon who heard it from Pythodorus (Parmenides 126b+). 
With these displays, Socrates' interlocutors conflate understanding with mere (passive) 
possession. 
With this passive or merely receptive view of the understanding, arguments and fables 
play essentially the same role. Accordingly, Adeimantus reasons, if the gods exist 'we know 
about them from the laws and the poets who give their genealogies - nowhere else' (2.365e). 
He thus assumes that to regurgitate myths is essentially to offer arguments (see 2.363e+, cf. also 
Protagoras 320c+). According to this merely receptive view of the understanding, to judge the 
veracity of the understanding's contents we must not look to the understanding itself (or the 
form of its contents), but beyond it, to the source of its contents. Since the poets are inspired, it 
is enough to trace what is recited back to them. 
Socrates' interlocutors' merely receptive use of their understandings has a 
consequence: when Socrates questions their understandings, he never really questions them. 
For there is no necessary connection between his interlocutors and the content of their 
understandings. Thus, Thrasymachus regards Socrates' testing of his arguments as a testing of 
something essentially external to him (see l.353e, also 1.338d; l.341ab; cf. Euthyphro Ilb+, 
15b; Lesser Hippias 373b; Philebus 12a; also cf. Symposium 175d+). In Protagoras the same 
pattern occurs: Protagoras repeatedly looks to hide behind other people's voices. When finally 
(just to appease Socrates) he agrees to go along with what Socrates says, Socrates immediately 
responds: 
[dJon't do that to me! It's not this 'if you want' or 'if you agree' business I want 
to test. It's you and me I want to put on the line, and I think the argument will be 
tested best if we take the 'if out. (Protagoras 331c; also cf. 333c) 
Socrates' interlocutors regurgitate a wall of verbiage. However, this behaviour is not 
the immediate cause of what separates Socrates from them - the situation is more serious than 
that. More correctly, their behaviour is what prevents them from gathering themselves as 
genuine selves. Thus, because of their behaviour, they do not rightly have selves to distance 
from Socrates. 
4.3 FORM OF VALUE AND FORM OF COMMUNICATION 
In Book II of the Republic, Glaucon and Adeimantus imitate Thrasymachus and defend his 
view concerning the value of injustice. From Thrasymachus' perspective, value is essentially 
extrinsic; there is only so much to go around; consequently, people must compete for it. 
(However, this competition for value does not merely arise because there are not enough objects 
of value to go around; for under this extrinsic conception, there is no genuine sense in which 
there could be enough value to go around. There is no sense in which anything is nearer 
completion upon the acquisition of extrinsic objects of value. Furthermore, competition is not 
merely a means to the end of acquiring pre-existing objects of value; it also delivers its own 
extrinsic value. For only through competition can the extrinsic value of victory arise.) 
According to Thrasymachus' view, value and justice are more often than not at odds. 
Thus, the person who is most unjust - the tyrant - possesses most value. Ending their 
defence of injustice, Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates to convince them of the 
opposing position. This challenge however presents a problem. For even though Glaucon and 
Adeimantus seek to distance themselves from the view that they defend (even as they defend it 
- see 2.358c, 2.361e, 2.367a), it is nevertheless clear that they are beholden to the same 
conception of value that Thrasymachus assumes. 
(Because Glaucon and Adeimantus assume a passive conception of value, they 
essentially misconstrue the character of that opposite position. Glaucon challenges Socrates to 
show that the just person is happier (2.361d). However, for him, happiness ultimately concerns 
pleasure (see 2.357b, 4.419a). Glaucon thus, throughout the remainder of the discussion, 
implicitly, and a few times explicitly, demands that Socrates preserve his way of valuing. In 
due course, as Socrates draws to the end of his account of justice, and after he has explained 
that the happiness of particular people is not the concern of justice - the eyes of a statue are 
not to be painted the most beautiful colour (purple), because what is at stake is the beauty of the 
whole statue and not merely the eyes (4.420cd) - he acquiesces and does a playful conversion 
for them. He reassures them that the just 'king lives seven hundred and twenty-nine times more 
pleasantly than the tyrant' (9.587e).) 
Glaucon and Adeimantus betray their passive take on value with the way they 
communicate and by their demand that Socrates also conform to that way. (For, in demanding 
such a response, they ignore the argument - that is, the showing - that is Socrates.) They 
assume that Socrates' defence will take the form of a direct transfer. However, it cannot. For a 
way of valuing is manifested not only in the content but more primarily in the form of 
communication. Glaucon and Adeimantus do not recognise that an appropriate defence of 
justice demands a quite opposite mode of communication to their own (else, they would 
recognise that Socrates already offers such a defence). In fact, their demand that Socrates 
convince them of the value of justice, essentially begs the question against that very conception. 
For, from Socrates' perspective, not only the content of Thrasymachus' thesis is askew but so 
too is his 'bath attendant' manner. If Socrates attempts to directly convince Glaucon and 
Adeimantus - that is to say, if he tries to impinge on their understanding by directly giving 
their understandings something rather than inviting their understandings to gather it for 
themselves (i.e., gather him for themselves) - he will thereby do them an injustice. For this 
reason, a direct defence of justice will show only injustice. Because Socrates connects value to 
the (completion of) form, he cannot communicate his conception in the given content of what 
he says. That is to say, he cannot directly communicate to others how he understands value. 
Because they take value to be extrinsic, Glaucon and Adeimantus are direct 
communicators. Consequently, they are concerned only with the (given) content of 
communication rather than its form. They thus expect all communication to be direct and are 
prepared to recognise only what is direct. That is to say, they expect Socrates to play the bath 
attendant, and, because of that expectation, they are determined to see him merely in that role. 
The upshot of this is that they are determined unwittingly to see Socrates express only their own 
conception of value, not only in the form of his communication, but also, in its content. 
Because of the direction of this determination, Socrates' interlocutors can only recognise aright 
the meaning of what he says if they already value in the way in which he communicates. This 
priority, which subsumes meaning under its determining practices, appears to create a vicious 
circularity, which counts against the possibility of genuine communication. 
In order to invite his interlocutors to think about value in this way (that is to say, in 
order to have them connect value to practices or form, rather than merely content), Socrates 
describes a healthy city. In his account he meets that call from Glaucon and Adeimantus for 
content with a presentation of form and an absence of a particular type of content. He describes 
a city that lacks those extrinsic objects that Glaucon and Adeimantus recognise as bearing 
value. Thus, this absence of the objects of value in the elements of the supposedly healthy city 
should summon them to think about value in a different way. Socrates invites them to think of 
value attaching to form rather than merely content (see 2.369ab, 2.372ab). In this respect, 
consider the place of value in Socrates' image of the cave: 'the form of the good is the last thing 
to be seen' (7 .517b), for value is conveyed only in what is appreciated as complete. 
However, retaining his merely receptive use of the understanding, Glaucon cannot 
recognise that Socrates has presented a form (2.372a) - an understanding must be active to 
recognise such manifest necessity. Glaucon focuses merely on the constitutive elements of the 
city, and consequently, he only sees an absence of value. He insists that Socrates refashion the 
economy to include objects of value: 'couches, tables, and other furniture ... perfumed oils, 
incense, prostitutes, and pastries' (2.372d; 2.373a). Here, rather than blaming himself for not 
recognising value, Glaucon effectively blames Socrates for not providing value. 
With his stipulation concerning the nature of value, Glaucon unwittingly replaces the 
unity of value manifest in the form of the city with a multiplicity of value to be found in its 
content. He thus unwittingly sabotages Socrates' account. Socrates goes onto describe a city in 
fever (2.372e-2.373a). In introducing objects of value into the city, Glaucon immediately 
introduces the spirit of competition and the threat of war (2.373de). 
Socrates goes on to augment quite radically the form of the city to accommodate what 
Glaucon stipulates. He creates completely new crafts, along with their training programs, 
which far outstrips the regimen of the crafts present in the simpler, healthy, city. These 
additional crafts are needed, because, in the feverish city, there is a greater deficit. (This deficit, 
or need, the activity of crafts must meet.) Throughout this subsequent account, Socrates tries to 
limit the influence of Glaucon's objects of value and thereby subtly alter Glaucon's 
understanding of value. For example, Socrates makes a distinction between divine gold etc. 
and human gold etc. He asserts that the guardians have the divine gold and silver in their soul 
and so they have no need of the human variety (3.416de). Here Socrates appropriates 
Glaucon's objects of value and transforms them: he makes them, in this case non-transferable, 
or intrinsic, rather than extrinsic. Socrates thus transforms Glaucon's objects of value into 
subjects of value (see Euthyphro chapter). 
However, in the end, this program fails and Socrates admits it. According to his 
description of those additional crafts needed by the feverish city, it is clear that such a city 
needs a Socrates. However, even Socrates is not enough. The meritocracy of this refashioned 
state, Socrates suggests, will inevitably disintegrate into a timarchy, in which the 'victory-
loving and honor-loving' rule (8.545a). In tum, the timarchy will descend into an oligarchical 
state where only the rich will rule (8.550c). In due course the oligarchy will reduce itself into a 
democratic state (in which everyone has a chance to rule), and that, finally will decay into a 
tyranny. Detailing this inexorable descent, Socrates arrives back to their starting point: 
Thrasymachus' take on value. The feverish city thus fails to escape the consequences of the 
tyrant's passive way of valuing. Socrates thus implicitly warns: introducing multiplicity in 
place of the unity and singularity of value invites an inevitable descent into ever compounded 
multiplicity (8.545a+). Here, Socrates indicates doubleness to this failure. For in this 
admission, he nods to his own failure to usurp Glaucon and Adeimantus' take on value. They 
have considered a city in fever: one that shows the origins of injustice rather than justice (cf. 
2.372e+). 
Apart from Phaedrus, the Republic is the only dialogue that places Socrates beyond 
the city walls. He is only a stone's throwaway in the port city of Pi rea us. In a sense, he is in a 
place conceptually beyond his idealisation of Athens, for he is in a place that represents what is 
gratuitous to the ideal city. The port city of Pireaus represents a conception of value that 
involves exchange or trade. It is thus a conception that focuses on content rather than form. 
This misunderstanding of value Socrates tries to banish from his ideal city. However, the 
inhabitants of Pireaus insist on its inclusion and their insistence brings about the destruction of 
that ideal city. 
4.4 SHOWING AND CRAFTSPEOPLE 
The way his interlocutors communicate clearly threatens the possibility of Socrates genuinely 
communicating with them. Glaucon and Adeimenatus' inability to recognise Socrates' 
conception of value implicitly and at times explicitly dogs the entire discussion. Their 
blindness to what Socrates seeks to communicate is most explicit the few times they question 
him (see e.g., 3.392c, 4.419a, 5.449c, 7.519d, 7.532d). The nature of these few disagreements 
reveal how unchecked Glaucon and Adeimantus' initial conception of value is. Thus, that 
apparent agreement marked by the almost unstinting flow of their yeses denotes no real 
agreement at all. 
Furthermore, Glaucon and Adeimantus repeatedly agree with things that they are in no 
real position to judge and if they were rightly gathering the meaning of Socrates' account they 
would realise that he was telling them that they are in no real position to judge. For example, 
according to Socrates, the feverish city will have to institute an arduous and extended 
educational regime for its prospective rulers. These rulers, he suggests, will be like doctors 
who administer drugs to the diseased city. In telling this story, Socrates also plays the doctor. 
Concerning these doctor-rulers, Socrates repeatedly suggests, they will have to use falsehoods 
as a kind of a drug (see 2.382c, 3.389b, 3.414b+, 5.459cd). Glaucon and Adeimantus agree. 
Their agreement, however, does nothing to acknowledge how engrossing Socrates' meaning is 
of their own situation. That is to say, they fail to receive what Socrates says as genuine 
communication. They fail to recognise his communication as something that involves, or 
threatens (i.e., summons), their own understandings. Rather, they receive it as if they were 
mere containers. 
Glaucon and Adeimantus thus do not place themselves in this story; they are unaware 
that only those who have successfully completed the requirements of that education program 
are in a position to rightly judge how the city-state should be arranged. Because Glaucon and 
Adeimantus have not benefited from such practices, their cascading yeses do not mark the 
success and completion of such an education. Socrates fails genuinely to communicate with 
them. This problem of communication (that is, the problem of people only. hearing what they 
expect to hear or hearing only what their way of valuing determines them to hear) looks 
intractable. However, Plato refuses to 'make up [his] mind to that' (cf. 1.327c). 
Socrates cannot communicate anything genuinely new to his interlocutors as long as 
they assume that he communicates directly. That is to say, he cannot communicate with them 
as long as they maintain their way of valuing. This problem arises for Socrates because his 
interlocutors do not recognise that he is showing them something rather than merely telling 
them something. That is to say, Socrates' interlocutors do not recognise that what it is to 
communicate, to understand, and to value involves a practice or a form rather than merely a 
receipt. The problem therefore arises not so much because Socrates' interlocutors value and so 
communicate in a way different from the way in which he values, but rather because they 
completely fail genuinely to value and communicate. (Consequently, Socrates' interlocutors 
not only have problems communicating with Socrates, they also have problems communicating 
with themselves. Consider Meno's debater's argument: Meno rhetorically asks: '[h]ow will 
you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will 
you know that this is the thing that you did not know?' (Meno SOd). Without hesitation, Meno 
concludes that genuine learning is not possible (Meno Sla). Meno's implicit assumption, that 
communication can only be direct (see his opening question of the dialogue - Meno 70a) 
inexorably leads to the conclusion he cannot even communicate with himself.) 
With his familiar claim that he knows nothing (see 1.337e, Meno 7Ib), Socrates warns 
his listeners against expecting mere content. That is to say, he warns that he has nothing to 
communicate directly. Nevertheless, he endeavours to communicate indirectly a form for their 
understandings. Socrates, it turns out, is an odd kind of craftsperson. With the dialogues, Plato 
shows him practising his craft; and that showing, as there is with all showing, invites 
participation. 
Throughout his many conversations, Socrates repeatedly discusses the activity of 
craftspeople. With these repeated appeals, he shows his affinity with those practical workers. 
Moreover, without fail, he frustrates his interlocutors with this kind of talk. Callicles gives 
voice to a feeling that most of Socrates' interlocutors will share. Exasperated, he rebukes 
Socrates: 
[b]y the gods! You simply don't let up on your continual talk of shoemakers and 
cleaners, cooks and doctors, as if our discussion were about them! (Gorgias 491a) 
Callicles' outburst is revealing. For within it he conflates what he should keep separate. 
Socrates' continual talk is really of shoemakers and doctors and not of cleaners and cooks. 
With his outburst, Callicles shows that he does not appreciate what defines crafts and so he does 
not understand Socrates' preoccupation with them. Further, with his conflation he belittles 
those practical activities. Callicles, like other sophists, sees himself above such mundane and 
practical concerns; this conceit is precisely the ground of his problem. 
On occasions it may appear that Socrates also attacks craftspeople. For example, he 
rebukes them in the Apology for their conceit of knowledge. However, here, as elsewhere, 
Socrates only criticises them insofar as he gauges their talk to extend beyond their practices or 
beyond their showing (see Apology 22d).4 That is to say, he only rebukes them insofar as they 
show themselves not to be craftspeople. As long as the communication of craftspeople does not 
extend beyond their practices, they not only genuinely communicate but they also manifest 
something of Socrates' conception of knowledge and value. 
According to Socrates, craftspeople get something right that his interlocutors 
invariably get wrong. For unlike his interlocutors, craftspeople communicate primarily through 
a showing (that is, theycommunicate through the form of their activity) rather than a telling (see 
5.466e+). They can only communicate in this way because their activity has a definite form 
and a definite end. Concerning craftspeople Socrates observes: 
see how each one places what he does into a certain organization, and compels 
one thing to be suited for another and to fit to it until the entire object is put 
together in an organized and orderly way. (Gorgias 503e-504a; also see Republic 
1.342ab) 
Because craftspeople have something to complete or perfect, there is for them a thoroughgoing 
connection between practice and value (see 1.341d, 2.369a, 2.371e, 3.406d); their practices 
determine how they value. Thus, with their practices they define or manifest value. Moreover, 
the objects of crafts address human needs or deficiencies (it is knacks rather than crafts that 
make people more deficient - see Gorgias 462c+); thus, the crafts together, aim to make a self-
sufficient whole (see 2.369b). There is thus something divine about the form of the ultimate 
end of the combined activity of the crafts. 
Socrates attempts to infuse his account of the perfect state with the craftsperson's form 
oflife, with its singularity of value. In that perfect city, every person's 'way oflife ... must be 
in common' (8.543a). With this practical foundation follows an agreement in the way people 
value. Craftspeople qua craftspeople thus solve the problem of communication. 
Concerning the form of communication in the ideal city Socrates states: 
the true lawgiver oughtn't to bother with that form of law of constitution [which 
impinges from without], either in a badly governed city or in a well-governed one 
- in the former, because it is useless and accomplishes nothing; in the latter, 
because anyone could discover some of these things, while the others follow 
automatically from the forms oflife we establish. (4.427a) 
Direct communication in the hands of a legislator is of no use. For, with it a legislator cannot 
successfully impose a law on an understanding bereft of that law. There is no way to convert 
regulative principles into constitutive ones merely through a telling or an impinging from 
without. Only a practice can inculcate such principles to make them the constitutive form 
rather than merely regulative elements of the understanding. In the case where such lawfulness 
already constitutes an understanding, such regulative principles are gratuitous (and so 
antithetical to the economical form of that constitution). 
Socrates ends his Republic narrative with the myth of Er (see 1O.614b+). With this 
story of the afterlife, Socrates re-emphasises the connection between practice and value. The 
story goes: Er, after dying on the battle field, and after lying dead for twelve days, springs back 
into life to report to others what will befall them in the world beyond. In reality, he reports to 
them what befalls them in this world. 
He explains that the dead are brought before Lachesis, one of the three daughters of 
Necessity, who sings of the past, and who sits on one of three thrones that face the lap of 
Necessity upon which the spindle of Necessity turns. Here, the dead must choose their next life 
from a number of models, which are taken from the lap of Lachesis the daughter of Necessity 
(10.617d). However, in a sense, there is no real choice here, only Necessity. For, with their 
previous way of life the dead have essentially already made that choice. For, Er observes, the 
choice 'depended upon the character of their former life' (10.620a). In other words, the form of 
people's lives determine both how they value, and what they will recognise as valuable (see 
1.330c). This necessity arises because value is not a given. (This is not to say that value is 
relative. Rather, this is merely to say that as long as an understanding is merely receptive, value 
will appear to it as relative. Once an understanding attaches value to activity - that is to say, 
once an understanding becomes active - then it recognises value only in that necessity 
manifested in completed form.) Er ends by reporting: 'the arrangement of the soul was not 
included in the model because the soul is inevitably altered by the different lives it chooses' 
(10.618b). 
Socrates' interlocutors have no feeling for necessity. For their lives do not involve 
practices. According to this order, Glaucon and Adeimantus' lives determine what they 
recognise in Socrates; and because of this, they are bound to misunderstand him. Socrates' 
interlocutors are not craftspeople. They are talkers rather than practitioners:5 they are sophists, 
students of sophists, poets, orators, rhetorians and rhapsodes. 
With his repeated appeals to genuine practitioners like cobblers, Socrates repeatedly 
silences his loquacious counterparts. Initially at least, they have much to say. However, as 
these encounters progress, Socrates quietens them.6 He brings this about by essentially 
demanding that they show him something with their telling. Because they have no practices to 
show, they eventually discover that they have nothing to say. 
4.5 RECEPTIVE REASON AND NON-CONTRADICTION 
Because sophists and their ilk are so removed from practices, they have no idea what might 
constitute a practice. They are thus not in a position to recognise what Socrates does. 
Consequently, they cannot rightly gather his meaning. In his hierarchy of degrees of being, 
Socrates ranks sophists beneath manual labours and just above tyrants, who are furthest 
removed from manifesting the self-motion of the divine (see Phaedrus 248de). Accordingly, 
because of their lack of practices, sophists make their students more like brutes than like gods. 
For when they get communication wrong they also miscommunicate what it is to reason. 
Protagoras, for example, claims to teach his students 'sound deliberation' (Protagoras 319a). 
However, as a direct communicator he cannot achieve this end, for, such teaching cannot show 
a practice for reason (see Protagoras chapter). Rather, it can only show reason outwardly 
directed; and showing reason merely expressing an outward movement, Protagoras can show 
nothing complete - that is to say, with his form of direct communication he cannot show 
reason manifesting self-motion. He shows merely an extrinsic application of reason rather than 
showing it defining a self (Le., a unity). 
Socrates, describing the robust resistance of healthy reason and the mark of its 
diseased counterpart, states: 
the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of 
itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we ever find this 
happening in the soul, we'll know that we aren't dealing with one thing but many. 
(4.436bc) 
When reason is acting aright, this resistant force (this refusal to deny itself) is a by-product of 
its positive or ~nifying activity. Socrates shows us this positive resistance in his many 
discussions with his interlocutors; his reason refuses to receive a contradiction from them. 
When they appear to contradict themselves he claims that he does not understand. 
The opposite order obtains when his interlocutors apply their reason. They search for, or 
look to secure, contradictions in others. Consider, for example, the tag-team sophist brothers 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: with a nimble and ambiguous use of language they seek to tum 
others on themselves (see Euthydemus). Even though the brothers are caricatures, with them 
Plato nonetheless identifies the pathology present in their more earnest counterparts. When 
Protagoras, for example, considers Simonides, he all too quickly latches on to the appearance of 
conflict. Finding this appearance, his reason rests content with the contradiction (see 
Protagoras chapter). 
Socrates shows his interlocutors that they search for contradictions where they ought 
not; he shows that they misapply reason; for, they direct its focus without. In this way, rather 
than showing reason completing something, they only show reason residing with 
incompleteness. Consequently, it is not, the understandings of others that are conflicted; rather, 
it is really their own understandings that contain that conflict. As long as they continue to 
direct their reason without, they can never reach a genuine understanding. Socrates' 
interlocutors thus fail to commit their reason to understanding. 
Understanding, Socrates shows, requires the positive or unifying practice of reason; 
reason must recognise (or work together a) singularity rather than receive multiplicity. The 
'useless and harmful' way in which Socrates' interlocutors tum their reason ends with them 
being 'filled with lawlessness' (7.518e, 7.537e). Socrates describes the behaviour that betrays 
this turning out of reason: 
[t]hey misuse [reason] by treating it as a game of contradiction. They imitate 
those who've refuted them by refuting others themselves, and like puppies, they 
enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with arguments. (7.539b) 
Socrates' interlocutors repeatedly accuse him of cheaply applying this same tactic. 
Thrasymachus, for example, charges: '[y]ou disgust me Socrates. Your trick is to take hold of 
the argument at the point you can do it most harm' (1.338d, also see 1.340d). In Gorgias, 
Callicles, in the same vain, accuses Socrates ofloving to win (Gorgias SlSb). However, these 
are merely examples of his interlocutors only recognising their own way of valuing in what 
Socrates does. They thus project something of their own way onto Socrates. 
This passivity, and its accompanying mark of multiplicity, is just as apparent when 
Socrates' interlocutors move from criticising others to offering their own explanation for things. 
Consider Euthyphro's justification for prosecuting his father (see Euthyphro Sd+), or 
Thrasymachus', Glaucon's, or Adeimantus' justification for injustice (see Republic Books I and 
II). In their attempts to tell stories that are merely self-consistent, Socrates' interlocutors are 
unable even to achieve that end. For passively applying the law of non-contradiction offers no 
guarantee of producing something coherent and its merely negative review is nowhere near 
sufficient to identify something that manifests necessity. For without a positive or unifying 
activity, reason is not only blind to necessity, it is also blind to genuine consistency. Consider 
the incoherent jumble that Socrates' interlocutors, and, for the most part, the poets, produce 
whenever they talk of gods and value. If Socrates' interlocutors want to tell self-consistent 
stories about value, justice and the gods then they must first possess adequate understandings of 
the necessary form of these things. Else, they cannot rightly judge what they can consistently 
assert of them. However, because they use their understandings merely as receptacles, they 
have not gathered such an understanding. They merely import something quite arbitrary into 
their understandings (see 2.365e). Because they are only concerned with given content, and not 
with form, they wrongly suppose that it is an easy matter to speak consistently. 
4.6 REASON AND UNITY 
In contrast to his interlocutors, throughout the dialogues Socrates does not look merely for 
consistency but for necessity. Because of this, rather than showing merely a negative use of 
reason he shows its positive activity (i.e., he shows a practice for reason). Socrates shows 
something complete. In his Republic discussion of education, he maintains: 'those whom we 
are rearing should never try to learn anything incomplete' (7.350e). For, without this condition, 
education is merely indoctrination. Education, Socrates asserts, is not a matter of 'putting 
knowledge into souls that lack it' (7.518b). Thus, when he insists that children should never 
learn anything incomplete, he signals that education should concern itself only with practices. 
According to the Republic's educational regimen, at age of twenty the prospective 
rulers are to be given their greatest and most decisive challenge: they are instructed to unify 
everything they know (7.537cd)? At this point they already implicitly know what it is to unify. 
For, their previous education has introduced them to works that exhibit unity of form. 
Furthermore, throughout their education they also engage in playful practices, the end of which 
is unity (7.536e, 8.558b). They thus, already know the form of activity that they must 
accomplish. They have essentially been educated to have an aesthetic appreciation for what is 
complete (3.401d+). Lawfulness has been inculcated into reason and is thus constitutive of the 
understanding. This form, or lawfulness, is not something that regulates the understanding 
from without (as might the law of non-contradiction). 
With his account of the training of the prospective rulers, Socrates describes an 
apprenticeship for reason, which will, if successfully followed, produce a craft for reason. 
Glaucon and company sit by and readily agree that this is the way education must go. 
However, if Socrates' account is correct then they will be in a position to recognise the 'must' 
in question only upon having successfully completed that same rigorous practical 
apprenticeship. This they have not done. Thus, there is something hollow about their assent. 
Socrates cannot invite his passive interlocutors to start unifying their understandings 
merely by telling them a story that manifests unity. For, in speaking with them, he is essentially 
addressing cave dwellers whose heads are still motionless (see 7.514a+). At most, they will 
passively receive the story as non-contradictory; they do not thereby gather his meaning. They 
will not know how to unify merely because someone tells them that this is what they must do. 
(The prospective rulers only know how to unify because ofthe form oftheir education.) 
4.7 RIDICULOUSNESS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF COMMUNICATION 
As Socrates completes his image of the cave, he obliquely refers to his own (and Plato'S) 
method of communication. That method promises to solve the impasse he faces with his 
interlocutors. According to that image, the person who escapes the confinement of the cave, 
who has turned his head around (from its extrinsic use of reason to the self-motion of its 
unifying activity), and who thus manifests and thereby recognises the form of value, will appear 
ridiculous to those 'perpetual prisoners' when he returns to the cave and tries to communicate 
with them. This appearance of ridiculousness promises to solve the apparently intractable 
problem of communication. 
This appearance partly results from the peculiar way in which Socrates values. He 
goes after none of the trappings that are most highly prized by his fellow Athenians. 
Furthermore, while he uses the same language as that used by his fellows he insists upon 
speaking of things such as cobbling, of which his educated interlocutors have no interest. 
However, this appearance of ridiculousness does not fully account for what comes next in his 
account. Immediately after suggesting that the philosopher will appear ridiculous, Socrates, 
referring to the shackled prisoners, adds: '[a]nd ... if they could get their hands on him, 
wouldn't they kill him?' (7.517a). - Glaucon (again without recognising his own place in the 
picture and so without feeling genuine malice) answers: '[t]hey certainly would.' 
What heralds the cave dwellers' bloodthirsty response? 
Consider the ridiculous antics of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus (see, e.g., 
Euthydemus 298b+). The tag-team brothers pose no real threat to anyone. They are merely 
comical: they aim at cleverness and fall short. Consequently, no one considers them much of a 
threat. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus thus do not manifest the kind of ridiculousness that 
Socrates presents. They are comical because they are transparent. That is to say, they do not 
merely appear ridiculous; they are ridiculous. 
Protagoras tries to make Simoni des out to be just as ridiculous. However, he is only 
able to do this because Simonides is absent. Socrates steps into Simonides' shoes, and 
suddenly Protagoras is ridiculous. Here, Socrates shows Protagoras something: in order not to 
be ridiculous (or, more simply, in order just to be), he must transcend what merely appears to be 
ridiculous. In this way, Socrates challenges Protagoras to unify what appears to be 
multitudinous (see Protagoras chapter). 
Thus, just as the simpleton conversation of the Spartans is a front, which hides 
something quite opposite (see Protagoras 342e), so, Socrates' ridiculousness is part of a 'big 
game' (see Symposium 216e). Consequently, Socrates' ridiculousness does not threaten to 
humiliate him; it rather threatens only to humiliate others - even his closest friends. 
Alcibiades admits that Socrates has humiliated him (Symposium 219d). He describes Socrates 
as 'impudent, contemptuous and vile!' (Symposium 215b) and, wearing the hat of a cave 
dweller, he confesses: at times, I have thought that 'I would be happier if he were dead' 
(Symposium 216c). However, there is something else to Socrates. Alcibiades continues: '[i]f 
you listen to his arguments, at first they'd strike you as totally ridiculous .... If you're foolish, 
or simply unfamiliar with him, you'd find it impossible not to laugh at his arguments' 
(Symposium 221e). Alcibaides concludes that Socrates is 'godlike' (Symposium 217a). 
4.8 SUMMONERS AND THE CRAFT OF REASON 
On the heels of the image of the cave, Socrates makes a distinction with which he effectively 
differentiates himselffrom the likes ofEuthydemus and Dionysodorus. He says: 
some sense perceptions don't summon the understanding to look into them, 
because the jUdgment of sense perception is itself adequate, while others 
encourage it in every way to look into them, because sense perception seems to 
produce no sound result. (7.523ab) 
True to form, Glaucon misunderstands. He supposes that Socrates refers to the kinds of 
appearance such as that worked in 'trompe l' oei! paintings' (7.523b). Here Glaucon thinks of 
those knacks that merely trick the understanding. Thus, he merely identifies the kind of 
deception used by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus (see 10.602c+). 
However, when Socrates refers to summoners, he speaks of something that really does 
summon the understanding. He points to something singular but having the appearance of 
multiplicity. Thus, he does not speak of the likes of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. For even 
though they contradict themselves, they in no way tempt their audience to unifY that apparent 
multiplicity. There is no singularity lurking behind their complexity. Their appearance 
sufficiently explains them. 
Socrates continues: 
[t]he ones that don't summon the understanding are all those that don't go off into 
opposite perceptions at the same time. But the ones that do go off in that way I 
call summoners - whenever sense perception does not declare one thing more 
than its opposite, no matter whether the object striking the senses is near at hand 
or far away. (7.523bc) 
Here Socrates refers to himself and his own ridiculous appearance. Consider, for example, 
what Socrates does in the Apology. Accused of teaching and thereby corrupting the youth of 
Athens, Socrates defends himself by first claiming not to be a teacher and then by claiming to 
teach the jury. Furthermore, responding to Meletus' additional charge of blasphemy, Socrates 
denies his guilt by explaining how he questioned the judgement of the Oracle at Delphi. At that 
trial, he also criticises the poets for being inspired and so writing without understanding. He 
goes on to claim that he knows nothing but he also claims to have a direct connection to the 
divine (see Apology chapter). 
Plato repeats this same pattern throughout the dialogues and extends Socrates' method 
to engulf himself as author of the dialogues. Thus, he has Socrates attack both imitative 
narrative (see e.g., 1O.S9Sa) and those people who never show themselves, preferring to hide 
behind the voices of others (see, e.g. Protagoras 331c). At the close of Phaedrus, he has 
Socrates attack writers. He suggests: 'if ... anybody ... ever did or does write ... a political 
document which he believes to embody clear knowledge of lasting importance, then the writer 
deserves reproach, whether anyone says so or not' (Phaedrus 277d). In Protagoras, he has 
Socrates attack those who discuss poets (presumably, we, as readers of the dialogues, are 
targets); he compares them to 'second-rate drinking parties' (Protagoras 347c+). 
Summoners are both the key to Socrates' peculiar mode of communication and the 
source of him appearing ridiculous. With them, he catches his interlocutors' attention and so 
too their hungry pursuit of (extrinsic) value. For with their passive or extrinsic use of reason, 
Socrates' interlocutors spy in him a contradiction, and with that recognition they sense their 
victory over him. However, they get to know that if they follow this familiar (extrinsic) course, 
only their own humiliation awaits them. Thus, when they spy that contradiction in Socrates 
rather than laughing at him, their understanding (for its own good) is forced to try to transcend 
that appearance. Socrates thus indirectly bullies them into rescuing him from the appearance of 
ridiculousness, else they will be found to be ridiculous themselves. Thus, through attracting 
their extrinsic use of reason he forces their understandings to engage in the opposite, unifying, 
direction. He compels them to stand up and tum their heads, and to begin to see something of 
themselves (see 7.S1Sc, 7.S15a). Thereupon they enter into a competition, but not an extrinsic 
one (with Socrates as foe), but one merely with their own understandings. The task: to rescue 
themselves from that received contradiction - that is, to rescue themselves from the 
multiplicity of non-being. If they are victorious (that is to say, if they work a unity out of that 
appearance of multiplicity - see Gorgias S03e-S04a), they introduce to themselves a new 
conception of value, a conception where there are winners and no losers. Through such a 
showing, Socrates thereby initiates others into that practice. Plato's Apology is thus tragic 
because in it Plato shows Socrates' fellow Athenians choosing to eliminate him rather than 
confront this challenge presented by his ridiculous appearance. Here, Plato presents non-
being's tragic resistance to being. 
4.9 IMITATORS AND ORIGINATORS 
The key to Socrates' form of communication is to be found in the connection between 
philosophy and poetry. In Book X of the Republic Socrates refers to 'an ancient quarrel 
between [poetry] and philosophy' (10.607b); and in that same work Socrates seems to do his 
part to intensify that quarrel into an all out war. The victor appears to be philosophy. For, 
according to Socrates, (philosophers') arguments compel him completely to ban imitative 
poetry from the proposed state. However, that might not be the final word. For it seems that an 
imitative poet (Plato) records this supposed victory. Thus, Plato seems to preserve the warring 
factions, one in the form and the other in the content of that work. 
In Book III, in the prelude to that ban, Socrates differentiates simple and imitative 
narrative. With simple narrative, he suggests, poets never hide themselves. Consequently, they 
maintain a distance from the events they describe. In contrast, imitative poets take on the voice 
(and style) of each of their characters (3.392d+). Thus, with this technique, poets do not merely 
tell their audience about the drama, they show them the drama. In doing so, such poets, 
according to their talent, draw their audiences imaginatively into the story. The audience 
therefore does not merely hear second hand about the struggles, sufferings and triumphs of the 
characters; they witness them first hand. This has a powerful effect. The audience, in effect 
also participate; along with the poet, they are drawn to imaginatively engage with the 
characters. They thus, for a brief time, essentially participate in that way of behaving and 
accordingly they take on the concerns and so values of those characters. If forms of life 
determine ways of valuing then imitative narrative is a means to introduce to an audience other 
ways of valuing. 
To show the difference between the simple and the imitative narrative styles, Socrates 
transforms a tract from Homer from its original imitative voices into its simple narrative 
equivalent: 
[a]nd the priest came and prayed that the gods would allow them to capture Troy 
and be safe afterwards, that they'd accept the ransom and free his daughter, and 
thus show reverence for the god. When he'd said this, the others showed their 
respect for the priest and consented. But Agamemnon was angry and ordered him 
to leave and never to return, lest his priestly wand and the wreaths of the god 
should fail to protect him. He said that, before freeing the daughter, he'd grow 
old in Argos by her side. He told Chryses to go away and not make him angry, if 
he wanted to get home safely. When the old man heard this, he was frightened 
and went off in silence. But when he'd left the camp he prayed at length to 
Apollo, calling him by his various titles and reminding him of all his services to 
him. If any of those services had been found pleasing, whether it was the 
building of the temples or the sacrifice of victims, he asked in return that the 
arrows of the god should make the Achaeans pay for his tears (3.393d-394a). 
Even though in this matter of fact retelling of events Socrates seems to preserve the content of 
Homer's narrative, he does not preserve its original meaning. For, in transforming its form, he 
also transforms the meaning of its content. The narrative no longer carries us into the action. 
We do not participate and so do not take on the concerns of those characters (cf. 3.387e). 
Socrates quite intentionally removes the life from the piece. He essentially creates a form 
appropriate to its content (cf. lO.601ab). 
With this single demonstration, Socrates shows how form determines meaning. What 
adds to the power of this display is the formal context that Plato fashions for it. For, this 
section of simple narrative appears within the imitative narrative of the Republic. The resulting 
contrast is stark. Socrates' reworking of the text not only leaves it lifeless in comparison to 
Homer's original imitative effort, but, more immediately, it is lifeless in comparison to the rest 
of the dialogue (and, perhaps also, in comparison to everything else in Plato's imitative corpus). 
Plato reinforces this contrast by having Socrates attack imitative narrative and champion in its 
place simple narrative. 
Thus, even though Socrates rallies behind simple narrative, he thereby indirectly 
reveals and emphasises the genuine power of the imitative form. Consequently, it may appear 
that Plato does not really do much to settle the battle. Rather he allows it to continue to wage 
between the form and content of his work. From this perspective, Plato's form of 
communication seems to win out over Socrates' content. 
However, such a conclusion is unsatisfactory. For, if (as Plato shows throughout the 
Republic and his other dialogues) form determines the meaning of content, then we could not 
have arrived at the above conflict having followed this determination. In fact, that supposed 
conflict arises because of determination of meaning in the opposite direction. That is to say, we 
see the conflict because we allow the given content of Plato's dialogue to determine how we 
view its form. We apply Socrates' distinction between simple and imitative narrative, to Plato, 
instead of allowing Plato's form of communication to determine our understanding of that 
taxonomy of narrative styles. In doing so, we essentially beg the question against the form of 
Plato's authorship. 
With this critique, Plato is concerned with imitation that lacks a genuine practice. That 
is to say, the type that merely receives and replicates, regurgitates or mirrors what is before it 
(10.596d). With this form of imitation, Socrates' interlocutors hide themselves behind other 
voices. Such behaviour does not constitute a craft. In this sense, we should not receive Plato as 
imitative. Even though we never directly hear Plato's voice anywhere in his dialogues, we beg 
the question against the nature of his authorship if we conclude that he thereby imitates and so 
hides himself. 
In that final book of The Republic, Socrates differentiates between two types of 
imitation; the imitation involved in crafts and the imitation that does not involve a craft. For 
example, the carpenter who makes a bed is an imitator. For, the object of his endeavour is in 
some sense given to him, for, the carpenter qua carpenter does not judge the adequacy of the 
bed, rather the end user does (see 10.601c-602a). Painters and imitative poets perform a 
different type of imitation. They imitate craftspeople or the objects of crafts but unlike those 
whom they imitate, they do not have end users to define a purpose for their production. 
Consequently they aim at mere pleasure. 
One category of craftspeople remains: namely, those who are non-imitators. In other 
words, craftspeople who do not follow a determination from without, but, who nevertheless 
have the same ultimate aim that is implicit in all other craft. These craftspeople are genuinely 
inventive. They are gods. Their craft concerns the form of reason, which cannot accommodate 
any imitation (cf 10.603a).8 Here the craftsperson is not an imitator but a god (cf. 10.597b+); 
for, there is something self-directed about the positive use ofreason. 
Thus, it turns out that Plato does not seek to continue that ancient quarrel between 
philosophy and poetry. He means to resolve that quarrel by conflating the forms of philosophy 
and poetry. He accomplishes this by removing the imitation from poetry (so that it concerns the 
feeling of reason rather than those of emotion - see 10.604de) and by removing the direct 
delivery from philosophy. Plato is a poet of reason. That craft has its analogue in the activity of 
the reader; with it Plato summons his readers not to be second rate drinking parties (see 
Protagoras). 
NOTES 
4 
Compare, for example, how Socrates begins his Apology speech. He quite explicitly warns 
the jury that he speaks in a different language to them (Apology 17cd). 
Throughout the dialogues, Plato uses slaves to denote an extrinsic conception of value (see 
Euthyphro, Meno, Symposium 21ge, Lysis 207e, Protagoras 310c, 352bc, 347bc). 
Only because he. thinks that both teaching and communicating essentially involve direct 
transfer, does Thrasymachus think himself able to demand a reciprocal exchange of value -
a fee - for his teaching (see 1.337d; also cf. Protagoras in this respect - Protagoras 310d, 
349a). 
In places in the Republic, Socrates also criticises the manual crafts (cf. 6,495d, 7 .522b). 
However, once again this is a qualified attack and not an attack on craftspeople per se. In 
the final book of the Republic, Socrates adds a single reservation to his positive assessment 
of at least some craftspeople. He suggests that they are imitators rather than gods 
(10.595+). However, he does not suggest that all craftspeople are imitators. And in the 
sense that craftspeople are imitators their imitation is a necessary part of their practices. 
They are imitators in the sense that their end has been given to them by the users of the 
objects of their craft (10.601c). But this leaves a craft that is both the creator and user of 
what it works. The craft, which concerns the form of reason, cannot accommodate any 
imitation (cf. 10.603a). Here the craftsperson is not an imitator but a god (cf. 10.597b+). 
The ideal state's rulers are, according to his conception, craftspeople. 
Gorgias, for example, claims that he is able to answer any question put to him (Gorgias 
447e-448a). Socrates describes Prodicus as 'godlike in his universal knowledge. However, 
his voice is so deep that it set up a reverberation in the room that blurred what was being 
said' (Protagoras 316a). Protagoras claims to be superior to others in verbal contests 
(Protagoras 335a). Socrates compares sophists like Protagoras to 'bronze bowls that keep 
7 
ringing along time after they have been struck and prolong the sound indefinitely unless you 
dampen them down' (Protagoras 329ab). Another interlocutor, Ion, wins first prize in a 
competition for those who recite the poets (Ion 530b). 
Thrasymachus, for example, after hurling himself at Socrates in Book I of the Republic he is 
reduced to silence by the end of that book and we only hear from him once (5.450a+) in the 
remaining nine books. 
This is essentially the challenge Plato shows Parmenides issuing to the young Socrates (see 
Parmenides). 
Throughout the dialogues, Plato shows that reason cannot be imitated. He shows that if 
such an imitation is attempted, something comical or genuinely ridiculous results. Thus, 
Euthyphro, at times, repeats certain theses that come out of the mouth of Socrates. 
However, in doing so, his receptive or passive understanding strips those utterances of their 
intrinsic meaning and something incoherent results. Euthyphro ends up contradicting 
himself and faces a dilemma (see Euthyphro chapter). Euthydemus and Dionysodorus also 
seem to repeat a number of theses we may wish also to attribute to Socrates. However, 
coming out of their mouths those ideas are quite incoherent (see Euthydemus). Cebes 
remembers Socrates' argument from recollection and in doing so associates recollection 
with memory. Like Euthyphro, Cebes transforms what is intrinsic into what is merely 
extrinsic and so incoherent (see Phaedo chapter). Again, consider how Cephalus merely 
memorises Socrates' conversation with Zeno and Parmenides (see Parmenides). 
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ABSTRACT 
Beauty and being share a form; convictions and fables similarly manifest 
something completed. The form of such wholes cannot be anticipated from a 
mere receipt of their given parts. The upshot of this is that we cannot directly 
discuss these forms. If we attempt to, we immediately convert what is essential 
to them into something quite gratuitous and as such antithetical to the necessary 
economy of their completed natures. With this annihilation of form, we facilitate 
an aggregation or dispersion of content. Consequently, if we embark upon such a 
discursive procedure, while we may think we speak of beauty, for example, we 
really speak of a multitude of things with quite opposite natures. In doing this, 
we are like an Anaxagorean figure, who tries to give an account of why Socrates 
sits in that prison cell awaiting execution by describing the relative position of 
Socrates' bones (see 98cd). 
Socrates is happy to refer to Beauty, or those things that are beautiful; 
however, he refuses to offer any analysis. He confesses that he does not 
understand such talk (lOOc+). Socrates does not tell us how to understand; he 
shows us. He manifests what it is to understand. With his relative silence and 
showing, Socrates essentially asserts that direct talk is antithetical to the 
necessary form of an understanding. For, in order for an understanding to 
appreciate beauty, that understanding must also share the irreducible form of 
beauty. Thus, because Socrates manifests beauty, he refuses to analyse it. 
Attempting the latter destroys the former: talk aggregates. 
However, his friends demand that he talk. Socrates' solution to this 
predicament is radical: he transforms arguments into the form of fables. With this 
transformation, apparently weak arguments become strong. For, with his talk, he 
shows rather than (directly) tells something. 
5.1 CHANGELESSNESS AND SELF-MOTION 
Phaedo counts as the final chapter in Plato's epic tale. It traverses Socrates' last day, and it 
ends with his death. In other dialogues, we learn that throughout his life, Socrates never really 
leaves Athens (see Phaedrus 230d); Crito shows how Socrates chooses to die there, rather than 
continue to live elsewhere. In the Apology, Socrates claims that his connection to the city is 
divine (see Apology 30e+).1 In contrast to the itinerant sophists, for whom all motion concerns 
change, Socrates is a divine presence. His form of motion accomplishes only changelessness? 
Plato invites us to think that his death will not change that. 
With this changelessness, Socrates shows his fellow Athenians something about being. 
His activity of remaining in Athens involves a manifestation of form. With this presentation, 
Socrates communicates. However, his friends do not understand him. They receive only the 
content of that showing and fail to gather its form. Consequently, they are blind to Socrates' 
being. 
This passivity makes Socrates' friends insensitive to what he is about. From Crito, we 
learn of their plan to assist Socrates to escape death by spiriting him out of Athens. 
Unwittingly, they thereby seek his destruction. Socrates is unmoved by their offer. Facing 
death Socrates is fearless. His friends are mystified. In Phaedo, Simmias and Cebes beseech 
him to justifY his confidence. They, like Glaucon and Adeimantus from the Republic, demand a 
particular content from him; however, Socrates already confronts them with an answer - a 
form - which they ignore. Socrates' friends are thus those shackled prisoners from the 
Republic'S image of the cave, who have their backs to the showing of the craftspeople (see 
Republic 7.514+). Because they do not tum their heads - that is to say, because they do not 
tum their understandings to gather rather than merely receive - they fail to bring something 
before their understandings and so they fail to recognise what is essentially before them in the 
presence of Socrates. 
Socrates cannot unshackle his friends merely by delivering arguments to them. In 
Phaedo, Plato shows that his friends already communicate with arguments; and, their 
understandings remain passive. To the merely receptive understanding, arguments offer only 
additional content rather than form. With this further content enters an ever-greater 
multiplicity, and with this, a receptive understanding strays ever further from the unity that 
marks conviction. Socrates thus cannot convey necessity to his friends' understandings from 
without. His friends must rather complete something for themselves. 
5.2 ACTIVE REALITY AND PASSIVE APPEARANCES 
The Phaedo exchange between Socrates and his friends is comic-tragic. In the hours 
immediately preceding his execution, those friends beseech Socrates to convince them that he 
has nothing to fear in death. To that end, Socrates appears to offer them argument after 
argument. Throughout the exchange, however, Simmias and Cebes find fault with Socrates' 
every defence. If Simmias and Cebes are right, there is something comic or ridicolous about 
Socrates' poise. 
Apart from the comic circumstances of this confrontation, it may appear that Simmias 
and Cebes show something positive. For they appear to display a quite healthy or robust 
recalcitrance to what appear to be shaky arguments. In contrast to the passivity of that flow of 
unchecked yeses from the Republic's Glaucon and Adeimantus (see Republic chapter), Simmias 
and Cebes appear quite active. Such a conclusion however is a mistake. Simmias and Cebes 
are no more active than Glaucon and Adeimantus. 
As the hour of Socrates' death rapidly approaches, it becomes increasingly clear that 
nothing he can say will satisfY his friends. Socrates is incapable of delivering to them that 
conviction for which they seek. Thus, just as Glaucon and Adeimantus' passivity determines 
them always to agree with Socrates, similarly, Simmias and Cebes' passivity determines them 
always to find Socrates wanting. For they, like Glaucon and Adeimantus, merely receive rather 
than gather the meaning of what Socrates says. Consequently, they read over Socrates' 
meaning, and, in turn, they find deficiency or incompleteness, where none exists. For they 
assess completeness in the given content rather than in the gathered form of what Socrates says. 
Simmias and Cebes seek conviction and completion by a means that draws them ever further 
from what has unity. 
Consequently, Socrates is not the tragic figure of the dialogue; his friends are. Their 
failure to understand what Socrates says is really their failure to appreciate his presence. Their 
failure to recognise his being follows from their own lack of being. Thus, the approaching 
absence of Socrates is not what really impinges in a tragic way upon their discussion. Rather, 
his interlocutors' ever-present absence weighs down the discussion. Their effortless 
faultfinding maintains their distance from the form that marks both being and understanding. It 
turns out that to understand the meaning of what Socrates says and to understand his presence 
are one and the same achievement. Socrates is Plato's real argument for the immortality of the 
soul- arguments, for Plato, turn out to be fable like. 
5.3 CONTAINING KNOWLEDGE AND MANIFESTING KNOWLEDGE 
In the midst of Socrates' unsuccessful attempt to communicate with his friends, Cebes 
implores: 'try to persuade [us] not to fear death like a bogey' (77e; also see 63d). With such 
pleading, Socrates' friends in essence insist that he separate meaning from practice, and deliver 
them the former without requiring them to engage in the latter. Unwittingly, Cebes all but 
articulates this demand. In reply to Socrates' description of the changelessness of the 
philosopher's form of life, Cebes counters: 
[i]f indeed [the soul] gathered itself together and existed by itself ... there would 
be much good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true; but to believe this 
requires a good deal of faith and persuasive argument to believe that the soul will 
exist after a man has died. (70ab) 
Thus, Cebes assumes that he can hold a conviction (concerning the immortality of his own soul) 
independently of the gathering together of his soul. In a sense, therefore, Cebes thinks that 
being is a given. From this perspective, his activity does not constitute his being; in a merely 
negative sense his actions preserve his being.3 This perceived givenness of being, makes Cebes 
fearful of death. For, if the being of his soul does not depend on him then he is equally out of 
control of its non-being. Just as he received his being from another source, he can just as 
simply lose it. This self-imposed passivity is the source both of Cebes' fear and his non-being. 
The upshot of his interlocutors' passive take on being is that they mistake the source of 
their esteem for Socrates. They look past his being and assume that what is so impressive about 
him is something that his being contains (that is to say, something that he has merely received). 
According to this perspective, convictions are the mere content of an understanding. 
Consequently, Socrates' interlocutors do not recognise his fecundate showing and instead they 
recognise only his silent refusal to deliver something, which they assume awaits his delivery 
(and, in return, their receipt). They mistakenly suppose that Socrates at each stage of the 
discussion holds something back from them. 
Their passive take on being thus results in a passive take on knowledge and 
communication. That is to say, from this perspective, knowledge and communication have no 
direct ontic significance. Cebes thinks that a conviction is merely contained in his being rather 
than something that his being must manifest. In other words, because he does not think that his 
convictions involve his activity he has no reason to think that they could be constitutive of his 
being. 
Without making such a connection between a person's practices, understanding and 
being, Cebes cannot conceive how he can be responsible for his own being. He merely assumes 
that Socrates can deliver to him as content a conviction (concerning the nature of being). 
However, he has received such content from Socrates before; to no good effect. 
Cebes collects arguments (see 63a) and has even memorised some of Socrates' 
arguments (see 72d+). This history of collecting gets him no closer to conviction (or 
recollection). For he listens to Socrates already knowing what Socrates will say. He recognises 
and can anticipate what Socrates will say; yet he lacks understanding. 
5.4 REMEMBERING AND RECOLLECTING 
Because Socrates goes on to offer what appear to be arguments, Simmias and Cebes assume 
that he thereby attempts directly to deliver on their request. This train of arguments begins with 
Cebes, who first introduces or recalls Socrates' argument from recollection; he has heard 
Socrates deliver it in the past. With his rehearsal, Cebes associates recollection with memory. 
He thus reads recollection as requiring a particular history: he explains 'we must at some 
previous time have learned what we now recollect' (see 72e-73a). Consequently, Cebes takes 
the mechanism of recollection to be analogous to the means by which he originally received 
that argument from Socrates. Thus, recollection for Cebes concerns mere content. He thus 
associates recollection with the passive receipt of memory rather than a possible activity or 
practice of the understanding. Simmias makes the same connection. He states: 
I want to experience the very thing we are discussing, recollection, and from what 
Cebes undertook to say, I am now remembering and am pretty well convinced. 
(73b) 
Because they use their understandings in merely a receptive way, Simmias and Cebes 
face Meno's dilemma. Meno (in the dialogue of the same name), entreats Socrates: 
[h]ow will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should 
meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know? 
(Meno 80d) 
He concludes from this that genuine learning - and by implication, genuine communication -
is not possible (Meno 81a). Meno's conservatism falls out because he, like Simmas and Cebes, 
has a passive or merely receptive view of the understanding. Accordingly, he can conceive of 
learning only as direct receipt. Focusing solely on this impinging motion from without, Meno 
can find no mechanism from which he can explain how we can recognise something with which 
we are not already historically familiar. The only mechanism he can find for recognition is 
memory. 
Thus, to associate recollection with memory, and, in tum, to posit a prior existence, 
merely aims to solve the epistemological problem of locating a source for the content of their 
understandings and they fall short. The real problem that they face concerns more primarily 
ontology (rather than merely epistemology). In securing being merely as a necessary condition 
for knowledge, they essentially transplant something that manifests intrinsic motion with 
something that merely receives or is buffeted back and forth by motion. In so doing, they 
cannot even make sense of their claims to know, much less their claims to be. They thus tum 
the problem on its head. This reversal reflects their mischaracterization of Socrates. They look 
past his being to what they think his being contains. 
Simmias and Cebes' own lack of activity is the source of their failure to understand 
Socrates. That is to say, they fail to recognise self-motion precisely because they fail to engage 
in that type of motion themselves. Because of this inactivity, they unwittingly project what is 
extrinsic onto what is essentially intrinsic. In order for an understanding to recognise an 
intrinsic form (i.e., a form of activity that completes itself), that understanding must first gather 
and complete that form for itself. An understanding must thus actively create a match that does 
not so much facilitate a future recognition, but more immediately involves or presupposes a 
recognition: namely, the recognition of that understanding that finds itself completing 
something. This conception of recognition is quite intrinsic. 
Just as Simmias and Cebes fail to recognise the self-motion of Socrates (even though 
he manifests this before them), so too do they fail to recognise the meaning of his argument.4 
That is to say, even though Cebes is historically familiar with the argument from recollection he 
nevertheless fails to gather its meaning. Cebes and Simmias thus suppose that Socrates' 
argument establishes the historical and pre-existence of the soul but not its immortality. That is 
to say, they suppose that the argument of recollection concerns only a certain content of the 
understanding rather than the form that constitutes genuine understanding and being. 
Because Cebes and Simmias collect or receive and remember rather than reason, they 
thus fail to see the vicious circularity or the utter redundancy of their explanation for the 
presence of what their understandings contain. Cebes essentially asserts: we cannot learn -
that is, we cannot recollect - without at some previous time learning what we now recollect. 
In other words, he maintains that we can recognise beauty and justice because in a previous life 
we were introduced to them. However, that same problem of recollection can be replayed in 
that previous life, where they are supposedly first introduced to those forms. The infinite 
regress that threatens should force or summon them to think about form rather than content. 
They must thus come to understand recognition as possible only because of an activity of the 
understanding that gathers a previously unanticipated form. With this movement of their 
understandings, they will recognise something with which they are not already historically 
familiar. They will thereby recognise something as necessary or timeless rather than merely 
contingent or historically conditioned. With this recognition, they of necessity will manifest 
something necessary and so timeless. Moreover, once Socrates' friends make this move of 
assigning self-motion to the soul, their historical foray into the pre-existence of the soul 
becomes redundant. 
Thus, the argument from recollection essentially argues against direct receipt. That it 
to say, it argues against itself as an argument, or more correctly, it argues against a certain way 
of reading arguments. For, to rightly understand the argument of recollection is to let go of and 
deny its content. It invites us to recollect rather than remember or merely receive. Thus, it 
invites us to deny that explicit association that Socrates makes between memory and 
recollection (see 73d+). We thereby deny the historicity of the understanding and thereby, we 
manifest its timelessness. To rightly understand the argument is thus to deliver oneself from its 
content as given and in its place to gather something quite unanticipated. It is thus for the 
understanding to refuse to contain the argument as mere content. Here Socrates implicitly 
draws us to think of arguments manifesting a form similar to that of fables. Thereby, Socrates 
invites his friends' understanding to latch onto a necessary, timeless or unchanging form and 
with this activity discover something about the possibility of the soul's immortality through its 
active changelessness. 
5.5 THE MOTION OF MISOLOGY AND MISANTHROPY AND THE UNASSAILABLE 
AGGREGATION OF CONTENT 
However, Simmias and Cebes fail to see that problem (in their own passive reading of the 
argument), which invites its own solution. Consequently, after Socrates finishes his re-telling 
of the argument from recollection, Simmas concludes: 'I do not think ... that we have proved 
that the soul continues to exist after death' (77b). Cebes concurs; he suggests that only 
[h]alf of what needed proof has been proved, but further proof is needed that [the 
soul] exists no less after we have died, if the proof is to be complete. (77b) 
Thus, Simmias and Cebes still face the same fear. In reply Socrates suggests that they should 
search the entire land 'sparing neither trouble nor expense' looking to 'find a good charmer for 
these fears'. He continues, adding the corrective: 
[y]ou must also search among yourselves, for you might not easily find people 
who could do this better than yourselves. (78a) 
In this way, Socrates directs his interlocutors away from him, or, more specifically, he directs 
them away from their direct receipt of what he says, and instead directs them to themselves, or, 
more particularly, he directs their understanding to turn on itself. Socrates thus warns his 
interlocutors that they should not look to him to deliver them their conviction. 
In what follows Socrates continues to direct them to the self-motion and so 
changelessness of the soul (see 78b+). In turn, his interlocutors continue to characterise the 
soul as the product of that antithetical type of motion (from without). Simmias, for example, 
suggests that the soul is like a harmony played upon a lyre (where the lyre is the body) (see e.g. 
85e+) and Cebes suggests that the soul is like a cloak (87b+). 
This to and fro exchange of arguments does not lead Socrates' friends to any positive 
conviction. Rather, it leads them to greater confusion. For, with their passive receipt and their 
passive delivery, they engage in a type of motion that only results in change. They are merely 
buffeted by the argument. They nevertheless resolutely hold to their original and passive 
expectation. Echecrates confesses: 
I am again quite in need, as if from the beginning, of some other argument to 
convince me that the soul does not die along with the man. (88d) 
That exchange of arguments finally ends with Simmias confessing that he still harbours 
misgiving about what has been said (107b). 
Throughout the dialogue, Socrates' friends do to him only what their singular (passive) 
conception of motion affords. They thus do to him what they fear will be done to them when 
they die: they scatter or unravel both Socrates, and what Socrates says. The more they ask 
Socrates to complete his proof, and, in turn, the more content they directly receive, the more 
multitudinous rather than unified their understandings become. With every reply from 
Socrates, they feel that they receive compounded cause for doubt. With these ever multiplying 
possibilities, Socrates' friends move further and further away from gathering conviction. Those 
arguments merely add to the content rather than the form of their understandings. Phaedo, 
confesses: 
[w]e had been quite convinced by the previous argument, and they seemed to 
confuse us again, and to drive us into doubt not only what had already been said, 
but also what was going to be said, lest we be worthless as critics or the subject 
itself admitted of no certainty. (88c) 
Socrates finally halts the exchange of arguments. That back and forth motion only leads 
to the type of misology to which Phaedo begins to give voice. Instead of continuing in the 
same way, Socrates addresses their predicament with something that looks more like a fable 
than an argument. He tells his friends the story of his first introduction to the thinking of 
Anaxagoras. He begins: 
[0 ]ne day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and 
saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted 
with this cause ... (97c) 
However, Socrates says, when he read that work his 'wonderful hope was dashed'. For 
Anaxagoras made no use of Mind in his explanation of things, 'but mentioned as causes air and 
ether and water and many other strange things' (98b). That is to say, in his explanation of 
things, Anaxagoras makes no appeal to self-motion but only motion from without. Socrates 
goes on to suggest that the type of appeal that Anaxagoras makes to Mind is akin to first 
claiming that 
Socrates' actions are all due to his mind, and then trying to tell the causes of 
everything I do, to say that the reason I am sitting here is because my body 
consists of bones and sinews, because the bones are hard and separated by joints, 
that the sinews are such as to contract and relax ... and contraction of sinews 
enable me to bend my limbs, and that is the cause of me sitting here with my 
limbs bent. (98cd) 
Socrates' friends unravel him in the same way that Socrates imagines Anaxagoras unravelling 
him.5 Thus, with fable, Socrates connects the misology that was emerging from their previous 
discussion with the misanthropy that was unfolding in step (89d+). 
In receiving Socrates as a direct communicator, his friends thus receive the meaning of 
the content of what he says as given. That is to say, they can only understand his meaning as 
historically familiar. The result is always an aggregation or merely a remixing of that with 
which they are already familiar (cf. 72c). Because of this, Socrates can never introduce to them 
(by way of a showing), and they can never introduce to themselves, any genuinely new 
meaning. Thus, conviction is always beyond their grasp. 
This same priority of part to whole, and the resulting unassailable aggregation of 
content, defines Anaxagoras' view of the world. With this priority, he arrives at a World, or a 
Mind, made up only of motion from without - a type of motion that only results in change and 
can afford no sense of completion. Thus, under such a conception, there can be no genuine 
World, Mind or Being. So, it turns out that just as Socrates' friends can find no conviction 
neither can they genuinely locate Socrates. Phaedo, Simmias and Cebes seek to go through 
him, to what he contains. In this way, they mirror Euthyphro, who attempts to go beyond what 
is godly to locate value in mere content (or what is essentially external to the divine). 
In connecting misology and misanthropy, Socrates summons his friends to an activity 
that will counter their passivity: he summons them to gather the connection between the form of 
good people and the form of good arguments. Thereby he invites his friends to stop directly 
receiving the meaning of what he says and instead to gather meaning. That is, he indirectly 
invites them to read his arguments as if they were fables (or, in other words, Socrates indirectly 
invites his interlocutors to recognise as stronger what they previously received as weaker 
arguments),6 and, in turn, to read his fables as arguments. 
5.6 FABLES AND ARGUMENTS 
As the dialogue commences, Socrates invites his friends to this understanding of 
communication: he summons them to conflate the form (rather than the content) of being, fables 
and arguments. When his friends enter his cell, they find him writing poetry. Thinking that he 
discovers Socrates doing something new, Phaedo asks him about his apparent change of 
practice. Within his reply, Socrates offers the following distinction: 'a poet, if he is to be a 
poet, must compose fables, not arguments' (61b). 
Here Socrates seems to draw a clear-cut division between the practices of philosophers 
and the practices of poets. Fables, according to this division, employ an indirect mode of 
communication; they thus require us to gather rather than receive their meaning. Consider, for 
example, the fable that Socrates relates immediately before offering the above distinction: he 
describes two animals with their heads joined. Because of this peculiar anatomical conjunction, 
if someone 'pursues and catches the one [creature], he is almost always bound to catch the other 
also' (60bc). Socrates explains that his story concerns the connection between the apparent 
opposites pleasure and pain. With this accompanying explanation, he shows that the intended 
meaning of fables is orthogonal to the literal meaning of their express content. That is to say, 
with his commentary, Socrates implicitly emphasises that the meaning of fables must be 
gathered rather than directly received. 
In his usual manner, Socrates relates fables throughout the dialogue. His final fable 
concerns 'the nature of the earth as a whole' (l11c+). With this story, he offers no elucidating 
commentary; at its completion, he merely observes: '[n]o sensible man would insist that these 
things are as I have described them' (114d). With this rider, Socrates does not mean to suggest 
that his fable has no meaning. Rather, he merely warns his interlocutors away from resting 
content with the express or given meaning of its content (that is to say, he warns them against 
becoming preoccupied with questions concerning the story's literal accuracy). In so doing, he 
implicitly directs them to gather its form. 7 
Arguments, on the other hand, at least, given Socrates' express contrast of them with 
fables, appear to employ a quite opposite, and so direct, mode of communication. That is to 
say, we should understand arguments literally; and for this reason, we are able to understand 
them in a piecemeal way. During their delivery, we can therefore rightly understand their 
constitutive parts. It is only with this presumption that Cebes is able to assert that Socrates 
proves half of what he needs to prove. If Cebes were to look at the determination of meaning 
flowing from the form to the content of communication then he could not talk of possessing 
half of what is complete (cf. 77b). This piecemeal take on meaning and completion can never 
accommodate the form of fables. With fables, we must await the totality of their expression 
before we can begin to gather their intended meaning. That gathering transforms the meaning 
of the fable's content as originally given. In other words, the genuine, or gathered, meaning of 
a fable is orthogonal to its received meaning. Because of this final determination of the 
meaning of a fable's content by its overall form, fables, in contrast with arguments, are genuine, 
or unified, wholes.8 
However, if this distinction between possible modes of communication (and their 
accompanying modes of understanding) is the one that Socrates has in mind (when he states 'a 
poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose fables, not arguments '), he cannot mean us to accept it. 
For, he offers that division (between philosophy and fable) in the midst of a fable (see 60d+).9 
Thus, if we allow the broad exegetical directive we receive from our initial express 
reading of that division to determine what we gather from our re-reading of that division -
now recognising it as part of a fable - it turns out that what we once received and what is now 
determining our approach, now escapes our grasp. That is to say, on our re-reading, it turns out 
that what we initially accepted, and what we now apply, eludes us. In its place, we gather 
something quite opposite in meaning. 
Because Socrates engrosses the meaning of the content of what he says in the form of 
what he says,JO he frustrates any direct receipt of his meaning. He therefore summons his 
friends to gather his meaning. Because of this reflexive aspect of his communication, there can 
only be one way of understanding his Phaedo division: Socrates essentially invites his friends 
to gather that there is no genuine division between his use of fable and argument. 
Through this showing by Socrates, Plato shows us how we should read his works. 
Plato thus does not seek to impose from without something upon our understandings. Rather, 
he invites or summons us to an activity through which we gather and complete a formal internal 
analogue of what we are to recognise. In this way, we are to read his philosophy as fable. Plato 
challenges us to recognise Socrates (as a presence) as the best of arguments. 
Socrates' friends fail to make sense of what he says. The result, according to Socrates 
is dire. At the tail end of his frustrating exchange with them, Socrates concludes that misology 
and misanthropy have a common cause. That common cause involves the misanthropist seeing 
people as only direct communicators and the misologist seeing arguments after the same 
manner. Neither the misanthropist nor the misologist recognise wholes or completed forms. 
For this reason, both the misanthropist and the misologist lack being. 
NOTES 
The Republic and Phaedrus are the only dialogues that place Socrates beyond the city walls. 
In both of these cases, he does not really leave the city proper. In the former case, he is 
only a stones throwaway in the port city of Pireaus. In Phaedrus is just beyond the city 
walls. Alcibaides, in his Symposium speech, describes Socrates' heroic feats on the 
battlefield. Once again, Socrates in defending Athens does not really leave the city. 
2 Compare the opening scene of the Symposium where Socrates turns up late to Agathon's 
gathering. He has been standing motionless (in thought) in a neighbour's porch (Symposium 
l75a+). In Phaedo we are told that Socrates places his feet firmly on the ground and 
throughout the discussion he does not move (Phaedo 6ld). 
He can choose to preserve his being by his choice not to take his own life and his resolve to 
prevent others from taking it (see 62d); and, in a more positive way, he can try to preserve 
his being by daily maintenance. 
4 Simmias and Cebes' passive reading makes no sense. With it, they essentially assert that 
they are incapable of recognising something without already have a match contained in 
memory. Thus, for the same reason that they do not recognise what is so distinctive about 
Socrates in the hours leading up to his death, they will similarly fail to recognise that nature 
in a prior life. Positing a prior introduction thus does nothing to explain how conditions are 
ever sufficient for recognition. It does not matter historically when or how many times 
Cebes and Simmias are introduced to what is just, or, what is beautiful, or, what moves 
itself. If their understandings do not actively manifest those forms, they still will fail to 
recognise them for what they are no matter how many times they are confronted by them. 
Those things that manifest intrinsic value can only be actively recognised by an 
understanding and not merely historically introduced to an understanding. 
In Phaedrus Plato also discusses the connection between Anaxagoras and what Socrates' 
friends do to him. In that dialogue, Socrates suggests that Anaxagoras influenced the 
rhetoric of Pericles (Phaedrus 270a). Here, Plato identifies Anaxagoras' metaphysics as 
the only kind afforded by a direct conception of communication. 
6 In the Apology, Meletus accuses Socrates of making the weaker arguments stronger. In a 
sense, this accusation is correct; but to see it in this way we must first rethink what makes a 
good argument good. Reading arguments like the argument from recollection or any of 
those arguments Socrates presents in his own defence at his trial as direct communication 
makes them weak. But to recognise them as indirect (or, as primarily involving a showing) 
is precisely to recognise them as strong and it is to unsettle that received understanding of 
what makes arguments strong. 
7 Only with this distinction, between gathered meaning and received meaning, can we make 
sense of Socrates' Apology attack on the poets (see Apology 22c). 
In Gorgias, in the midst of a heated argument from which his interlocutors attempt to 
escape, Socrates suggests 'that it isn't permitted to give up in the middle of telling stories 
.... A head must be put on it, so it won't go about headless' (Gorgias 505cd; also cf. 
Phaedrus 264c). 
9 We may think that Socrates here engages merely in autobiography (or in a mere telling of 
history) rather than fable. However, to proceed with this exegetical assumption essentially 
begs the question against the story's possible philosophical worth. For an example of 
Socrates' blunt refusal to search for the historical truth of myths, see Phaedrus 229c. 
10 For a playful and obvious example of how Plato thinks the form of a communication 
determines the meaning of its content, see Socrates' discussion of different narrative forms 
and in particular his re-writing of a portion of Homer's Iliad (Republic 3.393d+). With this 
change of narrative form, Socrates shows how the meaning of what is said also changes. In 
this regard, consider how Plato distances us from the impact of Socrates' death by the 
Phaedo account's predominant use of simple rather than imitative narrative. 
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ABSTRACT 
In Phaedrus Plato contrasts his own conception of love with that of the pederast. 
With this comparison, Plato also shows the difference between two quite opposite 
modes of communication - he tells us the one and shows us the other. His 
conclusion is surprising: the pederast brutalises love in his willingness to directly 
speak of it. Plato concludes that we can only directly speak of those things we 
cannot understand. If we try to speak directly of those things we can genuinely 
understand, we are bound to brutalise them and so we are bound to quite 
fundamentally misunderstand them. Moreover, we threaten to savage those with 
whom we speak and we most certainly abuse ourselves. Thus, according to Plato, 
a genuine understanding demands a reverent silence. Under this quite peculiar 
conception of communication as showing rather than telling, Plato's conception 
of love takes on the same fecundate form. 
6.1 SIMPLE AND SAVAGE UNDERSTANDINGS 
From one complicated perspective, Phaedrus is a work that concerns itself with many things. 
From this viewpoint, the dialogue deals with what it is to communicate to others, what it is to 
receive the communication from others, what it is to love, what it is to be loved, the nature of 
friendship, the nature of desert, etc. From another perspective, however, Phaedrus concerns 
itself with a single thing. Under this aspect, what it is to be, what it is to communicate, and 
what it is to love, all necessarily coincide; else, there can be no genuine communication, love or 
being. Plato shows both mutually excluding perspectives; and invites us to gather the one, 
rather than merely receive the multiplicity that is the other. 
Each perspective Plato associates with a particular kind of creature. Early on in the 
dialogue, Socrates questions: 
[a]m I a beast more complicated and savage than Typhon, or am I a tamer, 
simpler animal with a share in a divine and gentle nature? (230a) 
With this rehearsal, Socrates shows the form of his own enquiry. Importantly for Socrates, such 
an enquiry does not merely uncover something; rather, it decides it. For, with that activity of 
the understanding, as it reflects upon itself, its form becomes a product of its own activity. 
Thereby it becomes godlike. Consequently, this self-knowledge has a directly ontic import. 
According to this understanding, to know oneself is precisely to become a self. Thus, to enter 
upon the enquiry commanded by the Delphic inscription (see 230a) is precisely to decide one's 
own nature as divine rather than complicated. 
Being such a simple creature is precisely what it is to be a knower. It is not possible to 
know oneself as a complicated creature. In other words, one can only know oneself as simple, 
that is, active. This activity is the activity of knowing. Under such an understanding of what it 
is to know, knowledge does not concern what an understanding contains. Rather, it essentially 
involves the activity, form or finishing of the understanding. Since knowledge essentially 
involves a practice, incontinence is inconceivable. Thus, knowledge cannot merely sit as a 
premise in a practical syllogism and thus only inferentially or remotely connect to a possible act 
(cf. Protagoras 352d+). 
Plato goes on to differentiate two types of motion, motion from without and self-
motion (245c), and he associates these with the complicated and simple creatures respectively. 
The complicated creature does not reflect on itself; rather, it directs motion (savagely) to what 
is without. Because of this outwardly directed motion, it cannot gather or preserve a self. The 
complicated creature does not rightly have a self; its type of motion Socrates associates with 
mindlessness (see 270a). Such a creature is mindless or complicated precisely because it does 
not manifest the unifying type of self-motion (which gathers or finishes a self). 
Plato associates the savage creature - that is, the creature that communicates via an 
outwardly directed motion - with the rhetorician. According to this assessment, the 
rhetorician is essentially a pederast. The, rhetorician-pederast slavishly imposes himself on (or 
invades) the other. As a method of communication, this is self-defeating. For not only does 
that method's motion frustrate the possibility of the otherness of the other (and thereby it 
frustrates the possibility of genuine reciprocity from the other), but, in addition, its motion also 
frustrates the possibility of the rhetorician-pederast being a self. For, with the use of this 
impinging method, there can be no presentation of a self as a source from which that supposed 
communication or love emanates. Thus, with this method, nothing communicates; nothing 
loves. 
Plato identifies the rhetorician Pericles as the proximate father of this type of supposed 
communication; the more remote source is the mindless metaphysics of Anaxagoras (see 270a). 
For, with all his talk about mind, Anaxagoras transforms the unity of self-motion, which defines 
mind as mind, into something complicated. Thus, the way he talks about mind dissipates mind. 
In this way, he essentially denies mind (see Phaedo 96+). Just as Anaxorgoras' talk of mind is 
self-contradictoryl so also is the rhetorician's method of direct communication and the 
pederast's view oflove. 
Plato contrasts the complicated pederast-rhetorician with the divine philosopher 
Socrates, who is self-mover, an active lover and an indirect communicator. Throughout the 
ensuing dialogue, Plato pits his philosopher against the rhetorician-pederast. In that battle, 
Plato makes quite explicit what he means by bad love and bad communication: Socrates 
characterises this way of loving and communicating as that way in which 'wolves love lambs' 
(241d). However, Socrates does not directly tell Phaedrus what he means by genuine 
communication. Nevertheless, he does genuinely communicate. He thus shows Phaedrus what 
it is; and, in so doing, he leaves Phaedrus to gather rather than merely receive that meaning. 
According to the showing of Socrates, genuine love and genuine communication involve a 
showing or manifestation of form and a reciprocal gathering of that form by the other. In other 
words, the lover engages in self-motion rather than a motion that is directed to invade the 
(otherness of the) other. In order to recognise this form, Phaedrus' understanding must first 
instantiate it; thereby he will genuinely reciprocate that motion. 
6.2 RAPE AND COMMUNION 
The dialogue commences as Phaedrus and Socrates meet. Phaedrus has spent that morning 
listening to the pederast Lysias (227a; 228a). Lysias is the tragic but absent figure of the 
dialogue. His absence from the dialogue denotes his greater absence from being; and he is 
absent from being precisely because of the way he communicates. Lysias is a direct 
communicator; with what he says, he seeks to occupy or possess Phaedrus. He repeats to 
Phaedrus (228a), what he wants Phaedrus to believe. Because he communicates by way of an 
outwardly directed motion, he presents no genuine self when he speaks. We only hear from 
him when Phaedrus regurgitates his speech. Even here, he does not intend anyone to recognise 
him; for in that speech Lysias pretends to be what he is not. According to Phaedrus, Lysias' 
speech 
is aimed at seducing a beautiful boy, but the speaker is not in love with him -
this is actually what is so clever and elegant about it: Lysias argues that it is better 
to give your favors to someone who does not love you than to someone who does. 
(227c) 
Phaedrus has already started to commit that speech to memory and he carries a copy of 
it with him under his cloak.2 After a little coaxing, he reads the speech to Socrates. 
Within that speech, Lysias argues that it is more prudent for a boy to give his favours 
to a non-lover than to a lover. The non-lover is not overwhelmed by love; rather he has 'put his 
heart into whatever he thinks will give pleasure' (23Ib). Lysias suggests that while the lover is 
out of control (232a, 231d), the non-lover is not: he merely makes it his goal to win the boy's 
favours (233a). A lover begs for the favours of his beloved. Lysias however wants Phaedrus to 
consider him a friend, who deserves those favours (see 233d+). He concludes his speech 
suggesting that this arrangement 'really should work to the benefit of both sides' (234c). 
Lysias thus attempts to persuade his beloved that the non-lover - rather than the 
slavish lover - deserves favours (see 233d+). He supposes that he can get what he wantsby 
claiming desert rather than by slavishly begging. However, pursuing this strategy (that is, by 
trying to persuade the boy of this supposedly alternative type of relationship), Lysias betrays 
himself quite transparently as slavish rather than deserving. 
6.3 LOVE AND HUNGER 
Holding love to be essentially a hunger, Lysias cannot conceive that love could be truly 
reciprocal. Nevertheless, he desires reciprocity. Thus, he can only approach that end 
negatively, that is, by appearing to reduce or deny the quite fundamental asymmetry of his 
relationship with his beloved. He does this by pretending that there is no love to reciprocate. 
The closest he can get to reciprocity, is by getting Phaedrus all to himself and by instituting 
between himself and Phaedrus an economy of mutual benefit. Thus, Lysias' strategy is first to 
convince his beloved that he is not in love with him; then, he turns his beloved against all his 
other lovers. Thus, Lysias will only succeed in his limited aim insofar as he convinces 
Phaedrus that he is not what he is, and, in addition, insofar as he has Phaedrus reject what he 
really is. There is thus something 'quite essentially self-defeating about Lysias' approach. 
Lysias seems to be aware that what he most wants to do to his beloved frustrates what he most 
wants from his beloved. Lysias really wants to be not only the lover but also the beloved. 
The rhetorician's strategy is to persuade the other that he is not about what he is in fact 
about. In this way, he seeks to change (or make complex) the other to the end of having the 
other accommodate or tolerate him (as complex). He seeks quite directly to make others like 
himself (cf. Euthyphro 3c). After this method, Lysias seeks to introduce into Phaedrus a certain 
content of belief, which is alien to the self-motion of Phaedrus' understanding. He thus treats 
Phaedrus' understanding as if it is purely receptive. He treats him as a complex rather than a 
simple creature. 
Even though Lysias' strategy is complicated or self-defeating, he seems to succeed in 
deceiving Phaedrus. In achieving this however, Lysias does not really get what he wants. For, 
that victory leaves him with a mere transaction, replication and regurgitation rather than 
reciprocity. That is to say, he secures something complicated rather than something complete; 
of necessity, this is unsatisfying. 
Therefore, even though Lysias does appear to win Phaedrus over, he has no real 
security in that victory; for, there is no genuine meeting of minds. Direct communication is 
self-defeating for it only directly persuades the other by denying the otherness (that is, the self-
motion) of the other. Lysias can only successfully impinge directly on Phaedrus' understanding 
if he successfully thwarts the self-motion of that understanding. Thus, the other's 
understanding is not really convinced but only impinged upon. In this passive state, other 
motions from without are just as liable to sway it - Socrates for example can just as easily tum 
Phaedrus away from Lysias. Socrates however goes about things in an opposite way. For, in 
accordance with the Delphic command, he focuses on what is within rather than on what is 
without. He thereby directly addresses that complexity by manifesting simplicity, which 
indirectly invites reciprocity. 
6.4 COMPLEXITY AND SELF-CONTRADICTION 
Lysias direct form of communication expresses a way of valuing. In communicating with 
Phaedrus he imposes that way on him. In receiving that communication, Phaedrus receives or 
accommodates that implicit conception of value. Accordingly, Phaedrus associates value with 
what can be transferred and in tum, he associates what is complete with an accumulation of 
such content; he thus ignores fonn. Phaedrus assesses Lysias' speech as: the very best, clever, 
elegant, superb and complete (227c; 228a; 234c; 235b). He thinks (along with Lysias) that the 
speech is complete because it has gone on long enough (234c) and because it expresses 
everything that can be said on the topic (235b). 
Socrates' judgement is more measured. He dismisses the given content of the speech 
as repetitive and self-contradictory, and, he judges the fonn, thrown together at random (235a, 
246b). In the face of Phaedrus' adulation of Lysias, Socrates boasts that he 'can make a 
different speech, even better than Lysias" (235c). Phaedrus, continuing to prioritise content to 
fonn,3 supposes that Socrates has 'promised to make another speech making more points, and 
better ones, without repeating a word' from Lysias' speech (235d). Socrates pulls Phaedrus up 
on that extreme view concerning the origin of meaning and Phaedrus revises his expectation; 
nevertheless, he maintains his passive focus on content and continues to suppose that value can 
precede form. He says to Socrates: 'add anything of value to complete what we already have in 
hand' (236b). 
In order to make the speech complete, Socrates, in a sense, does add something (he 
also eliminates something). After Socrates finishes that reformulation however, Phaedrus does 
not recognise it as complete; he supposes that Socrates still needs to add a second half to his 
speech.4 Here, Socrates confronts Phaedrus' understanding with an opposite conception of 
what it is to be complete. Phaedrus will not find the conditions for its completion if he 
continues to look where Lysias points. In presenting something apparently contentfully 
incomplete, Socrates invites Phaedrus to think in a very different way, concentrating on the 
determination of form, rather than the givenness of content. 5 Here, Socrates not only implicitly 
invites Phaedrus to think about meaning and communication in a radically different way, but 
also to rethink his conception oflove. 
Socrates premises his version of the speech by explaining that its author is in love with 
the boy to whom he directs the speech. Within the speech, however, the author makes out that 
he is not in love. Upon that express duplicity, Socrates maintains and cleans up Lysias 
argument that the boy should not give his favours to lovers (237b). In this context, Lysias' 
voice clearly defeats itself. Socrates thus makes the contradiction of Lysias' speech quite 
explicit and uses this to summon Phaedrus' understanding. 
In that reformed speech, Socrates suggests that 'a man who is ruled by desire and is a 
slave to pleasure will tum his boy into whatever is most pleasing to himself' (238e). Such a 
lover will seek the total dependence of his beloved (239ab). Thus, lovers who seek pleasure 
seek to make their beloved passive. For this reason, Socrates suggests that 'the friendship of a 
lover arises without any good will at all' (241c). Thus, the lover who seeks the dependence of 
the beloved does not aim at beauty and instead aims at something quite opposite. Socrates 
suggests that the 'unreasoning desire that overpowers a person's impulse to do right and is 
driven to take pleasure in beauty '" takes its name from the word force (rhome) and is called 
eros' (238bc). Socrates concludes his speech: 
[y]ou should know that the friendship of a lover arises without any good will at 
all. No, like food, its purpose is to sate hunger. 'Do wolves love lambs? That's 
how lovers befriend a boy!' (241cd) 
Phaedrus is disappointed. He supposes that Socrates does not complete the speech; he 
expects Socrates to go on to give reasons for why a boy should give his favours to the non-lover 
(241d) - this aspect Socrates eliminates from Lysias' speech. Phaedrus thus continues to 
focus on content; he merely allows Socrates' speech to impinge upon him. Consequently, 
Phaedrus takes the meaning of the speech as given and so he fails to do something quite basic. 
He thus recognises in that speech only what he already believes or what he has already received 
from Lysias. And for this reason, he merely detects something missing rather than something 
successfully defeated. 
Socrates responds to Phaedrus' express disappointment, by explaining: '[d]idn't you 
notice, my friend, that even though I am criticizing the lover, I passed beyond lyric into epic 
poetry?' (241 e). Here Socrates (as he does to his interlocutors in Phaedo) invites Phaedrus to a 
different conception of what marks completion. He encourages Phaedrus to start thinking about 
or gathering form rather than merely receiving content. He must thus think of Socrates' 
argument not as directly delivering something to him; rather, he should assume that Socrates 
presents a form more akin to that presented by a poet. Socrates has already warned him against 
directly receiving the content of poems; he implicitly suggests that to receive mere content in 
that way is an anathema to the type of motion that the Delphic inscription commands (see 
229cd). 
In order for Phaedrus to start on the activity of gathering the meaning of Socrates' 
speech (rather than merely receiving a meaning), he must first assume that Socrates has finished 
or completed something. That is to say, he must assume that there is something to be 
understood (see Protagoras chapter). Wielding that presumption (or principle) of the 
understanding, his understanding already reaches beyond what it can merely receive or contain. 
Acting on this principle, the understanding anticipates its own form. With this expectation of 
meaning, the understanding already strays from its merely receptive capacity. For that principle 
comes from the understanding's understanding of what it is to understand. Here, it knows 
something of itself and it actively draws itself away from complexity to something essentially 
simple. The origin of that principle points to the only possible origin of all genuine meaning. 
6.5 SPEAKING THE UN-UNDERSTANDABLE AND UNDERSTANDING THE 
UNSPEAKABLE 
Socrates disowns his speech, suggesting it is 'close to being impious' (242d). For, even though 
he subverts Lysias' aim, he still seems to denigrate love; 'Love', he goes on to suggests, 'is a 
god or something divine' (242de). Rather than showing love manifesting the self-motion of the 
divine (see 245e), Socrates' and Lysias' previous speeches reduce it to a savage or slavish 
hunger. Because those speeches refer to something that cannot be reciprocated or completed, 
they do not really speak of love at all. 
In claiming that 'Love is a god' Socrates summons Phaedrus to conceive of love in 
terms of the divine. In other words, he summons him to consider what it would be for a perfect 
being to love. This type of move is familiar to the dialogues: in Euthyphro, for example, 
Socrates invites his interlocutor to do this with piety (and value). In Meno, Socrates has 
Meno's slave show Meno what it is divinely or genuinely to possess something. In Apology, 
Socrates summons the jurors to gather what it is to communicate, what it is to teach and what it 
is to understand while considering what it would be for a divine being to communicate, etc. In 
Phaedo, Socrates summons his friends to think of the nature of being in terms of the divine. In 
all these cases, Socrates invites his interlocutors to invert their previous take on these notions. 
This strategy produces mystical or ineffable results. However, this is not to say that 
Plato directs the understanding to something beyond its reach. Rather, this approach firmly ties 
the meanings in question to the understanding. It is thus a mysticism involving immanence 
rather than transcendence. For Plato's method merely re-introduces the understanding to itself 
(that is, it confronts it with its own peculiar type of motion). For according to Plato's 
understanding, the (self-motion of the) understanding is divine. Thus, even though Plato's 
method draws us to something ineffable - something of which we cannot directly speak (cf. 
246a) - it is not ineffable because we cannot understand it, rather it is ineffable precisely 
because we can understand it. Thus, according to Plato's understanding of what it is to 
understand, we can only directly speak of those things that cannot be understood. For the 
motion of direct communication (that outwardly directed motion) is an anathema to the self-
motion that essentially defines an understanding as an understanding. 
Thus, direct communication for Plato betrays a lack of understanding or conveys 
something that cannot be understood. Genuine understandings essentially involve necessity, 
and, necessity, no one can directly convey. In other words: to directly speak about an 
understanding is to decide something illegitimately about the understanding's nature. By 
making that nature speakable, one thereby renders it un-divine and so un-understandable. Thus, 
to talk directly of love is to make it something savage and that which is savage or complex 
cannot be understood. Similarly, to talk directly about mind, is to confer on it the character of 
mindlessness (cf. Phaedo 96+). There is something un-understandable about such 
communication. It conveys something complicated (for the form of direct communication 
disperses) and it is therefore self-contradictory (for a self must be simple rather than 
complicated). 
Lysias repeats this Anaxagorean error when he speaks directly of love. He 
characterises love as involving an impinging motion from without. Thus, the nature of love 
mirrors the form of his (direct) communication. In this case, the symmetry of this connection 
between the content and the form of Lysias' communication looks quite contrived. 
Nevertheless, with this contrivance Plato merely emphasises something that is for him 
unavoidable: namely, that asymmetry between the essential fonn of an understanding and that 
which is manifest by direct communication. Regardless of what Lysias happens to say directly 
about love, he cannot preserve it as something divine. Even if he did have a more adequate 
(that is to say, divine) understanding of love he cannot, on that account, reduce what essentially 
involves self-motion to something carried by an outwardly directed motion. To attempt this 
type of conversion is immediately to transfonn the nature of the understanding: that is, it would 
be to convert its essential fonn to something that implicitly, if not explicitly, emphasises 
content. It is to render that concept discursive but un-understandable. Plato's Phaedrus 
emphasises this necessary connection between the form and content of communication. Plato's 
implicit claim is that form unavoidably determines meaning (of content). With direct 
communication, there is no real fonn (that is, it has no fonn that can be completed) and so no 
real meaning. Plato's solution to this problem of direct communication is Socrates. Socrates 
shows something rather than directly tells something, and this showing is central to what it is 
genuinely to communicate, to love and to be. 
6.6 TRUTH AND BEAUTY 
Socrates goes on to give a second speech - a corrective - championing genuine love - a 
love that essentially involves the self-motion of the divine (245c+). He premises his account by 
suggesting: '[tJo describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account, altogether 
a task for a god in every way; but to say what it is like is humanly possible and takes less time' 
(246a). Thus, because the nature of the soul is ineffable,6 Socrates only talks about it indirectly 
by means of a myth (246a). 
In that fable, he connects each soul's self-motion to its appreciation of truth or beauty. 
Embodied souls, according to that myth, are those souls that fall to earth after having sacrificed 
the power of self-motion to motion from without (248a). Before its fall, a soul has wings; and, 
with those wings, it ascends to the presence of the divine. These wings 'are akin to the divine, 
which has beauty, wisdom, goodness, and everything of that sort' (246e). The soul's wings 
draw it up into the presence of'a being that really is what it is' (247c), and there, the wings are 
nourished and grow (246e). Thus, with its self-motion, the soul becomes evermore divine. 
According to this story, the wings of a soul are lost when souls strike one another 'as 
each tries to get ahead of the others' (248bc). With this type of motion from without, a soul's 
wings are trampled and crippled, and they lose their plumage (246e; 248ab). Thus, the being of 
a soul dissipates or the soul becomes less and less divine when it engages in outwardly directed 
motion - that is to say, when it engages in direct communication. 
Socrates goes on to suggest that, in its embodied state, in the presence of beauty a 
soul's wings can regenerate and grow (249d). For, appreciating beauty as beauty essentially 
involves self-motion. For, beauty is the presentation of a (completed) form and because of this, 
a soul cannot appreciate it merely with the passive or receptive use of the understanding. 
Rather, to recognise a competed fonn the understanding must gather and complete it itself. 
Thus, the understanding recognises beauty only by manifesting that same fonn through its own 
activity (cf. 246de). Beauty thus invites a genuine (that is to say, active) reciprocity from the 
other. 
Here, the indirect communication that is the manifestation of something simple rather 
than something complex transcends the self-contradiction of direct communication. The 
fecundate showing of what is simple invites or summons in the other reciprocity of fonn or 
activity. That is to say, it invites or indirectly demands a gathering from the other. Otherwise, 
it defies understanding. In other words, self-motion can only be recognised by the other upon 
the other engaging in self-motion (for intrinsic value cannot passively be recognised). 
In contrast, the complexity of Lysias defies understanding. He shows something that 
cannot be gathered. Thus, Anaxagoras' move to want to talk directly about mind is wrong-
headed. He would more genuinely communicate something about the nature of mind if he 
refused to talk of it and rather manifested its nature, as Socrates does as he sits motionless in the 
Athenian cell awaiting his execution. Socrates communicates in the only way we can rightly 
conceive of a god communicating. That way is also the only way we can conceive of a god 
loving. Love here is not a hunger but a manifestation of form, which in tum invites the same 
activity in others. This reciprocity ofform Socrates calls 'backlove' (255d). 
6.7 MAKING BEAUTY UGLY AND BACKLOVE 
Socrates' talk of backlove is meant for Lysias' ears. What is from Lysias' perspective, 
impossible really is according to Socrates possible. Reciprocity is impossible from Lysias' 
perspective for he associates love with hunger. Thus, the most he can hope for is coinciding 
appetites. 
Lysias is really the one who refuses to reciprocate in an appropriate way. In offering 
that speech, he does not treat beauty as he ought. Rather, he means to introduce something 
quite directly into the beautiful boy to whom he directs his speech. Introducing additional 
content into beauty is precisely to brutalise or make beauty ugly. Lysias respects neither the 
autonomy nor economy of beauty.7 Socrates, in his speech on this savage type of love, warns 
Phaedrus that the type of lover to whom Lysias refers will seek to destroy the beauty of his 
beloved (238e+); such a lover will seek to make his beloved totally dependent upon him (239b). 
If he cannot make his beloved reciprocate, he can make him dependant; and he gains this 
dependence by destroying his beloved's beauty. Thus, with his victory, he gains something he 
does not want; for, he gains something ugly rather than something beautiful. The lover's 
attempt to possess the beauty of his beloved only threatens to destroy that beauty. According to 
an externalist conception of what it is to possess, beauty (as an intrinsic form) cannot be 
possessed. Beauty is essentially autonomous (or divine). The lover can only rightly aim at 
possessing beauty in an intrinsic rather than in an extrinsic way: that is to say, the love can only 
possess beauty through manifesting it rather than trying to invade or conquer it. 
Lysias really wants to be not only the lover but also the beloved. He desires 
reciprocity. However, what Lysias most wants to do to his beloved frustrates what he most 
wants from his beloved. When Socrates describes how the beloved can come to express 
backlove for the lover (255d), he seems to offer some promise to Lysias' hope. However, it is a 
summoning promise, for, by following its invitation Lysias will be led away from the 
conception oflove that led him to follow that invitation. For, the lover can only invite backlove 
from his beloved if he does not do what he most wants to do to his beloved. Positively, that is 
to say, the lover must manifest form (or beauty) rather than directly impinging upon the beauty 
of his beloved. In order to get what he most wants the pederast must cease to be a pederast. 
This change in the way Lysias treats his beloved will in tum change what Lysias most wants. If 
Lysias manifests a beautiful form, he will thereby summon the beloved to reciprocate in kind. 
Backlove turns out to be the reciprocity invited by the lover's manifestation of a beautiful form. 
Backlove is thus itself the manifestation ofa beautiful form (rather than a trading offavours).8 
That gathering invited by the fecundity of genuine love and genuine communication is 
what Plato demands' from us if we are rightly to appreciate the fable he tells concerning 
Socrates. The dialogues are Plato's expression of backlove for Socrates. Accordingly, there is 
a formal identity between Socrates' and Plato's expression. That is to say, that showing of 
Socrates is the showing of Plato. Even so, there is hardly any backlove expressly shown within 
the dialogues.9 Rather, throughout the dialogues, Plato shows Socrates' interlocutors failing to 
gather his meaning. Even in the hours immediately preceding Socrates' death, Plato tragically 
depicts Socrates' closest friends quite fundamentally misunderstanding his form of 
communication (see Phaedo and CrUo). Throughout these failures to communicate, Socrates 
maintains a form of silence (a silence only matched by Plato's ever present silence). And, he 
must maintain that silence. For he cannot solve this communication problem by directly telling 
his interlocutors what he is about. For this problem of communication centres on the passivity 
of his interlocutors. He will only feed that passivity by changing his mode of communication 
from indirect to direct. And with that direct mode he will cease to show them what he 
previously did. Instead of Socrates' interlocutors trying to brutalise his manifestation of beauty, 
he will instead cease to manifest beauty and instead brutalize them. 
6.8 MEMORY AND RECIPROCITY 
After that fable concerning the possibility of backlove and the possibility of genuine 
communication, Socrates leads the discussion back to the problems of direct communication. 
He offers a myth concerning Theuth and King Thamus. Theuth, Socrates suggests, is the god 
who first discovered number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, as well as 
the games of checkers and dice, and above all else, writing. (274cd) 
Theuth displays his arts before King Thamus and urges the King to disseminate those arts to his 
people. Before making that decision, King Thamus asked Theuth to explain the pros and cons 
of each art. In contrast to his judgements on the other arts, Theuth can find only advantages and 
no disadvantages to the art of writing. He boasts: 
o King, here is something, once learned, will make the Egyptians wiser and will 
improve their memory; I have discovered a potion for memory and wisdom. 
(274e) 
King Thamus is unimpressed; he supposes that the art of writing will 
introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who use it: they will not practice 
using memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and 
depends on the signs from others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, 
completely on their own. . .. Your invention will enable them to hear many 
things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that they have come 
to know much while for the most part they will know nothing. (275ab) 
When Socrates finishes this fable, Phaedrus immediately accuses him of making up stories 
(275b).10 Here, Phaedrus (as he does as their conversation commences - cf. 229b+) displays an 
unhealthy pre-occupation with the external origins of truth. Here, he wrongly connects 
authority to that impinging motion from without and is suspicious of inventions of the 
understanding (or the understanding remembering from inside). Phaedrus is thus that type of 
person King Thamus foresees, who, after externalising authority (or after suffering the 
brutalising direct communication from others), forgets how to remember from the inside. 
King Thamus' attack on writing summons Plato's readers to free Plato's dialogues 
from that censure. For King Thamus' worry expresses Plato's worry about his audience reading 
his dialogues in a certain way. However, reading the dialogues in merely this receptive way has 
King Thamus' attack on writing catch up with Plato's writing. And so, from such a reading, 
Plato attacks his own attack on writing. Thus, the merely receptive reading of that myth is left 
with nothing to receive. Plato here frustrates the merely receptive understanding. 
In order to receive King Thamus' attack as Plato's attack we must thus wrest Plato 
from its reach. That is to say, we cannot merely receive that attack but rather must gather its 
meaning. Thus, with his myth of King Thamus, Plato shows how written communication can 
escape the attack from that King. That myth thus turns out to be negative in its delivery and 
positive in its active receipt. 
Plato thus invites us to recognise what he shows something and so he invites us away 
from merely receiving what he appears to tell. In writing his dialogues Plato obeys Socrates' 
stipulation: 
[e ]very speech must be put together like a living creature; it must be neither 
without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are 
fitting both to one another and to the whole work. (264c) 
Plato thus presents something complete - that is to say, he presents something beautiful. 
Beauty is its own authority; and thus it is both the touchstone of truth and the end of the activity 
of the understanding. In other words, an understanding can only be recognised as active if it 
manifests a beautiful form. Plato's showing requires from us a reciprocal activity or 
manifestation of form. With the presentation of beauty, the understanding can recognise only 
through its own activity a completed form. The understanding can only recognise truth upon is 
own activity rather than with a mere receipt. That is to say, it can only recognise that a source 
is authoritative by itself becoming an authority by becoming a genuine source. Beauty has an 
essential role here. The authoritative understanding is a beautiful understanding. If truth is not 
beauty, then the understanding has no way of recognising truth other than through mere receipt 
and that way is not to possess an understanding at all (see the Euthyphro chapter - Euthyphro 
can makes no sense of the nature of truth or authority with his merely receptive understanding). 
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It is self-contradictory in the sense that its form of delivery effectively denies (or 
annihilates) the very identity or source that that delivery seems to presuppose. 
In carrying that speech, he carries something essentially external. Even upon committing it 
to memory he will still carry something essentially alien or external to his understanding. 
To suggest that Phaedrus prioritises content to form is just to suggest that he attaches 
meaning entirely to the given content of communication. The alternative conception has 
meaning of that supposedly given content (downwardly) determined by the (completed) 
form of communication. 
Compare how Simmias and Cebes accuse Socrates of proving only half the case for the 
immortality of the soul (see Phaedo chapter). There is no sense in which half a form can be 
produced. Thus, in their talk of parts, Cebes and Phaedo betray their exclusive concern with 
content rather than with form. In other words, in order to recognise that only half a form has 
been produced Simmias', Cebes' understandings must already be in possession of that 
completed form, and so their understandings do not really want for that other half. However, 
Simmias and Cebes are clearly in want of something. In this way they show themselves to 
be unconcerned with form. 
Also compare how Socrates in his Republic account of the perfect state presents something 
that appears to Glaucon to be contentfully incomplete. 
Along with the nature of the soul Socrates also refuses to speak directly about Beauty (see 
Phaedo 1 OOde) and the Good (see Republic 7.514+). 
7 Throughout a number of dialogues, Plato represents a number of attempts to brutalise 
beauty. For example, consider how Glaucon insists that Socrates accommodate his complex 
conception of value in his account of the perfect state (Republic 2.372+). Glaucon asks 
Socrates to 'fill it with a multitude of things that go beyond what it necessary' (Republic 
2.373b) and thus immediately threaten to destroy the economy of that beautiful form. 
Consider how Crito visits Socrates in prison with his scheme to lead Socrates to freedom 
(see Crito). In these instances and others, Plato in a sense rescues beauty from these kinds 
of violation. The beauty of Plato's completed dialogues thwarts those many attempts to 
violate the economy and autonomy of beauty. Plato subsumes those instances of ugliness 
within a greater completed (and so beautiful) form. 
9 
Here Plato gives us the tools to explain in an accommodating way something of the 
phenomenology of love. He enables us to make out the connection between on the one 
hand, our thinking of our beloved as perfect, and, on the other, that feeling of timelessness 
(the feeling that one has always known one's beloved even though one can remember the 
historically first meeting). For this feeling of timelessness (or this feeling of a necessary 
connection between oneself and one's beloved) results from the aesthetic completion (of a 
form) by one's understanding in one's appreciation or recognition of one's beloved as 
perfect or beautiful. There is an inner necessity or timelessness to this aesthetic form (rather 
than merely the historical connection between the ideal lovers made out in Aristophanes' 
myth - see Symposium). 
The most obvious exception to this pattern is Alcibiadies' Symposium speech. However, the 
most notable exception is Socrates himself. Undoubtedly, Socrates expresses backlove for 
the divine, and perhaps also for Parmenides. 
10 This charge, is essentially the same one Meletus brings against Socrates (see Apology 
chapter). The passive understanding associates invention with deceipt or error; such an 
understanding associates truth with mere receipt. 
PART II 
SIN 
A tightrope walker does not allow himself to be braced in order to avoid falling; 
if he did so, he would be sure of his act, but he would no longer appear a skilful 
man. 
Leibniz (letter to Countess Elizabeth) 
Kierkegaard self-portrait (letter to Regine - unsent) 
Man is a rope, fastened between animal and Superman - a rope over an abyss. A 
dangerous going across, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking back, a 
dangerous shuddering and standing still. 
Zarathustra (Nietzsche) 
INTRODUCTION 
SUPPOSING METHOD MATTERS 
Lost in the maze of London's streets a tourist stops and asks a boy at play if he 
knows where the Tower of London is. The boy replies: Yes - but if 1 wanted to 
get there 1 wouldn't start from here.! 
Method is unavoidable. In large part, our method determines the results of our inquiry. What 
we want however is for the subject of our enquity to determine those results. In other words, 
we want our investigation to tell us something about our subject rather than for it merely to tell 
us something about our method. 
Solving this problem requires that we use the method that in some sense suits or 
matches (rather than brutalizes) the form of the subject of our investigation; only in this way 
will we avoid inappropriately forcing a rule upon it. If we succeed in this respect, the 
determination of that method will happily reflect or reciprocate in our understanding the form 
of that subject. 
However, we can never gain direct access to the nature of the subject of our 
investigation - for inquiry without method is impossible. We can only get a handle on the 
nature of the subject through a method. For there are no facts of which we can take hold 
independently from the determination of a particular method. Thus, any reflection on method 
will itself be methodologically laden (that is to say, any reflection on method wiIl also employ a 
method). Consequently, is not clear how it is possible to be methodologically reflective without 
begging the question concerning what is most at issue in that enquiry. 
In order practically to acknowledge the problem of method, we must be able to 
recognise unhappiness between our method of choice and the subject of inquiry. Clearly, some 
methods are far less likely to be frustrated in their progress than others. Consider the case of 
the misanthrope. His method (of suspicion) is negative and for this reason he does not have the 
resources to recognise what may positively lie in each subject of that determination. Thus, the 
determination of his method is hard to unsettle and it decides rather than discovers something 
with its judgements. 
According to the story Thomas Kuhn tells, scientists are able to resolve this problem of 
method (see the Kuhn chapter). For, scientists qua practitioners have sorted out the nature of 
value: they assume that nature is unified.2 Upon this assumption, practitioners subscribe to 
methods that offer the most promise of capturing that expectation of unity. However, method 
can still frustrate a practitioner's ultimate aim. According to Kuhn, when this happens 
scientists do not give up on that ruling assumption, they rather abandon their method for 
another that offers more promise. Only because their conception of value precedes or 
transcends their method can they detect unhappiness between the determination of their method 
and their assumption concerning the nature of nature. 
However, in this respect scholarship in the history of ideas looks importantly different 
from the endeavour of scientists. For that assumption by the scientist regarding the nature of 
value, looks obviously question-begging in the case of scholarship - clearly some thinkers do 
not express or even seek to express a thoroughgoing unity in their works. Still, like the 
scientist, the scholar, who investigates those works, uses a method. And whatever method 
scholars use they presuppose a particular conception of value. That is to say, every method 
implicitly and unavoidably presupposes something about the nature of its object. Moreover, a 
modest method - one that avowedly does not assume a unity in its object - does not leave the 
nature of value as an open question (to be decided in the act of inquiry). Rather, an overly 
modest method is essentially nihilistic and so threatens to deny the possible nature of value 
manifest in the object. 
It seems that the only way to escape the possible brutal progress of method is to 
assume the very best concerning the nature of our subject of inquiry. In this case, if our method 
illegitimately imposes something (in such a way that we cannot detect that determination) then 
that detennination will be charitable rather than brutal. At most it will threaten to collapse the 
distance between the is and the ought of the subject (or, what is presented and what is merely 
promised in the subject). Thus, if it misses the mark we will thereby make understandable what 
in reality falls short of that standard. 
After this manner, Immanuel Kant thinks the very best of the nature of nature (see the 
Kant chapter). In thinking the best, he seeks to maximise meaning. However, Nancy 
Cartwright (who, in contrast to Kant's sublime understanding, possesses a beautiful 
understanding) can it seems accuse Kant of begging the question against her conception of 
value. Thus, from Cartwright's point of view, if the progress of Kant's method is illegitimate 
then rather than being charitable it is brutalising. 
Cartwright however assumes a conception of value that cannot be frustrated. If we 
methodologically assume that nature is an aggregate then with that method we are incapable of 
recognising anything that can confuse that ruling assumption. Kant, perhaps rightly, subsumes 
the beautiful under the sublime understanding. From his perspective, the beautiful 
understanding cannot get its conception of value together. For when reason reflects upon itself 
to discover its own purpose (that is to say, when reason seeks to know itself), it will draw itself 
unavoidably into a sublime way of thinking; for it will reach out to grasp a totality (else reason 
gives up on itself - which it cannot do without at the same time undennining all of its 
endeavours). With this exercise, reason reveals to itself its own essential nature. Thus, Kant 
can rightly assert that the pursuit of unity is precisely what it is to reason. For, from the 
sublime point of view, it is our own conception of the necessary fonn of agency that gives that 
sublime method the warrant it needs. (Moreover, when Kant appeals to the noumenal as a 
means of reconciling competing but empirically incompatible understandings of nature, this 
move of his is likewise warranted. The beautiful understanding cannot secure a conception of 
agency; thus, it lacks a warrant to assert its own method over that of the sublime.)3 
Kant does not reflect on his approach to Plato as much as he does on his approach to 
nature and agency. He fails to do Plato justice. With his reading of Plato, Kant's sublime 
understanding takes the lead and he allows it unfettered space in a way he does not allow that 
same faculty space when he applies it to nature. (Because of the detennination of method) 
Plato does not frustrate the progress of Kant's sublime understanding, and so Kant is forced to 
conclude that Plato has a real problem. Thereby Kant assumes that Plato commits the sublime 
constructive sin that he (Kant) is so careful to avoid. It turns out that Kant commits that very 
sin in his reading of Plato. For rather than receiving blame, he projects it. Here Kant is 
inconsistent: he reads Plato as fanatical only because he allows his own sublime reading of 
Plato to go unchecked. 
Thus, Kant does not really approach Plato thinking the best of him. Rather, he 
approaches Plato with the thought that it is himself (Kant), who delivers the stem corrective to 
the history of metaphysics.4 Thus, he approaches Plato as a metaphysician already assuming 
that Plato is in error. 5 If, on the other hand, Kant had genuinely thought the best of Plato, that is, 
if he had assumed that Plato did not commit the metaphysician's sin (of allowing the sublime 
understanding to construct unchecked our understanding of the world) then Kant might well 
have discovered a thinker far more compatible with a portion of his own thought. However, in 
order to arrive at that conclusion, Kant would initially have had to shoulder the blame he 
projects onto Plato. Shouldering that blame, Kant would have had to alter his approach to Plato 
(see Protagoras chapter). In this way, Kant might have come to question his assumption that 
Plato is a theoretical-metaphysical rather than merely a practical-metaphysical thinker. 
Thereby, he may have freed his reading of Plato from that fanatical bent. 
However, if we are to conclude that we must always assume an appropriate unity when 
we approach an object (that is to say, if we are to assume that meaning can only be 
communicated indirectly), then at first glance we seem to assume too much. For, such an 
assumption seems quite inappropriate when we approach thinkers like David Hume. A 
beautiful understanding it seems could rightly charge that we would, wielding that assumption, 
brutalise Hume. Perhaps this worry is misplaced. For, if our expectation of unity in our 
reading of Hume is not completely frustrated (which it might well be) then it will most likely 
discover Hume to be a supreme ironist, who lays out a reductio on the empiricist's method. A 
beautiful understanding's reading may disagree with the sublime understanding's overall 
conclusion (that Hume is running a reductio), but it is less clear that such an understanding will 
thereby find fault with those considerations of Hume that led the .sublime understanding to that 
conclusion. The beautiful understanding will just deny that final sublime move. 
This is not to deny that a beautiful understanding cannot lay hold of that same reading 
of Hume (sans, the reductio conclusion); it is just to suggest that, in the case of Hume, the 
beautiful understanding's method will find a happy match. That kind of match is not so happy 
with its consideration of other thinkers such as Plato. Moreover, that method will fail to 
recognise that unhappiness. Thus, in such cases the beautiful understanding will unwittingly 
brutalise the subject of its enquiry. 
NOTES 
2 
4 
Source unknown. 
This reading of Kuhn is perhaps a little idiosyncratic and it cannot be gathered merely from 
his main work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. However, given what he says in the 
later essay Reflections on My Critics, such a reading can be constructed retrospectively over 
that prior work. In that later work, he takes issue with those commentators who characterise 
him as an irrationalist and relativist. He makes his escapes from those epithets by 
suggesting that our conception of what it is to be rational must change to fall in with what 
he describes as occurring during scientific revolutions. Perhaps the best way to make sense 
of this claim is to connect this supposedly revisionist conception of rationality to the 
synthetic, aesthetic or unifying activity of reason. In the Structure Kuhn seems to associate 
rationality exclusively with the analytic use of reason (see Kuhn chapter). Thus, with 
reflection, Kuhn establishes a conception of value (which attaches to scientists qua 
practitioners) that at least coincides with, or is manifest in, those methodological decisions 
- even if strictly speaking it does not appear prior to those decisions or their practices. 
None of this will persuade the beautiful understanding. For, when such an understanding 
reflects upon reason its method essentially constructs an opposite nature for reason. The 
beautiful understanding will be tempted to construct a history (e.g. a Darwinian explanation) 
for that faculty that prevents it having anything of that nature the sublime understanding 
attributes to it. Reason, according to the beautiful understanding, is essentially instrumental 
or analytic rather than inventive (Hume, for example, characterises reason as a slave). 
(Because of its understanding of the essential nature of reason the sublime understanding 
must deny such a history for itself.) 
The suggestion here is not that it might have been Plato rather than Kant who was the first 
to offer this corrective to the sublime understanding. Rather, the suggestion is: if we read 
Plato as a metaphysician only insofar as he gives himself warrant to make metaphysical 
conclusions through his consideration of practical concepts then he fails to commit the 
endemic sin of the metaphysician with which Kant takes issue in the first Critique. 
This reading of what Kant is up to is perhaps a little harsh. In a sense, given Kant's overall 
purpose, his reading of Plato is justified. For, even if Plato is not guilty of the incontinence 
of reason of which Kant accuses him, it is nevertheless true that many subsequent thinkers 
in the history of philosophy have assumed Kant's reading of Plato. Thus, Kant's perhaps 
unwarranted criticism of Plato turns out to be a justified criticism of one branch of the 
subsequent history of philosophy. 
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1.1 HISTORY OF INDEBTEDNESS AND INDEBTEDNESS TO HISTORY 
The history of western philosophy is undoubtedly indebted to Plato, and, at least from a 
particular perspective, the nature of that indebtedness seems clear. Richard Kraut for example 
suggests that Plato 'invented philosophy as a distinct subject' and gave it 'a distinctive 
intellectual method' (Companion p. 1). However, to understand this indebtedness may not be 
to understand Plato. Kraut and others appear to conflate these two questions. Kraut seems to 
suppose that the way to understand Plato is precisely through appreciating something of the 
history of philosophy's indebtedness to him. Consequently, he unquestioningly takes Plato to 
be a direct communicator. 
1.2 ARISTOTLE AND PRIVELEGING CONTEMPORANEOUS AUTHORITY 
For the last twenty years of Plato's life, Aristotle was a member of Plato's Academy. For this 
reason, most, if not all, scholars of ancient philosophy assume that there was a close connection 
between Aristotle and Plato. Kraut and Terence Irwin, both justify their approaches to Plato by 
appealing to Aristotle's reading (cf. e.g. pp. 4 ff., 23). Irwin suggests that '[i]n deciding how to 
take the dialogues, our most important witness is Aristotle' (p. 77). He continues: 
we should follow Aristotle in believing that the arguments and conclusions of the 
Platonic Socrates (and other main speakers) generally represent the views of 
Plato. (p. 77) 
Undoubtedly, in some respects, Aristotle did have a privileged perspective on Plato. 
After all, he largely shares both a culture and a history with Plato. This alone does seem 
sufficient to make him an 'important witness' to something about Plato. However, this type of 
familiarity is not of itself sufficient to guarantee an appropriate appreciation of Plato's creative 
works. 
If Aristotle does rightly understand Plato's works then he brings something to his 
understanding in addition to the aforementioned familiarity. For to consider cultural and 
historical familiarity sufficient for such an understanding, is to suppose that great works are 
merely products of their times rather than quite peculiar artefacts that in some sense transcend 
the circumstances of their invention. To assume that even the greatest works are merely 
products is precisely to deny that those works are genuinely creative and thus it is essentially to 
deny their greatness. Consequently, such an assumption begs an important question against the 
nature of those works. 
Because there is at least the possibility of something unprecedented (that is to say, 
genuinely new rather than merely recombined) about great works, we cannot automatically trust 
contemporaneous thinkers to deliver appropriate interpretations. If Aristotle is an authority, he 
needs to show himself as such. 
Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes' very different characterisations of Socrates show 
that historical proximity is not sufficient to arbitrate a veridical perspective. Ranking 
Aristophanes, Plato and Zenophon according to their relative calibre will not help. For even if 
we rightly judge that Plato is the most gifted, this of itself gives us no reason to conclude that 
his portrayal of Socrates is the most historically reliable. Quite the opposite conclusion might 
be more consistent with that assessment of calibre. The list of interesting mis-readings of great 
thinkers by great thinkers threatens to be as long as the list of great thinkers who interpret other 
people's works. Such mis-readings are not without value; we cannot however merely assume 
that their true worth lies in their veracity. 
Because Aristotle, like Plato, is a giant he may not offer a reliable reading of Plato. For, 
giants create their own perspectives. This very feature of their endeavour marks them off as 
great and in a sense it separates them off from, rather than draws them closer to, other giants. I 
Aristotle as a direct communicator and a direct communicator obsessed with taxonomies and 
classifications may do to Plato what he does to nature. Aristotle's own contribution to the 
history of ideas may thus colour his readings of Plato. 
1.3 PRIVILEGING THE ARTIST'S INTERPRETATION AND THE ARTIST'S SILENCE 
In order to justify privileging Aristotle as an exegetical authority on Plato's dialogues, we need 
to assume that Plato confided something to him regarding the nature of his authorship. Perhaps 
Irwin and Kraut assume that Plato must have spoken about his works to Aristotle (or to 
someone else with whom Aristotle had contact). However, that assumption begs an important 
question regarding the nature of Plato's authorship. For if we assume that Plato must have 
explained his works to others we essentially do one of two things: either we merely assume that 
his works are works of direct communication or we impugn Plato's character. 
We could expect Plato to explain his works if we already have reason to suppose that 
those works are works in direct communication. However, if those works do not involve direct 
communication then there is every reason to suppose that he would remain silent concerning 
their nature (or, at least that his communication regarding them would coincide with the spirit 
of the type of communication of those works). For, if he did speak directly about his indirect 
communication, he would effectively undermine the work of his dialogues (see Apology and 
Phaedrus chapters). Artists, to avoid destroying the autonomy (i.e., the communication) of 
their works, must not undermine that economy with commentary.2 
That is to say, if his works are works of indirect communication then we have every 
reason to think that his utterances about his works will also be indirect and thus unhelpful in 
directly securing the hearer of those utterances as an authority. If Plato is an artist then an 
understanding of history or culture cannot arbitrate an appropriate reading of those works. We 
must approach his dialogues as if they are their own authority. 
Thus, to assume that Plato must have spoken in a direct way to Aristotle concerning 
his works is merely to assume from the outset that those works are works in direct 
communication. That is to say, to take Aristotle to be the best authority is already to assume the 
methodological veracity of Aristotle's own direct approach. To avoid this vicious circularity of 
justification we cannot use what Aristotle says to decide the question regarding the direct or 
indirect nature of Plato communication. The fact that Aristotle reads Plato as a direct 
communicator may just as well reveal how consistent Plato's communication was and not that 
that communication must be for that reason direct. 
1.4 PLATO AS ARGUER AND PLATO AS ARTIST 
Kraut summarily rejects the call to interpret Plato as an artist (i.e., as an indirect 
communicator). However, he premises this rejection upon a cynical reading of the nature of art. 
Kraut assumes that artistic expression is merely a corruption of direct communication. In this 
respect, he looks surprisingly close to Plato's characterisation of Protagoras (see Protagoras 
chapter). Protagoras uses his reason in a merely analytical way. Accordingly, he conceives of 
communication as essentially direct; and the artist as merely a surreptitious direct 
communicator rather than an indirect communicator. 
Because their method is reductive, at best analytic philosophers struggle to secure any 
measure of autonomy for artistic expression. Hume for example, connects our possible 
appreciation of beauty with 'a delicacy of taste' (Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion p. 2). 
He compares this judgement 
to a clock or watch, where the most ordinary machine is sufficient to tell the 
hours; but the most elaborate alone can point out the minutes and seconds, and 
distinguish the smallest difference in time (p. 5)3 
According to his method, which subjectivizes beauty, Hume concludes: 
[b]eauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which 
contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. . .. To seek the 
real beauty ... is as fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or 
real bitter. (Of the Standard of Taste, p. 252) 
Kraut is in that same philosophical tradition and methodology as Hume and he seems to start on 
the right foot. Regarding artistic expression, he correctly judges that in works of art we cannot 
assume to be directly hearing the author's voice. He suggests: 
when we read the plays of Sophocles or Euripides, we all recognise that what the 
characters say need not represent the beliefs of the author. (Companion p. 25) 
However, he misjudges the reason why we do not straightforwardly hear the artist's voice. 
Kraut essentially denies the artist a voice. He observes: 
Plato's works are not written to be entered into competition and performed at 
civic religious festivals, as were the plays of Greek tragedians and comedians. 
He concludes: 
Plato is not assigning lines to his speakers in order to compose a work that would 
be considered beautiful or emotionally satisfying by official judges or an 
immense audience .... [Thus,] if Plato's aims differ from those of the dramatist, 
then he will have a reason that the dramatist lacks for using the main speakers as 
a mouthpiece for his own convictions. (p. 25) 
To the end of creating a case for reading Plato as a direct communicator Kraut's comparison is, 
at best, question begging.4 He (along with Hume) assumes that the artist must be merely trying 
to produce an effect rather than inviting something more cognitive or autonomous. 
Within his summary rejection, Kraut seeks to dismiss Leo Strauss' reading of Plato (see 
pp. 25 and 42 fn.72). Strauss observes: 
[i]f someone quotes a passage from the dialogues in order to prove that Plato held 
such and such a view, he acts about as reasonably as if he were to assert that 
according to Shakespeare life is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
signifying nothing. (The City and Man p. 50) 
From Kraut's perspective, Strauss' approach must seem extreme, needlessly complicated and 
potentially fruitless; for, Strauss seems to offer no real method (i.e., no easy rule in light of 
which to arbitrate meaning).5 He merely seems to seek to deprive analytic philosophers like 
Kraut of their straightforward method. If this kind of worry about meaning is what motivates 
Kraut, then his final position is founded on a misunderstanding. 
Nevertheless, Kraut would be right in thinking that there is no prior rule that can 
decide an artist's meaning. However, it does not follow that nothing can decide that meaning. 
For, even though an authoritative voice cannot precede a work of art it does not follow that the 
work can offer no authority. Because Kraut assumes that meaning must be reductive, he fails to 
entertain the possibility that an aesthetic criterion may arbitrate competing interpretations. 
Kraut need not deny Plato as an artist in order to hold onto Plato as a philosopher; he just needs 
to rethink his understanding of what makes artists artists and philosophers philosophers (i.e., he 
must recognise Plato's work as the solution to that ancient quarrel between philosophy and 
poetry - see Republic chapter). 
Kraut does not engage with Strauss' example of Shakespeare. Perhaps he thinks: 
because of that escape of history that separates Plato and Shakespeare, Sophocles and 
Euripides are more fitting counterparts to Plato than is Shakespeare. Kraut may reason: if the 
claim is that Plato ought to be regarded as a dramatist then surely the best test of this is to 
compare him with some of those whom Plato himself recognises as dramatists (cf Phaedrus 
286c, 269a). For a presumption, ifnot a convenience, threatens ifscholars, such as Strauss, try 
to project onto the activity of Plato more modern conceptions of what may constitute drama. 
If this is the type of thinking lying behind Kraut's substitution (of Sophocles and 
Euripides for Shakespeare) then he threatens a presumption of his own. For, to assume that the 
more appropriate comparison is between Plato and contemporaneous dramatists is already 
potentially to assume the case against him as an artist. For with that assumption, he would 
thereby suppose that the appropriate criteria for distinguishing artists from non-artists are 
adequately captured by the cultural norms (regarding the nature of art) of the time in question. 
If this is his thinking, then Kraut threatens to eliminate precisely those artists that do most to 
redefine or extend the nature of art. Thereby Kraut threatens stipulatively to define art by 
excluding the greatest artists. 
Kraut fails to entertain the possibility that artists in some way are creators of culture. 
For he cannot expect artists to be both creators of culture and recognised as artists by their own 
cultures. The greatest artists are only able to achieve a measure of timelessness in their work by 
working themselves free from what is merely given within their own cultures. The creative 
nature of art constantly threatens predominant, or received, conceptions of art. Some artists 
quite self-consciously challenge those received norms in their own works. In other words, they 
go out artistically to defy the received conventions of artistic expression. Plato does this (see 
Republic chapter); he seeks to settle an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry by 
creating a new (artistic) form. 
What is most at issue between those who follow the general methodological approach of 
Kraut and those who have sympathies with Strauss is not really the issue of whether or not 
Plato uses 'the main speakers as a mouthpiece for his own convictions', rather, the issue 
concerns the question: what is it to be a mouthpiece? Resolving this question demands an 
enquiry into the possible variety of conviction concerning the meaning of meaning and how 
these will influence a conception of what it is genuinely to communicate. Thus, what it is to be 
a mouthpiece for a particular conviction, depends on the nature of that conviction. If, for 
example, the conviction is that all telling in addition to a showing is gratuitous, ugly, or 
impious, then to be a mouthpiece for this position is methodologically quite different from what 
it is to be a mouthpiece for a reductionist take on meaning (cf. Apology chapter). Again, if the 
conviction is that what is understood cannot directly be spoken or what is directly spoken 
cannot be understood, then this conviction demands an indirect mode of communication (see 
Phaedrus chapter). Again, the conviction that with genuine communication one must show 
something complete rather than merely tell something, also demands an indirect mode of 
communication. This is all just to say, we may not be able to adequately appreciate the 
difference between mouthpieces merely by considering what they say. If there is a 
philosophically and artistically interesting difference, it will be found primarily in the respective 
forms of their communication. 
Kraut seems to be unreflective about this possible methodological distinction and 
assumes that to be a mouthpiece is quite simply to be a direct communicator. Thus, he is 
dangerously conservative when he claims: 
[o]ur best chance to understand Plato is .,. to begin with the assumption that in 
each dialogue he uses his principal interlocutor to support or oppose certain 
conclusions by means of certain arguments because he, Plato, supports or opposes 
those conclusions for those reasons. (Companion, p. 29)6 
In this final assessment, Kraut again presupposes more than he tells us. If methodologically he 
has not decided what may and may not count as an argument then there may not be much of an 
issue here (that is to say, he may escape begging some quite fundamental questions about 
Plato's form of communication even before he starts reading him). However, Kraut brings to 
his reading of the dialogues his own idea about what counts as good argument. He does not let 
Plato reveal anything new to him in this respect. Thus, he approaches the dialogues already 
confidently assuming something quite fundamental about the form of their delivery. For this 
reason, his rule of interpretation is perniciously conservative; for with the above claim, Kraut 
essentially supposes he already knows what philo,sophy is before picking up Plato. That is to 
say, he supposes that Plato has nothing to teach him. That implicit assumption, or conceit, 
eliminates the possibility of Plato proving him wrong. 
Kraut's assumption makes Plato scholarship unproblematic, but, at the same time, 
Plato ultimately comes off looking shabby. For, upon that assumption, Kraut and scholars like 
him cannot sufficiently explain why Plato chooses the method of communication he uses (e.g., 
Kraut cannot adequately explain why Plato uses the dialogue form or why he repeatedly uses 
Socrates within that form etc.). Scholars such as Kraut thus arbitrarily separate off the content 
from the fonn of communication; in tum, they discard the fonn. In so doing, they implicitly 
deny that Plato is interested in the nature of communication, and so they fail to entertain the 
possibility of a (necessary) connection between Plato's metaphysics and the form of his 
communication. 
NOTES 
2 
This is Catton's observation (related in conversation). 
If artists are to remain artists, they must remain silent on the nature of their work. 
Hitchcock was a consummate artist. In order to preserve the integrity or autonomy of his 
work, and because he needed so many other people to fall in with his plans, he had to playa 
sophisticated game in order to avoid inartistic direct communication. 
[Kim Novak early on in the filming of Vertigo] raised a question about some 
aspect of the way her role was written: might it not be better if the character's 
inner motivation was brought out by changing this line or extending that? Hitch 
replied simply, 'Kim, this is only a movie. Let's not go too deeply into these 
things. It's only a movie.' (Hitch p. 241) 
Here in order to preserve the integrity of his work, and to keep his actor happy without 
having to spell stuff out to her in an inartistic way, Hitchcock feigns imperfection in order to 
more properly aim at perfection. Even though Novak worked with Hitchcock and even 
though she had many discussions with him, it would be a mistake to receive her possible 
commentary as automatically authoritative. We may have reason to assume a historical 
accuracy, but we should not conflate the possible deliverances of memory for what demands 
interpretation. 
As a further example of an archetypal artist's relation with his work, consider 
Kierkegaard: one day he began writing as if he were many men and continued that way until 
he completed a shelf of works. In those pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard described the 
world from the perspective of each work's hypothetical author. Those authors he fashioned 
as exemplars for radically different fonns of life: an aesthete seducer of young women, a 
man committed to the dutiful existence of marriage and a religious soul who is tempted by 
the ethical. 
During the daylight hours, which prefaced each night's furious writing, Kierkegaard 
wandered the streets of Copenhagen conversing with everyone he met; frequently he 
stopped off and idled the hours away smoking cigars in coffee houses. With his 
wanderings, he laid his alibi. 
Each evening, he would break from his prodigious efforts and attend the intennission 
at the opera. When the other patrons returned to enjoy the perfonnance, he would steal 
himself away and return to his writing. In addition, in order to help remove any possible 
suspicion that he might have somehow found time to author other people's works, he would 
publish a number of works under his own name when he published his pseudonymous 
works. For example in 1843 he published six works: under his own name, he published 
three volumes of sennons entitled Edifying Discourses. Under pseudonyms, he published 
the double volumes of Either/Or, along with Fear and Trembling and Repetition (see 
Kierkegaard, p. 89). To all appearances, that man, who died at the age of forty-two, who 
wrote more than anyone could expect a single man to write, lived a life of leisure (see 
Kierkegaard, p. 88). Kierkegaard went to an extraordinary length to preserve the autonomy 
of his works. 
It seems that Kierkegaard developed his extraordinary sense of duty (together with his 
ability to slip into other people's shoes) through his quite extraordinary education. When 
Kierkegaard was sent,' to school his father gave him but a single task to accomplish. 
Moreover, during his schooling his father made no enquiries of Kierkegaard concerning his 
work or his progress - he just left him with that single task: to come third in the class. 
4 
6 
Elsewhere, Hume re-emphasizes this appreciation through sensitivity to the base ingredients 
of a thing. He states: 
[w]here the organs are so fine as to allow nothing to escape them, and at the same 
time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition, this we call 
delicacy of taste ... (Of the Standard of Taste p. 258) 
Hume notes the story told by Don Quixote's Sancho (see pp. 257+). Sancho (explaining his 
own nose for good wine) tells a story concerning the fine taste of his relatives. He explains 
how one of his relatives could discern the taste of leather and another the taste of iron in the 
same cask of wine. Because their descriptions were so different, they were roundly 
ridiculed. However, they both turned out to be correct. For, when the cask was finally 
drained a key with a leather strap was found lying at its base. 
Hume's point is that even though he connects our appreciation of beauty to taste, and 
even though tastes and the fineness of taste differ, there is still a meaningful sense in which 
the bearer of taste can justifY his or her judgements. However, that justification takes on a 
particular reductive form. 
Kant rescues beauty from the subjectivity of taste and from Hume's reductionism. 
That rescue on the one hand makes out how our appreciation can be cognitive and on the 
other hand why reason giving might be insufficient to get a handle on beauty. In relation to 
Don Quixote, Hume latches onto Sancho the servant's slavish conception of value; Kant, on 
the other hand, makes sense of Don Quixote's masterful conception of value; that 
conception emphasises form rather than mere ingredients or content. 
Kraut makes an odd qualification when he differentiates the supposed motivations of 
Sophocles and Euripides from Plato's motivation. It may well be true that Plato, unlike 
Sophocles and Euripides, does not aim at the mere appearance of beauty, but that does not 
mean that Plato does not aim at beauty. The latter rather than the former claim is what 
Kraut's argument needs. However, if Kraut had phrased his argument referring to beauty in 
the way Plato would refer to it then his case looks quite ridiculous (i.e., sophistical). Thus, 
Kraut's justification of his reading of Plato turns out to be thoroughly unPlatonic. 
Kraut asserts that if we do not take Plato's voice to be direct we have no grounds for 
eliminating any reading of the dialogues (see Companion p. 29). In order to provide a 
plausible argument for this claim Kraut would have to be far more methodologically 
reflective than he shows himself to be. However, that kind of reflection would soon betray 
the poverty of his claim. 
Irwin in places makes more general and more benign claims. For example, he suggests that 
'no internal or external evidence gives us any good reason whatever for denying that the 
dialogues express Plato's own philosophical views' (Companion p. 88). Here Irwin seems 
to leave as an open question the nature of that expression - that is, until he makes the more 
determinate assertion that Plato's views are unproblematically expressed 'by the leading 
speakers in the dialogues' (p. 78). 
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2.1 REDUCTIONISM AND ELIMINATIVISM 
Methodologically, Gilbert Ryle is a precursor to Kraut and Irwin; and he shows where their 
types of exegetical assumptions lead. Because he assumes that philosophy is only where 
arguments are, Ryle concludes that much of the content of some dialogues, and, in other cases, 
entire dialogues, are either philosophically benign or philosophical irrelevant. Clearly, 
(conceptually) before picking up the dialogues, Ryle has already decided what philosophy is; 
and he does not let his reading of those works disabuse him of that confidence. However, 
because of this assumption, he fails adequately to explain the dialogue form: that is to say, he 
fails to make out a necessary connection between the form and content of Plato's 
communication. His assumptions make Plato look shabby. Ryle asserts: 
[t]here is no philosophy in the Menexenus, the Apology or the Critias; almost no 
philosophy in the Laws, except for Book X, or in the first six speeches of the 
Symposium; and almost none in the Phaedrus. The Republic is a mixed bag ... 
(Encyclopedia 6.319) 
Even before considering the worth of alternative approaches, this eliminative consequence of 
the analytic approach should be sufficient reason for us to eliminate it as an exegetical 
contender. Ryle's reading does not so much tell us what Plato thought about philosophy; 
rather, it quite explicitly tells us what Ryle thinks about it. 
2.1 ANAXAGORAS AND PLATO SCHOLARSHIP 
Ryle's elimination of entire dialogues as philosophical uninteresting betrays him as 
methodologically unreflective. Plato, in contrast, is primarily concerned with method. Within 
the dialogues Plato shows Socrates' interlocutors interpreting Socrates, nature, the poets, and a 
raft of concepts in a particular way. For example: Meletus, Cebes and Simmias interpret 
Socrates in the way Anaxagoras reads the nature of Mind (see Apology and Phaedo chapters); 
after the same method, Protagoras reads the poet Simonides (see Protagoras chapter), Lysias' 
reads the nature of love (see Phaedrus chapter), Euthyphro reads the nature of piety (see 
Euthyphro chapter), Celphalus, Polemarch, Thrasymuchas, Glaucon and Adeimantus read the 
nature of value (see Republic chapter). Socrates consistently takes issue with his interlocutors' 
approach. Here, there is an implicit but clear warning by Plato to his readers: he warns us not to 
make this same type of mistake in reading the meaning of the dialogues. We are not to read 
Plato, for example, in the way that Meletus reads Socrates; for, in doing so, we essentially kill 
Socrates (and Plato) (see Apology chapter). 
Broadly speaking, the method, which Socrates repeatedly takes to task, is analytical 
and reductive. Proponents of that method assume that meaning is given rather than gathered; 
and that communication is direct rather than indirect. The interlocutors with whom Socrates 
takes issue are talkers rather than practitioners. 
2.2 PHILOSOPHY AS CONCEPTUAL PORNOGRAPHY AND PHILOSOPHY AS 
LOGICAL GEOGRAPHY 
In his The Concept of Mind Ryle explains what he thinks it is to do philosophy. He portrays 
philosophy as 'the replacement of category-habits with category-disciplines' (Mind p. 10); and 
he imbues that work's description of itself with that same philosophical modesty. He explains: 
[t]he philosophical arguments which constitute this book are intended not to 
increase what we know about minds, but to rectify the logical geography of the 
logical knowledge we already possess. (p. 9) 
Ryle's repeated metaphorical characterization of his project as a work in 'logical 
geography' is apt. Logic, in this sense, refers merely to the study of the analytical function of 
reason. Geography is the study of the surface features of the world, together with an analysis of 
how geographical elements sit in relation to each other. As a geographical philosopher, Ryle is 
not interested in challenging the elements of the philosophical terrain; these he takes as given. 
Ryle rather concerns himself with setting those elements in their appropriate conceptual place. 
The following declaration epitomizes Ryle's analytical, geographical approach: 
[t]o explode a [philosophical] myth is ... not to deny the facts but to re-allocate 
them. And this is what I am trying to do. (p. 10) 
Philosophical puzzles arise, according to Ryle, because of our 'inability to use certain 
terms in the English vocabulary' (p. 19). Thus, solving puzzles merely involves re-allocating 
facts to arrive at an appropriate logical structure. Because of the primacy of the facts to that 
structure, this re-allocation will result in an account bearing only a thin measure of coherence. 
According to Ryle, the philosopher has much in common with the historian. Ryle explains: 
[t]he historian, having assembled a mass of relevant facts, has to think before he 
can give a coherent account of his campaign; but the coherence of his final 
account is a unity of quite a different kind from that of a chain of theorems. His 
account will contain a lot of inferences and it must be free from inconsistencies 
... (p. 294) 
Ryle thus conceives of facts as conceptually prior to the story that they combine to tell. 
According to this account, historians arrange their set of given elements so that historically 
earlier facts can be understood causally to explain later facts. Such an arrangement or logical 
structure preserves the integrity of those original facts. Once historians have arranged all the 
facts so that no fact lacks a causal history, they will have a coherent story. Such an historical 
understanding of events is essentially mechanical. The end of such an account is a consistent 
story rather than a story exhibiting organic unity. It is a type of account that emphasizes 
change.1 Ryle's choice of method essentially assumes and thus decides that there are no genuine 
wholes in the world. For, in order for Ryle to admit that there are wholes he must admit that 
facts are not always given (but must in some cases be gathered). 
2.3 CATEGORY MISTAKES AND CONCEPTUAL BLINDNESS 
In the opening pages of Mind, Ryle describes what he means by a category mistake (i.e., the 
logical misplacement of a concept). He provides a number of simple examples of possible 
misuses of the concepts 'university', 'division' and 'team-spirit' (pp. 17-19). Even though 
these examples are rather crude and artificial, they are by no means barren; for, they sharply 
reveal the blindness of Ryle's method. 
Ryle is well aware that these examples are contrived. Consequently, he assumes he 
has all his readers onboard when he offers his solutions. For this reason, he does not bother to 
defend what turn out to be methodologically question-begging replies. From a particular 
vantage point, Ryle's stated corrections are no less wrong-headed than the fanciful errors they 
supposedly rectify. Because, Ryle does not entertain this other perspective, he shows himself to 
be methodologically unreflective. 
The hypothetical person, whom Ryle posits to commit the category mistake, is a 
geographer like himself. From Ryle's perspective, the only difference between himself and this 
fanciful creature is that the latter is a geographer who makes a typological slip in a place where 
Ryle does not. Thus, with his examples of category mistakes, Ryle offers no real 
methodological contrast. Ryle simply does not recognise any other way of doing philosophy 
than by his geographical method (all other supposedly different methods - or, from his 
perspective, different takes on the terrain - still necessarily involve the doing of geography, 
but just the doing of it in a wrong way). Thus, precisely because he only recognises his foes as 
typological blunderers, Ryle turns out to be methodologically blundering. He fails to recognise 
that competing methods need not merely contrast different ways of doing geography, but some 
methods may tacitly question the appropriateness of the geographical method. 
Ryle's final example of 'team-spirit' brings to the surface something lurking not far 
beneath his earlier examples. In that example, Ryle first explains a possible misuse of that 
term. He suggests that we make a logical error in our employment of the term 'team-spirit' if 
we see it as another operation teammates do in addition to catching, kicking, etc. Ryle's 
correction to this muddle is interesting: he suggests that team-spirit is 'roughly, the keenness 
with which each of the special tasks is performed, and performing a task keenly is not 
performing two tasks' (p. 18). 
Ryle's geographical perspective determines him to see teams as merely the sum of 
their given members. Thus, the way he arrives at his conception of 'team-spirit' from his 
separate understandings of 'team member' and 'spiritedness' is mechanical: he merely 
distributes 'spiritedness' over the elements of a team. According to such a perspective, the 
players are what are most basic to a team; conversely, there is something non-basic about a 
team. A team is a geographical relation of facts rather than it being a fact itself. According to 
Ryle's method, this geographical relation must preserve the nature of what is most basic to, or 
what is conceptually priori to, that relation. From his perspective, it is the facts that are basic to 
relations, not relations that are basic to facts. Thus, Ryle's method prevents him from 
entertaining the possibility that a whole may condition the nature of its parts. For the whole, 
according to Ryle, is merely arrived at through the appropriate placement of those parts. 
However, this way of rendering the terrain eliminates the possibility of team-spirit as anything 
other than individual-spirit. Thus, Ryle does not sufficiently accommodate the role of the team 
in the nature of 'team-spirit'. That is to say, he cannot conceive of how a player who is 
individually spirited can at the same time completely lack team-spirit. 
Correctly understood, a player will have team-spirit if and only if her keenness is 
directed at goals not attached merely to herself qua individual at the exclusion of those 
aspirations of the team. In some cases, the dictates of team-spirit and individual-spirit will be at 
odds; in such cases, if team-spirit is ascribed to players, those players must sacrifice their own 
goals to those of the team. There is thus something about a player exhibiting team-spirit that 
cannot be found as a fact before the greater whole of the team is secured. Here, Ryle's 
geographical method, which seeks to preserve the givenness of facts rather than determine or 
gather facts, is insufficient to the task. With team-spirit, the whole (i.e., the team) is prior to the 
nature of its parts. For, with team-spirit the team is greater than the product of merely its 
spirited members. Team-spirit transforms a mere aggregate of (perhaps spirited) players into an 
organic unity of players. Thus, the accurate ascription of this concept, presupposes a 
conditioning of a player by the whole of which that player is a part, namely the team. Thus, in 
this case, facts are not prior to a gathering. 
Ryle has the same problem with his earlier example of 'university.' He states: 
[t]he University [Oxford or Cambridge] is just the way in which all that what 
[we] have already seen [the colleges, the laboratories and offices] is organized. 
(p. 18) 
However, if we take the meaning of those colleges, laboratories and offices as already given 
quite independent to the whole they form, we overlook how the meaning of those colleges, 
laboratories and offices is in fact conditioned by the meaning of the whole that is the university. 
The meaning of a university is prior to the contingent elements Ryle identifies. It is the 
meaning of university that determines the nature and meaning of those elements, not vice versa. 
Because of the way it prioritises parts to wholes Ryle's method only produces 
adequate results when it deals with mere aggregates. It captures for example the unhealthiness 
of unhealthy marriages, the sickness of sick societies and the deficiency of unhappy families; 
however, his method cannot get a handle on healthy counterparts to these. This is a problem, 
for the healthy exemplars are the very standards from which we judge their aberrant 
counterparts as aberrant. Thus, the eliminativism that results from Ryle's geographical method 
unwittingly involves a fonn of nihilism and thus it turns out to be unable to judge its own 
worth(lessness ). 
While he hardly refers to Plato in Mind, Ryle's brief mention of him IS 
methodologically revealing: 
[t]he commentator on Plato's philosophy need not possess much philosophic 
originality, but if he cannot, as too many commentators cannot, appreciate the 
force, drift or motive of a philosophical argument, his comments will be 
worthless. (pp. 53-54) 
The direct consequence of this conception of the modest commentator is the depiction, or 
detennination, of a modest subject. Ryle's judgment concerning the worthlessness of anything 
unconnected to argument is merely his expression of his geographical view of philosophical 
objects. For, it is not the elements of that geography that philosophy reveals but merely their 
logic. Thus, the commentator's role is not so much to discover facts but to lay bare the logical 
connection between facts. Arguments explicitly detail this typological relation between the 
geographical elements of philosophy. Thus, from this methodological vantage point he is able 
to say: where there are no arguments, there is no philosophy. 
2.4 UNADVENTUROUS METHODS AND UNADVENTUROUS SUBJECTS 
Ifwe believe that philosophy concerns itself with revealing or gathering facts, then Ryle's take 
on that discipline is overly modest. For, that modesty threatens to cloak rather than uncover 
what is original to great works in philosophy. His modesty as a commentator demands and 
secures a similar modesty in his subjects. Because of this, Ryle has a very narrow conception 
of the didactic nature of philosophy. He believes that the discerning reader and the writer tread 
the same geographical path (cf. p. 54). The reader mechanically follows something marked out 
by the writer. Philosophers tell their audience what dots to connect. The logically acute reader, 
in tum, joins those dots. There is something philosophically unadventurous and unchallenging 
in this characterization of following, in the same way that there is something philosophically 
transparent about the moves made by the philosopher. The writer and the reader are doing 
something the same. Thus, Ryle must conclude that the communication between them is quite 
direct. Thus, according to Ryle: 
didactic discourse is impersonal and untopical, in the sense that the lessons it 
delivers could be delivered by any suitably trained teacher to any suitably 
prepared recipient. (p. 293) 
From this perspective, Plato's use of Socrates throughout most of the dialogues is 
philosophical uninteresting and arbitrary. Socrates is merely a placeholder. Accordingly, Ryle 
is also detennined to dismiss as philosophically gratuitous both Plato's choice of the dialogue 
form, and all those elements within the dialogues that connect to the dialogues' being dialogues 
rather than with their merely being the unadorned presentation of arguments. 
Ryle explains the presence of all these philosophically uninteresting elements in 
Plato's works by assuming that Plato taught elenchtic argument and that his dialogues fall 
somewhere into that teaching practice. Plato's extant production, in Ryle's view, is more a 
recording, to facilitate another recording, than an origination. The dialogues are thus didactic 
discourses, 'intended to be remembered, imitated and rehearsed by the recipient' (cf. Mind p. 
292; contrast the Phaedo chapter).2 He conjectures that Plato's 
dialectical dialogues should be read as case-books of recent Moots, dramatized 
partly to help students remember and digest the argument-sequences that finally 
crystallized out of these Moots. (Progress p. 18, also cf., Encyclopedia 6.317)3 
Here, Ryle creates a history that, in a mechanical way, explains why the dialogues have 
precisely those elements that they exhibit. However, there is no necessity in this explanation. 
This fonn of explanation avoids philosophy. 
2.5 mSTORICAL EXPLANATIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF MEANING 
Ryle's lack of interest in necessity (or genuine unity) shows itself when he explains the 
elements of any particular dialogue. From Ryle's initial assumption, about the nature, bounds 
and possible expression of philosophy, further disunities naturally cascade and envelope much 
of the content of Plato's works. These disunities do not preclude Ryle from securing a 
consistent story, but this consistency gets him nowhere close to preserving the object of his 
enquiry as unified. 
Ryle's brief summary of two elements within the Phaedo serve to show how his 
assumptions locate unities or variety in the parts and do not push him to unify the meaning of 
those parts. Rather his methodological assumptions serve to frustrate the possibility of such 
unification. He observes: 
[i]n the Phaedo Socrates is made to declare his personal renunciation of natural 
science and his resultant recourse to conceptual enquires. With surprising 
inconsistency he almost concludes his conversation with an exposition of 
"someone's" geophysical theories about the spherical shape and the internal 
structure of the earth, about its hydraulics and about the causes of volcanoes and 
earthquakes. Parts of this geophysics belong to the real period well after the 
death of the real Socrates, so the passage is likely to record things that Plato had 
newly learned at about the time he completed Phaedo. (Encyclopedia 6.324) 
Ryle does not attempt to transcend the apparent tension between those elements he 
observes within the Phaedo. He does not go on to tell a more encompassing story about the 
meaning of the dialogue as a whole. Rather, he uncovers a prima facie inconsistency (between 
on the one hand Socrates' renunciation of natural science and on the other his proffering of a 
geophysical theory about the world) and he rests content with that. That is to say, he settles for 
multiplicity rather than unity of meaning (see Protagoras chapter). In a sense he is happy to 
conclude that Plato is ridiculous (see Republic chapter). He accommodates this multiplicity 
within each dialogue by telling causal stories about each of those parts. He can explain, for 
example, how one element came from Egypt and how another came from Sparta, and how they 
came to be together in this single place because Plato hears these various stories and records 
them - and haphazardly, or unthinkingly, endorses the one and denies the other. Here, Ryle 
offers us little reason to suppose that Plato is philosophically interesting. 
Because of the way he approaches the dialogues, Ryle cannot avoid descending into ad 
hominem (see Phaedo chapter). His method is quite pregnant with that consequence. For, his 
reduction (that is to say, his reading of the meaning of the elements of the dialogue as given 
rather than gathered) essentially denies rather than discovers or recognizes value. Because his 
method effectively denies the unity of each dialogue, his method is nihilistic and it projects that 
very confusion onto Plato. 
Pace Ryle, that single picture of science, which Ryle sees Socrates at one time denying 
and later asserting, is not a single picture at all. Here, Plato presents two competing methods, 
he has Socrates deny the one and endorse the other. Ryle's method brutalizes that clear 
distinction. Misreading this element of Plato is to misread Plato's direction to the reader on 
how his dialogue should be read. Socrates' supposed renunciation of natural science is really 
far more specific: he merely rejects the type of reductive or corpuscular explanation 
Anaxagorus will give for the nature of wholes. With such accounts, the parts are prior to the 
whole. With this assumption, Socrates cannot find what unifies him. Adding part to part to 
part to part to part, he can arrive at no genuine whole; only an aggregate. The problem with this 
type of explanation is not merely that Socrates ends up a mess of parts. Rather, the problem is 
that we cannot locate Socrates at all. Any supposed identification of Socrates will be arbitrary. 
Each of those apparently contingent parts has a story, but Socrates as a whole lacks a story. 
Here, we cannot locate agency or activity, but only movement or change. 
The second type of explanation, which Ryle calls geophysical, is opposite in type to 
that earlier Anaxagorean reductive take on nature. That supposedly geophysical explanation, 
according to Socrates, concerns 'the nature of the earth as a whole' (Phaedo lllc). With this 
methodological contrast, Socrates directs his friends to an opposing form of enquiry (see 
Phaedo chapter). That is to say, he essentially directs them away from trying to make sense of 
him in the way Ryle proposes that we make sense ofPlato.4 
Because he is methodologically unreflective Ryle never recognizes a whole as 
anything other than the sum of its given parts. Under this perspective, geophysical explanation 
must collapse into the first (Anaxagorean account) with no explanatory loss. Thus, Ryle reads 
over Plato's attack on his own reductive method. In some sense Ryle is Meletus, he assumes 
Socrates as a direct communicator. Ryle along with Meletus condemns Socrates on this 
assumption.5 
NOTES 
2 
4 
In his Plato's Progress Ryle suggests: 
[i]n justice to Plato we should ask not 'Did Plato grow?' but rather 'What was the 
course of his philosophical growth?' (p. 10) 
This search for, or preoccupation with, change is not incidental to his method; it is rather a 
determination of that method. Thus, Ryle's method can never recognise Plato as divine. 
Thus, according to Ryle's reading, we should place no significance on who in particular 
narrates each dialogue: it is incidental therefore that Socrates narrates the Republic and 
others figures narrate the Symposium and Parmenides, for example. 
Broadly, Kraut agrees with Ryle's assumption regarding the purpose (if not the history) of 
Plato's form of communication. He states: 
[t]he dialogue form provides a natural way to air challenges the reader might be 
expected to make to the theories under discussion; assigning an objection to a 
speaker is a vivid way of clarifying and defending the views being presented 
(Companion p. 27) 
Ryle makes the same blunder in his reading of Phaedrus. He says of that dialogue that 
[t]he specimens of rhetoric introduced into the dialogue are indeed about Love, 
but they could have been about anything else without effecting the dialogue's 
argument. (Progress p. 36) 
Here he refuses to take up Plato invitation to see a necessary connection between different 
types of love and different types of communication (see Phaedrus chapter). That is to say, 
Ryle refuses Plato's invitation to gather a new understanding of what it is genuinely to love 
and what it is genuinely to communicate. Ryle's conclusion (that there is something so 
fundamentally arbitrary about the dialogue) should be sufficient to warn him that he is 
heading down the wrong track. The fact that it does not, merely serves to exhibit the 
nihilism that that method imposes upon his understanding. 
Unwittingly, Ryle falls under his own description of the slave boy of the Meno: '[t]o start 
with, the boy jumps to tempting but false answers' (Encyclopedia p. 325). Ryle, however, 
does not sufficiently explain the temptation he feels in the way that he reads Plato. He thus, 
unlike Plato, leaves his readers cold and bemused. The slave boy of the Meno, of course, 
ends up with the correct answer. However, the slave boy, unlike Ryle, recognises and is 
sensitive to the presence of Socrates. 
Ryle does for Plato, what Zenophon did for Socrates. Kierkegaard suggests, if 
Zenophon's account of Socrates is correct 
Athens people would rather have wanted Socrates done away with because he 
bored them than they feared him. (The Concept of Irony XIII 114) 
In the same vain, ifRyle is right about Plato then Plato is hardly worth reading. 
CHILD CARE ACTION PROJECT (NOTE) 
SUPPOSING ARTIS ANALYZABLE 
3.1 METHODOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE BRUTALITY OF 
PATERNALISM 
A particularly crude but revealing example of a method that treats genuine (unified) wholes as 
aggregates is exhibited in the work of a group of self-styled film analysts at the ChildCare 
Action Project (CAP). 
CAP investigations and analyses are conducted using the CAP Numeric Analysis 
Model, or the CAP Model. The CAP Model is applicable to any system or 
vehicle which imparts information to an observer which requires the observer to 
learn or to form an opinion, or which elicits emotion(s) or value judgment(s) in 
the observer .... 
An Investigator will observe relatively closed cultural or societal entities for 
occurences [sic] of the Investigation Standards. Annotation of findings is 
performed using detailed recording instruments. The Investigator will then input 
his/her findings into a computer system. The computer system is designed to 
generate a numeric score in each of the six Investigation Areas plus a unique 
statistical average. The higher the CAP score the greater the moral acceptability 
of the cultural entity under investigation.! 
In other words, CAP catalogues instances of 'unacceptable' language, behaviour and attitudes 
that appear in each of its films of review. CAP categorize and sum the tally of such violations 
and, after applying a simple formula, score the film out of 100 - Mary Poppins scores a 
perfect 100. Other apparently uplifting films do not fare so well. 
For example, consider CAP's analysis of Wes Anderson's Rushmore (1998).2 As with 
all films falling within the coming-of-age genre Rushmore's sensibilities lie in its focus on the 
struggles, frustrations, eventual resolutions and accompanying character development of young 
people in their first genuine forays into independence. Pursuing these themes, the very best of 
such films, come to settle upon the nature and creation of meaning. 
What follows is a partial list, ready for an easy conversion into demerit points, of 
inappropriate behaviour cited in CAP's analysis of Rushmore: 
insults by a teen to a stroke patient in his hospital bed ... a minor forcing himself 
into his female teacher's bed, a minor kissing his female teacher in her bed ... 
guzzling booze and booze poured into a soda in the presence of a teen ... 21 uses 
of the three/four letter word vocabulary ... arrogance against fair authority ... a 
dart shot into a younger boy's neck ... frequent lies to impress and to deflect 
accountability ... hatefulness and vengeance among and between minors and 
toward adults ... vulgar gesture to fair authority ... threat to kill ... starting a leaf 
fire on school property ... ignoring restrictions ... using bees to effect vengeance 
... chucking rocks3 
CAP's moral pedantry fails Rushmore: it scores the film at 39 out of 100. Their 
extended list of crimes and misdemeanours conveys neither context nor chronology. Thus, 
CAP's matter-of-fact, context-free, cataloguing gives us information without meaning.4 CAP 
strips the work of that form that makes it a whole and they pick over its remaining fragmentary 
content; thereby they misconceive the meaning of that content. For, those parts, which their 
analysis highlights, are not parts that we can recombine to form the object of their analysis -
thus, those given elements, are not really genuine parts of the film at all. 
CAP defends its techniques: 
[t]he CAP Model relies on fact, not speculation - it is as objective as any human 
evaluation system can be. Either an example of unacceptable activity or behavior 
was present during the investigation or it was not. 5 
CAP takes facts as givens. Consequently, they assume that they can understand the elements of 
a film as it plays. That is to say, they suppose that they can appreciate the meaning of each 
scene of a film independently of a possible understanding of the whole of that film. For this 
reason, their analysis countenances no determination of the facts by the whole that is the film. 
Only the very worst of films (i.e., those films that could never be mistaken for art), are 
not brutalised by CAP's methodological assumption. However, we make the whole mode of 
communication that is film look sad if we adopt that ad hominem method. 
NOTES 
2 
4 
See www.capalert.comlmethodlmethod.htm 
Rushmore (1998). Directed by Wes Anderson. Written by Anderson and Owen Wilson. 
Touchstone Pictures. 
www.capalert.comlcapreports/rushmore98.htm 
Ironically, if it is as CAP would have us believe - that meaning is given in the parts -
then CAP unavoidably violates its own standards. For, if certain depictions, quite apart 
from the context of those depiction, violate their standards, then CAP violates those very 
standards in listing such violations - for the context of that listing is irrelevant. 
Ibid. 
DAWKINS (NOTE) 
SUPPOSING PEOPLE TO BE MECHANISMS 
4.1 REDUCTIONISM AND SELFISHNESS WITHOUT SELF 
CAP's method brings a rule to its object; that rule determines the nature of that object. 
However, only in the very worst of cases does this detennination bear any resemblance to the 
genuine nature of the work in question. However, in those very cases the work lacks genuine 
meaning. CAP needs to allow each film to deliver its own exegetical rule. 
Richard Dawkins would not have much sympathy for what CAP does. For his attacks 
on religious fundamentalism are ferocious. l However, his dispute with them does not tum out to 
be very strong; for, he cannot take issue with their method. For after his own pejorative use of 
the tenn, there is something religious about Dawkins' own method. That is to say, his method 
confidently begs an important question about the nature of meaning. Dawkins' understanding 
of things is just as much hostage to his method as are the understandings of those whom he 
attacks. 
In The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins explicitly states the reductive rule of his method. 
He states: 
[i]f there is a complex thing that we do not yet understand, we can come to 
understand it in terms of simpler parts that we do already understand. (Blind p. 
11) 
With this approach he essentially eliminates any possibility of a future negotiation between an 
understanding of a thing's parts and an understanding of that thing as a whole. For, he 
stipulatively defines the nature of the thing in terms of its 'simpler parts that we do already 
understand.' There is no problem with this strategy if the thing in question is merely an 
aggregate; but, if it is not, then Dawkins' method brutalises the nature of that unified whole. He 
thus illegitimately forecloses on the possible nature of the whole. Dawkins dismisses this kind 
of worry and dismisses his critic: 
if he started boring on about the whole being greater than the sum of its parts, I 
will interrupt him: 'Never mind about that, tell me how it works.' (p. 11) 
Dawkins assumes that his flavour of reductionism can get a handle on the complexity 
of wholes. He explains: 
[t]he hierarchical reductionist explains a complex entity at any particular level in 
the hierarchy of organization in terms of entities only one level down in the 
hierarchy; entities which, themselves, are likely to be complex enough to need 
further reducing to their component parts; and so on. (p. 13) 
However, Dawkins misunderstands his critic. His refinement of naIve reductionism does 
nothing to address the possible problem with the reductionist's method. For without a prior 
understanding of the whole, Dawkins has no warrant to assume that he has correctly identify 
those elements 'one level down in the hierarchy' from that whole. For if it is a genuine whole 
then our understanding of those elements one level down must be determined by our 
understanding of the whole. Dawkins here merely stipulates that the whole is nothing but a 
sum of those parts. He presents no case for this. If he is wrong (that is, if there exist genuine 
wholes) then he merely offers a recipe for misunderstanding them. In a sense, this reductive 
method arises from a doubting of the possibility of genuine wholes. However, the problem is 
that he cannot doubt himself free from that kind of doubt. Methodologically to doubt the 
possibility of a genuine (unified) whole is precisely to deny that possibility. 
In contrast to the rule that detennines Dawkins and CAP's every exegetical move, 
consider the artist's radically anti-paternalistic approach. An interviewer once asked Andrei 
Tarkovsky about the meaning of the symbolism in his films. This supposedly open question 
really forecloses on a more important issue; for, it unquestioningly presupposes a certain 
approach to understanding film. Tarkovsky replied that his films have no symbolism.2 Thereby, 
Tarkovsky puts that reductive method in its place. In so doing, he frees his audience from the 
constraint or the extrinsic determination of that rule. Here, Tarkovsky only directs his 
audience's understanding in a negative way. For, in as much as he disabuses them of those 
well-worn tools for interpretation - such as identifying and interpreting symbolism - he 
leaves them on our own before his works. In depriving his audience of that toolkit of concepts 
and rules, he reintroduces them to the autonomy and mystery of his works. That mystery 
should first humble his audience and then draw them up to discover in his work something new 
(creative) rather than something merely historically familiar and reworked. 
Dawkins imposes a form upon the object of his inquiry rather than allowing that object 
to reveal its own form. After this manner, he forecloses on the appearance of mystery and thus 
he approaches everything already knowing. The apparent coming to know through his 
investigation is more properly an unfolding of something already contained in his method. 
Dawkins thus does for human nature what CAP does for films (or, what Lysias does for love (in 
his talk oflove) - see Phaedrus chapter). 
NOTES 
2 
See e.g., Dawkins' 'Religion's misguided missiles: Promise a young man that death is not 
the end and he will willingly cause disaster' in Guardian, Saturday September 15, 2001: 
www.guardian.co.uklArchivel Article/0,4273,4257777,00.html. Also 'The God Shaped 
Hole' in The Dubliner, October, 2002: www.thedubliner.ie/cover_story_ october_2002.php 
www.geocities.com/mishaca/interviews/tarkovsky.html. Elsewhere, Tarkovsky quotes 
extracts from various letters from viewers of his films; many of these viewers express their 
bemusement and they ask his help. He responds: '[u]nfortunately I have nothing to advise 
such correspondents' (Sculpting in Time p. 8). 
DREYFUS (NOTE) 
SUPPOSING PLATO TO HAVE HAD ANAL YTle AMBITIONS 
5.1 INSIGHT AND INCONSISTENCY 
Hubert Dreyfus is more attuned than most to the shortfalls of reductionism. However, he still 
unwittingly succumbs to that methodological temptation. 
Dreyfus argues that our everyday understanding extends far beyond the reach of any 
possible analysis. Across several works, Dreyfus sustains a prolonged and persuasive attack 
against the proponents of Artificial Intelligence (AI). He essentially claims that the proponents 
of AI make the same erroneous assumption concerning human knowledge that CAP makes in 
relation to the meaning of cultural artefacts. Dreyfus takes his inspiration from the works of 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Kuhn (Computers Still Can't p. 56, 56-57, 277-278). 
Accordingly, he argues for the primacy and irreducibility of know-how knowledge over 
propositional or know-that knowledge. He thus emphasises the situatedness of knowledge and 
accuses those proponents of AI, who want to reduce all knowledge to a set of propositions, 
which can be loaded into a computer, of 'failing to ask what a world is' (p. 14). 
Dreyfus's ferocious attack on the twentieth century's mechanical ambition of 
formalising all human knowledge has merit. However, his interpretations of some historical 
thinkers to whom he wishes to attribute the origin of that wrong-headed ambition seems to 
result from him engaging in those practices he counts as so illicit. Dreyfus argues that 'the 
heart of the problem', which intoxicates those analytic ambitions of proponents of AI, is the 
'information-processing model of the mind' (p. 10). The proponents of AI, according to 
Dreyfus, seek to realise '[a]n old rationalist dream' (pp. x-xi). The founding premiss of that 
dream, according to Dreyfus, is, 'the rationalist assumption that understanding equals analysis' 
(p. xxx). 
The irony of Dreyfus's attack enters with him identifying Plato as the founding father 
of that analytic view. Dreyfus asserts: 
Plato leaves no doubt about his view: any action which is in fact sensible, i.e., 
nonarbitrary, has a rational structure which can be expressed in terms of some 
theory and any person taking such action will be following, at least implicitly, 
this very theory taken as a set of rules. (pp. 176-177) 
The story of artificial intelligence might well begin around 450 B.C. when 
(according to Plato) Socrates demands of Euthyphro, a fellow Athenian who, in 
the name of piety, is about to tum his own father in for murder: "I want to know 
what is characteristic of piety which makes all actions pious ... that I may have it 
to, and to use as a standard whereby to judge your actions and those of other 
men." Socrates is asking Euthyphro for what modem computer theorists would 
call an "effective procedure," "a set of rules which tell us, from moment to 
moment, precisely how to behave." (p. 67) 
And, finally: 
[a] digital computer is a machine which operates according to the sort of criteria 
Plato once assumed could be used to understand any orderly behaviour. (p. 192) 
Dreyfus's understanding of Plato could only have resulted from him reading Plato's 
dialogues in the way in which he accuses proponents of AI reading human knowledge. That is, 
Dreyfus refuses to recognise that the situatedness of Plato's utterances determine their meaning. 
Not for a moment does Dreyfus entertain the possibility that Plato (and Plato's Socrates) is 
trying to show us something rather than directly tell us something (or elicit a direct telling from 
us). For, if Dreyfus had considered the possibility that the meaning of Plato's dialogues escape 
a reductive analysis of their content, he would see that his accusations fall flat. Dreyfus 
essentially conflates the same two questions Kraut conflates: namely, the question concerning 
the possible influence of Plato's dialogues on the history of western philosophy and the 
question concerning the meaning of Plato's works. 
With his appeal to Euthyphro, Dreyfus assumes that in that dialogue and elsewhere 
Plato seeks a discursive rule. Given his own understanding of what it is to understand, it would 
be more consistent and plausible for him to assume that Plato confronts Euthyphro (and in tum 
us, the readers of the dialogue) with the characteristic of piety as exemplified in the person 
Socrates. Socrates shows rather than tells Euthyphro something about piety. The more context 
we offer to Socrates' inquisition of Euthyphro the more plausible this conclusion becomes (see 
Euthyphro chapter). That is, the more we are drawn to conceiving the meaning of Socrates' 
enquiry as determined by the context of that enquiry the more we are drawn away from 
Dreyfus's reading of Plato and toward Dreyfus's attack on the sins of analysis. 
In another context, Dreyfus makes a more interestingly inconsistent claim. The 
following inconsistency is more interesting for its reflexiveness. Dreyfus suggests: '[0 ]ne 
paradigm, it seems, is worth a thousand rules' (p. 24). In this claim, Dreyfus again falls into the 
very habit of analysis that he seeks to have that very claim attack. If a paradigm is literally 
worth a thousand rules then it would seem that know-how knowledge, which is manifested in a 
paradigm,can after all be reduced to propositional knowledge. 
However, Dreyfus's slips are inconsistencies with his method rather than outcomes 
from his method. And thus such examples perhaps only serve to show the pervasiveness of that 
tradition that he fights against. Dreyfus is also fighting to free himself from its grip. Thus, 
Dreyfus shows us something; and in that showing he has us warn ourselves. 
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6.1 EXEMPLARS AND THE FORM OF AN UNDERSTANDING 
The essence of Kuhn's conception of paradigms or exemplars is surely the one that Dreyfus's 
position demands. According to Kuhn, a single exemplary problem-solution can inspire, and so 
determine, a whole tradition of scientific research. The extension of an exemplar thus 
accommodates the diversity of the world, or more correctly accommodates diversity as a world. 
However, if we attempt to tie down an exemplar's expression to a set of rules, we cognitively 
and practically distance ourselves from that form which immediately unites that diversity. In 
other words, we distance ourselves from the essential expression ofthat exemplar. 
According to Kuhn, the vast majority of scientific practice falls within periods of normal 
science (Structure cf. p. 5). During such times, scientists are inspired, and their activity is 
determined, by 'examples of actual scientific practice' (p. 10; also see pp. 42, 46), i.e., 
'universally recognised scientific achievements' or exemplary problem-solutions (p. x). 
According to this picture, 'concrete scientific achievement[s], [are] ... a locus of professional 
commitment, prior to various concepts, laws, theories, and points of view that maybe abstracted 
from [them]' (p. 11). Kuhn suggests: 
[s]cientists ... never learn concepts, laws, and theories in the abstract and by 
themselves. Instead, these intellectual tools are from the start encountered in a 
historical and pedagogically prior unit that displays them with and through their 
applications. (p. 46) 
Thus, according to Kuhn, students learn to be scientists in much the same way 
apprentices learn to be trades people (see p. 43): just as someone who by boxing foundations, 
framing walls, pitching roofs and hanging doors etc. learns to be a carpenter, so it is for 
scientists; for them, 'doing problems is learning the language of a theory' (Reflections p 264; 
also cf. p. 272).1 Education under a paradigm, at least during the reign of normal science, is thus 
heavily practical and importantly involves rehearsing exemplary problem-solutions. 
Central to Kuhn's conception of exemplars is his claim that '[s]cientific fact and 
theory are not categorically separable' (Structure p. 7). In other words, according to Kuhn, 
exemplars not only determine a way of inquiring into nature but they also direct us to a way of 
describing nature (p. 109). Exemplars are thus, according to Kuhn, world defining. For this 
reason - because of the express showing and implicit telling of the 'universally recognised 
scientific achievements' (p. x) - the practice of normal science 'is predicated on the 
assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like' (p. 5). 
A practitioner working under a paradigm implicitly assumes that she knows what 
nature is like. Because of this confidence, she 'is a solver of puzzles, not a tester of paradigms' 
(p. 143). During such calm periods of science-as-cumulation (p. 96), practitioners seek to 
extend the scope and precision of the dominant exemplar (pp. 52, 53). By solving the 
anomalies thrown up by that exemplar, practitioners achieve this extension. Normal science, 
thus involves practitioners actualising the promises of the exemplar (pp. 23-24). Because 
normal science is characterised by the extension of the dominant paradigm the activity of 
normal science essentially involves the scientist showing something or at least attempting to 
show something. 
Even though, at times anomalies will frustrate every practitioner, such frustrations will 
not cause good practitioners to doubt the promise of the ruling paradigm. Because exemplary 
problem-solutions, which drive the research programs of normal science, bespeak success, 
scientists will blame themselves rather than their exemplars for any relative lack of success. 
They see themselves failing the exemplar rather than the exemplar failing them. Because 
exemplars offer an overflowing promise for an understanding, or because they exhibit fecundity 
of expression, practitioners conceive anomalies as puzzles rather than causes for questioning the 
worthiness of the ruling exemplar (p. 79). 
Those problems, which practitioners conceive of as holding a solution under their 
exemplar's determination, fuel research programs. Under the influence of a paradigm, 
particular kinds of problems for consideration are self-selected. Because of this, there is a 
genuine paradigm-induced expectation of success. Such problems, according to Kuhn, are thus 
more rightly termed 'puzzles'. For in contrast with some problems, puzzles properly so-called 
are invariably soluble (p. 37). Thus, those puzzles, which are thrown up for research during the 
reign of normal science, 'serve to test [scientists'] ingenuity or skill' (p. 36). Scientists are 
aware that they can fail such tests of their mettle. 
During the run of normal science, meaning transcends frustrated scientists to the extent 
that they can secure no locus of authority from which to question the ruling paradigm. Only 
success provides such a locus. There is thus no sense in which a frustrated practitioner can 
forcefully claim: because I have not solved this problem the exemplar has/ailed me. Frustrated 
practitioners must therefore creatively reassess their own approach and thinking as genuine 
emulations of what is manifest in the exemplar. When expectations are not met, good 
practitioners, like good carpenters, blame themselves rather than their tools (p. 79).2 
This is not to say that the exemplar will never be found wanting. However, because of 
the connection of meaning to the expression of exemplars, any levelling of blame or 
unworthiness (by a worthy practitioner) must also involve a paradigm shift. If practitioners are 
to sacrifice the meaning, promise and understanding of one exemplar, they must only do it at 
the feet of another (more promising) exemplar. Else, they give up on meaning, or, they 'reject 
science itself' (p. 79). Thus, throughout both normal and revolutionary science the practitioner 
implicitly holds firmly to the belief in unity of nature (or the unity of meaning). If an exemplar 
shows itself unable to secure this end, it is abandoned to something else that looks more 
promising. 
6.2 DOUBT AND REVOLUTION 
If a paradigm's best practitioners show that its central anomalies are recalcitrant to their greatest 
efforts, the reign of normal science grinds to a halt and scientists embark on the extraordinary 
investigations of revolutionary science. For, when the extended and concerted effort of a 
paradigm's best practitioners ends in collective failure then suspicion rightly arises concerning 
the promise of that governing exemplar; for, the exemplar shows itself unable to explain the 
facts that it describes (p. 11).3 Under such circumstances, practitioners realise that 'nature has 
somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science' (pp. 53-54). 
Whereupon, scientists begin to change their focus; for, their repeated failures bring insecurity 
(pp. 67-68, 82), introspection, crisis and ultimately failure for the ruling paradigm. 
In the accompanying period of extraordinary investigation, scientists stop doing what 
they previously practised as science and start doing philosophy (in the form of analysis) (p. 88). 
That is to say, their activity ceases to show something - rather than continuing to extend the 
paradigm, they start analysing it (pp. 47-48). Thus, practitioners change their investigative 
motion from a centrifugally sweeping extension of their perspective to a centripetally inwardly 
focusing analysis of the foundations and the rules that governed their previous research. Such 
scrutiny not only marks the demise of the exemplar (for they can never doubt themselves free 
from doubt), but, in doing so, it prepares the ground for a scientific revolution - 'the tradition-
shattering [complement] to the tradition-bound activity of normal science' (p. 6). 
Before a scientific revolution can occur, (the more able) practitioners must invent other 
exemplars. These initial and sketchy conceptions of alternative views and approaches to nature 
compete for the allegiance of practitioners. Slowly a new way of conceiving nature wins 
practitioners over from the faltering paradigm. Practitioners change their allegiance upon the 
expectation that an alternative exemplar offers more promise (cf. pp. 17-18,23). Once that new 
paradigm has won the force of numbers, a new period of normal science arises. 
6.3 TRUTH AND UNITY 
In the Structure, Kuhn shows us something; for, he not so much analyzes the history of science, 
he constructs it, or puts it together, according to what his conception of paradigms prescribes. 
In this respect, we can see how Kuhn's thinking on exemplars is itself exemplary. 
Significantly, however, when Kuhn pauses, from that creative and prescribed 
enterprise, to reflect in an analytical way upon his own construction, he almost invariably 
falters. Even though he does not in those faltering sections expressly doubt his own theory, he 
nevertheless unwittingly adopts a method of doubt. With those moments of analysis, he 
introduces incoherencies into his own work; and, in doing so, he again reflexively shows us 
something. This time he shows us something of which he warns us: namely the destructive 
progress of analysis. Ironically and fittingly, his acts of analysis do not merely threaten a 
particular exemplar but they threaten his very conception of exemplars. 
His analysis does most damage in the last few pages of the Structure. If someone with 
an eye for what is complete had stood over him while he wrote that work, she should have 
pulled the work from under his pen before he reached that final and fateful thirteenth chapter: 
'Progress through Revolutions'. In those pages, Kuhn denies that science aims at truth. With 
that denial, he abruptly and forcefully distances meaning from truth. According to that purpose, 
Kuhn compares the "progress" of science with that of Darwinian evolution. In doing so, Kuhn 
essentially denies that science genuinely progresses. 
Kuhn explains that Darwin introduced a paradigm shift into biology; that shift entailed 
the elimination of teleology from evolutionary thinking (p. 172). Thus, according to Darwin, 
evolution does not aim at anything; for this reason, evolutionary design does not need a 
designer. Darwin thus argues that we can understand the "progress" of nature without positing 
a goal for that "progress." Just as evolution creates a fittedness between organisms and their 
environments, so too do researchers fit science to nature. Thus, Kuhn suggests, we can 
understand the "progress" of science without supposing that it aims at truth (pp. 171-173). Here 
Kuhn essentially denies any possible realist epistemological understanding of science's 
progress through revolutions. 
However, Kuhn fails to explain the conception of truth involved in his denial that 
science makes progress towards it. Moreover, he surely misconstrues the analogy with 
biological evolution. Kuhn is doubtless correct in claiming that there is nothing forward 
looking about Darwinian evolution. Further, even if we accept that there is nothing forward 
looking about those practices determined by an exemplar (which seems a stretch), there is still 
something essentially forward looking about the practitioner. For, if those practices sufficiently 
frustrate practitioners, they will look for something else offering more promise. If we cannot 
connect this directedness of the practitioner to her aim at truth then it is unclear whatever we 
could mean when we refer to the pursuit of truth. Kuhn's problem here is that he lets his 
concept of truth slip out from under the determining influence of his paradigm. Consequently, 
he cannot say what truth is. 
Kuhn's comparison of the history of science with evolution draws our attention to 
those crucial junctures in that history that are scientific revolutions. Kuhn compares the 
creation of new paradigms with that mechanism that introduces variation into a species' gene 
pool. That latter mechanism according to Darwinian evolution is completely random. Thus, 
with this comparison Kuhn has us identify what is creative with that what is random. He 
thereby, implicitly eliminates any rational elements from what is essentially creative. With this 
move, Kuhn distances science from truth. 
6.4 BEAUTY AND REASON 
Kuhn analyses the possible reasons for why practitioners, during extraordinary or revolutionary 
periods of science, adopt particular exemplars over competing exemplars. In his search for the 
grounds for such choices, he appears to undermine the possible influence of reason. At one low 
point Kuhn suggests: 
[a]s in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice-there is no standard higher 
than the consent of the relevant community. (p.93) 
A few chapters on, Kuhn re-emphasizes the apparently non-rational ground for paradigm 
choice: 
[s]omething must make at least a few scientists feel that the new proposal is on 
the right track, and sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic 
considerations that can do that. (p. 158) 
Elsewhere in that work, Kuhn suggests that no logical or probabilistic appeal can be made in 
support of a new paradigm. Consequently, the only arguments that proponents of an exemplar 
can proffer are circular (p. 93). 
Of all the many factors Kuhn lists as possibly entering into grounds for paradigm 
choice, he emphasizes above all others the influence of aesthetic appeal (pp. 72, 158, esp. 155-
156). However, without explicitly tying down his understanding of the grounds for aesthetic 
appeal he leaves us all at sea. If, for example, he had tied his understanding of aesthetic appeal 
to Kant's worked up understanding of that affect then the worries about Kuhn's relativism 
would thereby be allayed. However, as Kuhn leaves it in the Structure, he collapses our 
judgement of facts onto our value judgements and leaves us to conjecture: since he is a 
relativist about fact, he must surely also be a relativist concerning value. 
That latter move, which secures Kuhn as a relativist, is invited but is not strictly 
speaking warranted. For, with a little work, we can make out as rationally grounded all those 
stated grounds for choice, which seem to be at first glance without much rational foundation. 
For example, that unassailable standard of choice - namely, the consent of a community-
need not imply relativism; especially when the relevant community, values highly rationality. 
Consider also the possible sin of circular arguments: circular arguments only appear irrational if 
one emphasises the analytic rather than the synthetic operation of reason. Moreover, with such 
an emphasis on merely the analytic operation of reason, we essentially deny the conception of 
knowledge pointed to in the Structure. 
Even so, given what Kuhn does say, compared to what he could have said but 
significantly did not say, he makes the reading of him as a relativist at least tenable. In leaving 
the door wide-open to relativism, he significantly undermines the rational structure of scientific 
revolutions and in doing so distances us from conceiving genuine progress at work in the 
history of scientific endeavour. 
6.5 THE CRITICAL ATTITUDE AND CREATION 
All the above slips by Kuhn are akin to Dreyfus's slips: they are gratuitous and so distracting to 
the essential meaning of his work. With a misplaced modesty, Kuhn caps the influence of the 
exemplary or creative nature of his work. His analysis therefore removes something from his 
work. For, it expressly eliminates an aspect, which would otherwise lie pregnant as a 
possibility. However, insofar as those pieces of analysis seek to limit the scope of his work, 
they also cease to be a part of the exemplary nature of that work. 
Perhaps Kuhn's problem in the Structure is that he is too caught up in the very 
tradition that he seeks to attack.4 The young Popper, in The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
defines that opposing tradition. There, Popper 'distinguish[es] sharply between the process of 
conceiving a new idea, and the methods and results of examining it logically' (Logic p. 31). In 
so doing, he champions the analytic operation of reason and finds no definite place for reason's 
synthetic application. To be sure, Popper could have emphasised the synthetic role of reason in 
the invention of new ideas or new understandings of nature. However, in his effort to distance 
himself - in an analytically respectable way - from Hume's analytic problem of induction, he 
did not want to connect the invention of new construals of nature with reason. Consequently he 
asserts that there is an 'irrational element' in every discovery (p. 32). Concerning rationality 
Popper states: 
I equate the rational attitude with the critical attitude. The point is that whenever 
we try to propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to 
overthrow the solution, rather than defend it (p. 16). 
Kuhn explicitly rejects Popper's latter prescriptive point. According to Kuhn, 
scientists are unreservedly committed to their exemplar inspired understanding of the world; 
during the reign of normal science, practitioners seek to extend rather than question their 
understanding. Scientists implicitly premise their endeavour on the assumption that their 
approach to understanding nature is correct. 
In addition to distancing himself from Popper in regard to method, Kuhn should have 
also expressly rejected Popper's former stipulation: i.e., his exclusive identification of 'the 
rational attitude with the critical attitude.' However, if anything, Kuhn's express remarks about 
reason in the Structure appear to support Popper's analytic conception of that faculty. And it is 
precisely through his apparent support for Popper's characterisation of reason that Kuhn 
distances reason from much that he conceives as central to the work of scientists. 
Consequently, insofar as Kuhn follows Popper in this respect he fails to offer a genuine 
alternative to Popper's overall perspective on scientific method. 
Kuhn's analytic reading of reason in The Structure allowed his proponents (from the 
humanities) and his opponents (from philosophy and the sciences) collectively to tar him as an 
irrationalist and relativist. However, Kuhn subsequently adds a corrective. In his essay 
'Reflections On My Critics', he argues that such epithets misconstrue his work and, in tum, the 
nature of rationality. He explains: 
to describe [my] argument as a defense of irrationality in science seems to me not 
only absurd but vaguely obscene. I would describe it, together with my own, as 
an attempt to show that existing theories of rationality are not quite right and that 
we must readjust or change them to explain why science works as it does. To 
suppose, instead, that we possess criteria of rationality which are independent of 
our understanding of the essentials of the scientific process is to open the door to 
cloud-cuckoo land (Reflections p. 264).5 
Here, we can see Kuhn putting something together, which he failed to do in the 
Structure. Instead of meeting his previous analysis with further analysis, Kuhn, in his 
Reflections, essentially denies that former slip and thereby frees and actualises some of the 
promise of the exemplary aspect of his work. With this synthetic act, he essentially establishes 
the synthetic operation of reason as central to his account of scientific practice. He thus extends 
the exemplary perspective of the Structure to finally cover the nature of rationality. In turn, in 
reassessing his view of rationality, Kuhn also invites us to reassess his concept of truth and so 
too his denial that his work says anything about human nature (see Structure p. 173). 
Kuhn thus comes to emphasise the synthetic role of reason in our aesthetic 
appreciation of exemplars. Similarly, he implicitly emphasises reason's essential role in our 
acts of creation and understanding. Consequently, even though Kuhn makes facts dependent on 
the way practitioners value, (in his final synthesis) he does not thereby become a relativist. For 
even though Kuhn's final account of exemplar dominance comes to rest on practitioners' 
aesthetic judgements (cf. p. 77), these judgements are inseparable from what it is to be rational. 
Kuhn thus essentially invites us to conceive of that aesthetic form as essentially constitutive of 
meaning and truth. Thus, those value judgements, which decide so much during revolutionary 
periods in science and which thus tie the different periods in the history of science together, 
essentially involve the form of reason. 
On this perspective of Kuhn's story, we can tie those alternating periods in the history 
of science together into a single endeavour (instead of multiple and incommensurable 
endeavours). This single story details the aesthetic progress of science. This perspective on 
Kuhn's contribution to a possible understanding of science, has much in sympathy with the 
possible story that combines the first half (concerning the form of aesthetic judgements) and 
second half (concerning the application of aesthetic judgements to our understanding of nature) 
of Kant's Critique of Judgement. 
6.6 ANALYSIS AND NIHILISM 
Recall how Dreyfus uncharacteristically suggests a possible reduction of exemplars to rules 
(Computers Still Can't p. 24); importantly, Kuhn explicitly denies this possibility. He asserts 
that an exemplar is 'a fundamental unit". a unit that cannot be reduced to logically atomic 
components which might function in its stead' (Structure p. 11; also cf. p. 46). In addition, 
Kuhn goes one daring and significant step further: He suggests that once we make a concerted 
effort to locate such rules then the positive work of an exemplar is at its end (Structure cf. p. 
44). 
According to Kuhn, a search for the foundations of an exemplar cannot succeed. For, 
in the sciences, such a search results from frustration and suspicion - the results of such a 
search cannot embarrass the doubt that initiates it. For, such a search misconceives the logical 
form of an exemplar. Analysis thus seeks something it ought not find. For an exemplar does 
not have foundations, it has unity or at least the promise of unity. An exemplar is an aesthetic 
(or indirect) argument of which analysis can offer no substitute. 
Under Kuhn's conception of science, a search for foundations already betrays the 
exemplar's lack of sufficient unity (or the poverty of its promise to offer a complete 
understanding). Thus, in such cases the exemplar does not die because practitioners cannot find 
its foundations but rather it dies because practitioners are driven to look for its foundations. In 
that moment of suspicion (even though their proj ected grounds for suspicion are in a sense 
misconceived), they stop treating the exemplar as exemplary (Structure p. 48, 87-88). No 
progress of analysis can restore that lost status. For, analysis is quite an opposite endeavour to 
that invited by the form of an exemplar. There is nothing exemplary about the action of 
analysis. 
Analysing and exemplifying oppose each other as direct opposes indirect 
communication. Even though an exemplar embodies or points towards a worldview, nothing of 
value is directly given in the expression of an exemplar. Exemplars communicate indirectly 
insofar as they show and implicitly invite us to participate with the form of their action. 
Accepting the direction manifest in an exemplar requires a moral or aesthetic judgement; that 
judgement is caught up in our very recognition of an exemplar as an exemplar. For, since there 
is no direct telling or directing with an exemplar, our judgement, whether it is approving or 
disapproving, requires our understanding to first participate with that form. Else, there is 
nothing of which to approve or disapprove, accept or reject. Therefore, under the influence of 
an exemplar we essentially judge only what we work together ourselves. Upon that positive 
(moral or aesthetic) judgement, we embrace something concrete as the mark of meaning - or, 
we embrace something concrete as an analogue of a form of reason, which marks meaning. 
For, upon our reason completing a form, our reason recognises meaning. Thus, only with our 
activity, do exemplars offer us a form to extend in our understanding of the world. Our ability 
to recognise an exemplar as an exemplar thus reveals an activity of the understanding, which 
both connects to our ability to gather meaning and our ability to find, recognise and create 
value. Since the activity that is necessary for us to recognise an exemplar as an exemplar is 
creative, we do not and cannot consistently treat exemplars questioningly; exemplars cease to 
be exemplars insofar as we question the direction they express. 
In contrast to the showing of exemplars, analysis engages in a telling (or direct 
communication). Analysis explicitly decides something or it delivers a jUdgement rather than 
invites a judgement. When this operation of reason is turned on an exemplar it demands a 
decisive but defensive and so a less confident voice: a voice to shore up what is already present, 
rather than a voice we can extend far beyond what is immediately present. The analytic 
scrutiny of an exemplar thus threatens to convert an exemplar's fecundate expression into 
something more insular and staid. In a sense, when we attempt to analyze an exemplar we, with 
one application of reason, attempt to make sense of the opposite application of reason. We 
attempt to analyze a synthetic activity. We can only embark on such a venture by denying the 
autonomy of the synthetic operation of reason. With our analysis of exemplars we implicitly 
assume that synthesis is just analysis operating in the opposite direction. That is to say, we 
assume our synthesising involves our reason aggregating rather than creating. With this denial 
of a genuinely synthetic operation of reason, we essentially deny value and we thereby (through 
our analysis) eliminate value from exemplars. 
Analysis converts indirect into direct communication. And in so doing it annihilates 
the value that is expressed in an exemplar. For, an exemplar's value is not directly given to us, 
but arises within us with our act of gathering its form. Thus, analysis, in seeking to externalise 
(or make direct) that which is internal (or indirect) to the exemplar, cannot succeed. The types 
of rules that analysis seeks only promise to explain the particularity rather than the universality 
of the exemplar. Because analysis converts showing into telling, the discursive rules that it 
delivers particularise and so kill exemplification. Analysing an exemplar threatens to tie its 
communication down as expressing precisely this rather than that. In this way, analysis 
freezes, and so debilitates, the dynamism that is the life of an exemplar's expression. In those 
cases where analysis delivers rules, it discovers what has already exhausted itself. For those 
rules will explain the particularity rather than the universality of the exemplar. Thus, the rules 
delivered by analysis are closer to pure description than prescription. Our discursive 
acquaintance with such rules does not help us to extend the sweep of the exemplar and so does 
not help to extend our understanding. Consequently, there is nothing exemplary about analysis. 
Because analysis can exhibit neither value nor a way of valuing, its form is (unintentionally) 
nihilistic. That is to say, its form can never be completed. 
Methodologically, from Kuhn's perspective, science gets it right. For, scientists only 
employ analysis once an exemplar ceases to communicate, that is to say, once the exemplar 
ceases to be exemplary. Scientists thus search for meaning only when meaning is already 
frustrated. Consequently, with their analysis they sacrifice nothing and with an enquiry, which 
would be under any other circumstances debilitating, they psychologically free themselves to 
recognise or create a more promising perspective. By doing otherwise - by engaging in such a 
search for foundations when the meaning of an exemplar is still alive - they threaten 
prematurely to exhaust that exemplary expression. For, such analysis essentially begs the 
question against the possible future communication of the exemplar and effectively frees. the 
practitioner from the influence of that possible expression. For if our analysis is able to find 
rules, it thereby artificially caps the possible expression of the exemplar. For, under those rules 
the expression of the exemplar is determined. That determinate horizon we create with the 
mechanical application of those rules. In contrast, without such discursive rules, an exemplar's 
expression is far more indeterminate. Or, more correctly, we determine the expressiveness of 
an exemplar. This purchase we achieve through our creative and analogical reapplication of 
what we conceive as manifest in the exemplar. Thus, if, after the expectation of Dreyfus, we 
are able to successfully replace an exemplar with rules then by doing so we essentially uncover 
the poverty of that exemplar. We reveal just how un-exemplary and mechanical that exemplar 
is. 
In those cases in which our analysis fails to uncover consistent rules governing the 
expression of an exemplar, we more immediately cap the expression of the exemplar. Once 
again, that end may be premature. For such inconsistencies through our creative extension of 
the exemplar might naturally resolve. For, an exemplar promises an understanding of the 
world. Its concrete expression does not comprise such an understanding; that concrete 
expression merely points towards a more general way of understanding. Thus, if we cannot 
formalise the concrete expression of an exemplar that failure we cannot transitively impose 
upon that possible way of understanding pointed to by the exemplar. For that understanding, 
we do not create from that concrete expression mechanically but creative1y.6 
NOTES 
2 
There is perhaps something importantly disana10gous in this comparison of the carpenter 
with the scientist. For, there is something essentially aggregative about the nature of what 
the carpenter builds. This may well not be the case for the object of the scientist's 
endeavour. 
Also cf. Structure p. 80: '[i]t is a poor carpenter who blames his tools.' 
Also cf. Structure p. 97: 
4 
[p ]aradigms provide all phenomena except anomalies with a theory determined 
place in the scientist's vision. 
See Structure p. 77: 
[n]o process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all 
resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison 
with nature. 
Also cf. Reflections p. 262: 
[w]hat I am denying then is neither the existence of good reasons nor that these 
reasons are of the sort usually described. I am, however, insisting that such 
reasons constitute values to be used in making choices rather than rules of choice. 
Concerning analytically inscrutable exemplars, consider for example the case of Nietzsche: 
Nietzsche's express communication defies an analysis that preserves his activity as 
exemplary. In the precocious contradictoriness of his expression, he implicitly demands 
that we understand him in a way antithetical to the way of understanding offered by 
analysis. And for the most part we quite naturally fall in with Nietzsche's implicit demand; 
his contradictions do not tempt us to fault him. We enjoy rather than question his play. 
Indeed, we should feel ourselves caught out or embarrassed in calling him up on those 
contradictions. For in doing so we expressly impose a standard - of direct communication 
- which he so obviously calls into question. Thus, if we find fault with Nietzsche on this 
score, we more obviously expose a fault with our own way of understanding. 
Worse than taking issue with Nietzsche's contradictions, we could defuse them 
through that first movement of analysis. We take that first movement when we assume that 
we reach our understanding of the whole through first understanding its parts. (In other 
words, that first move involves our denying the autonomy of the whole.) Consequently, 
according to that move, we split up Nietzsche's influx of tradition-shattering perspectives 
and hold them apart. With a direct reading, when we find that those parts do not easily 
recombine, we deny that there is a single Nietzsche and in tum we postulate that there are 
many Nietzsches. However, in so doing, in claiming that each Nietzsche we can appreciate 
in isolation from the others, we deflate that force with which Nietzsche confronts our 
understanding. That force, which we have removed, is contained in those contradictions and 
tensions, which arise when those fiery perspectives sit (or hit) one against the others. 
Immediately we carve Nietzsche up, we dissipate that force. We make benign to our 
understanding that violence Nietzsche means to wreak. Thus, that first move of analysis 
extinguishes much ofthe life or dynamism of Nietzsche. 
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7.1 THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL UNDERSTANDINGS 
In his pre-critical work, Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant details 
the differences between the two possible types of moral or aesthetic understandings. Broadly 
speaking, this distinction is one between on the one hand a tendency towards, and a valuing of, 
reason, and, on the other hand, a tendency towards, and a valuing of, sense (Observations p. 79) 
Kant characterizes the sublime as always great (p. 38). Thus, the feeling of the 
sublime is one of esteem (p. 51) and it essentially connects to the virtues of duty and justice. 
There is something universal (p. 65) and deep (p. 78) about the sublime understanding. 
In contrast, according to Kant, beautiful objects are able to be small and ornamented 
(p. 38). Such stimulate love rather than esteem (p. 51) and they evoke feelings of sympathy and 
charity rather than duty (pp. 58, 63). Thus, the beautiful understanding is concerned with the 
particular or what is multiple and concrete rather than with what is universal. This type of 
temperament is thus concerned with what is given to the senses rather than to reason. 
Kant's distinction here is the same one Isaiah Berlin makes while appealing to a 
fragment from the ancient Greek Poet Archilochus, which reads: '[t]he fox knows many things, 
but the hedgehog knows one big thing' (Thinkers p. 22). Berlin goes onto to divide all thinkers 
between these species. 
Kant carries this distinction between the beautiful and sublime understandings into all 
of his three critiques; with it, he diagnoses the maladies of past philosophical extravagancies 
and modesties; in tum, he also seeks to use it to mediate a solution to those past aberrations. 
Historically, rationalist (or sublime) philosophers, in their metaphysical understandings of the 
world, used reason's idea of an unconditioned unity, or the demand of reason for 
comprehension in one intuition (eJ 254), in a thoroughly constructive or determining way. 
During this extended era in the history of western philosophy, reason was allowed to construct 
unity outside the bounds of possible intuition. Reason, in playing this determining role, 
dragged the understanding (the faculty that, according to Kant, plays the role of constructing 
concepts) beyond a place where it could have empirical employment (cf. CPR A 642/B 670, A 
643/B 671). 
Spinoza, in his Ethics, for example, confidently follows this sublime principle of 
reason to an unconditioned unity and unhesitatingly posits that unity as 'God or nature.' 
Spinoza's sublime understanding finds no place for beauty; he denigrates the senses to the role 
of delivering only mutilated and confused ideas. Thus, for Spinoza, only reason can arrive at 
adequate ideas. Reason provides a stem corrective to the muddle of the passions. Because 
Spinoza's world is through and through sublime, he can find no philosophically respectable role 
for the beautiful understanding. 
Hume, in contrast, asserts that we can appeal to what is unconditioned, only if we can 
ground it in experience. Observing that his experience only receives what is merely contingent, 
Hume concludes that we cannot legitimately arrive at anything universal from a consideration 
of particulars. According to the bent of his beautiful understanding, he dismisses Spinoza's 
determination of reason as an activity without warrant. Reason of itself, according to Hume, 
cannot inform us regarding matters of fact. The only legitimate role that Hume's understanding 
can find for reason is an instrumental rather than an originating one. His beautiful 
understanding thus leads him to settle on the received manifold of nature. 
Cartwright, in her work How the Laws of Physics Lie, continues a Humean attack on 
the sublime role of reason in science. She subscribes to the 'metaphysical ... belief in the 
richness and variety of the concrete particular' (Laws of Physics, p 19). This belief, alone, is 
not sufficient to make her a combatant of those of a more rationalistic temperament for such a 
variety amongst concrete particulars is perfectly consistent with the existence of a 
thoroughgoing unity exhibited in theoretical covering laws. Leibniz, with his Principle of 
Perfection, for example, argues for this very coupling of maximal variety of phenomena with 
simplicity of covering laws. 
Cartwright is however an anti-realist concerning theoretical laws, but not in regard to 
theoretical entities. Thus, she overtly sides with the particular rather than the universal. Stating 
her anti-realist metaphysical commitment Cartwright, thus, asserts that there is something brute 
about concrete variety. The richness and variety of nature, according to Cartwright, does not 
explanatorily give itself up to anything more general. Nature is thus 'a jumble' (p 19), where 
'[w]hat happens on most occasions is dictated by no law at all.' (p 49).1 
To lay bare the tautology manifest by the coupling of the rationalists' method with its 
consequent metaphysical conclusions Cartwright facetiously mimics that philosophical malady 
with her beautiful understanding: 'God', she suggests, 'may have written just a few laws and 
grown tied' (p. 49). Elsewhere, she conjectures: 'I think that God has the untidy mind of the 
English' (p. 19). Without the originating role of reason the manifold of experience remains 
something quite brute. 
7.2 INCOMMENSURABLE VALUES AND METHODOLOGY 
The dispute here between empiricists and rationalists is at base moral or aesthetic. For, each 
receives or conceives of nature in accordance with her or his conception of value. It just so 
happens that each has a different conception of what is good. Cartwright's talk of untidiness 
and tiredness clouds the issue. With this language, she seems to suggest that God's nature, falls 
short of an ideal. However, this is not the case; for, using this language, she merely goes out of 
her way to offend the sublime understanding by using that understanding's projections as the 
vehicle for her quite opposite ideals: she hijacks their form with her content. In so doing, she 
implicitly displays her own distaste for the sublime ideals; they are ideals that deny, or seek to 
annihilate, her conception of value. 
From her own perspective, Cartwright does not think that there is anything tired about 
nature; rather, she is jealous of preserving that supposed jumble. For, if nature exhibited less 
brute variety and multiplicity, that is to say, if something quite simple accounted for that 
apparently quite diverse phenomena, it would be from her perspective less good. Thereby, 
nature, from her perspective, would manifest less value. For her, more orderliness does not 
increase meaning; it reduces it. 
If we, along with Cartwright, emphasize the possible aesthetical rather than the 
theoretical difference between scientists, it is evident that there is nothing that one group of 
scientists can discover that will be sufficient to convert someone who holds to the opposing 
aesthetic conception of value. Hence, nothing that sublime scientists could discover could 
divest Cartwright of her own beautiful conception of nature. For, even if those scientists 
discovered or invented quite simple theoretical laws that explain the complexity of nature, she 
need only deny the reality of those laws to preserve her value-laden conception of nature. 
Cartwright is aware of this, and concedes that '[ w]e do not know if we are in a tidy universe or 
an untidy one' (p 49) - in a sense, we morally or aesthetically decide. 
7.3 FIRST CRITIQUE AND SUBLIME SYNTHESIS 
When the sublime understanding and the beautiful understanding each wax metaphysical, they 
construct fundamentally different worlds. Given what each corresponding species of 
philosopher takes to be most basic to understanding a world, it seems that there is no 
reconciling the two. Kant, however, sees no genuine disagreement between these two types of 
thinker. Rather, he sees them both doing something right. For, 
in one reasoning person the interest of manifoldness (according to the principle of 
specification), but in another the interest of unity (according to the principle of 
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aggregation) may be stronger. Each of them believes that he has acquired his 
judgment from insight into the object, and yet is basing it solely on his greater or 
lesser attachment to one of two principles. Neither of these principles rests on 
objective bases, but they rest only on the interest of reason; hence they might 
better be called maxims rather than principles (CPR B 694/A 666 - A 667/B 695) 
He continues: 
as long as these maxims are regarded as objective insights, their difference 
occasions not only dispute but also obstacles. These obstacles greatly delay the 
truth, until a means is found to reconcile the disputing interest and to satisfy 
reason in this regard. (CPR A 667/B 695 - A 668/B 696) 
Kant thinks that he has discovered a way of adjusting the claims of these opposite 
types of understanding, in a way that will accommodate both to an adequate science ofnature.2 
With this move he intends to prescind from that kind of history in which 'visionary treasures 
are promised and real treasures are squandered' (CPrR 163). 
Kant essentially agrees with Hume that the transcendental ideas of reason can have no 
determining foundation in a science of nature; thus, we employ them illegitimately if we use 
them to construct concepts concerning nature as a whole (cf. CPR Antinomies, A 426 B 454 ff.). 
Reason, nevertheless, according to Kant, has an 'empirical employment' (CPR A 643/B 671). 
Kant argues we may legitimately use reason's demand for comprehension in a single 
intuition not in a constructive but rather in a merely regulative way; for prescribing both a 
direction to the understanding and an ordering of its empirical concepts. Thus, reason, rather 
than constructing our understanding of the world provides a rule 'through which alone the 
manifold of knowledge can become a system' (CPrR 151). It is thus in its regulative 
employment, rather than a constructive employment, that reason is able to draw the 
understanding above the brute multiplicity of appearances. 
However, Kant concludes that: 
reason's law whereby we are to seek this unity is necessary, because without this 
law we would have no reason at all, but without reason would have no coherent 
use of the understanding, and in the absence of such use would have no sufficient 
mark of empirical truth. (CPR A 651/B 679) 
With this conclusion, Kant appears to backtrack, at least on the spirit, if not the letter, 
of his preceding critique. In so doing, Kant travels dangerously close to begging the question 
against Cartwright's position. For, in his stipulation that truth fundamentally concerns 
coherence he seems to locate the very concept of empirical truth in the sublime understanding. 
Here Kant's own conclusions seem to fall under his general diagnosis of reason's natural 
tendency to over extend itself. 
Cartwright might respond to Kant's sublime stipulation: for all Kant knows, the world 
is a jumble. If it is a jumble then that fact alone should not preclude our acquiring knowledge 
of nature. It will just be the case that our empirical knowledge will concern only particulars. 
Surely, in such a case Cartwright will still have a sufficient criterion for empirical truth. 
7.4 THIRD CRITIQUE AND BEAUTIFUL JUSTIFICATION FOR A SUBLIME 
SYNTHESIS 
In his third Critique, Kant more directly addresses the above type of worry. In this final 
Critique, he seeks to establish an empirical warrant for the empirical employment of reason. In 
the first Critique Kant had advocated a different approach; the kind Leibniz suggests in his 
Discourse on Metaphysics §22. Leibniz's metaphysical conclusions (secured by the work of his 
sublime understanding) provide the warrant for the regulative use of the principle of reason in 
his epistemology. Leibniz's epistemology quite naturally flows from his metaphysics. 
Wielding his sublime principle of reason, Leibniz paints in broad strokes the 
metaphysical structure of nature. However, that principle cannot get him to the determinate 
details of any particular region of nature. For, unlike God, Leibniz cannot carry out the 
necessary deduction from the totality down to the particular. Thus, Leibniz's tendency to 
prioritise the whole to the part essentially prevents him from determining the character of any 
particular region of nature. Thus, the sublimity of his understanding thwarts his epistemology 
taking on the same form as his metaphysics. Accordingly, finite minds must be content with 
understanding nature mechanically rather than teleologically. Nevertheless, because of his prior 
metaphysical conclusion about the overall form of nature he gives himself the warrant to help 
mechanical investigation along with a heuristic (or regulative) use rather than a determining use 
of that sublime principle of reason. Thus, he is able to direct his mechanical understanding to 
the investigation of the shortest path or the simplest mechanical law. 
Kant faces a problem in the first Critique, because he eliminates Leibniz's 
metaphysical warrant for the regulative use of that principle of reason. Kant nonetheless wants 
to give himself the discount of wielding that principle. However, without that metaphysical 
warrant he threatens to commit the very metaphysical sin of which he tries to rid philosophy. 
In his Critique of Judgment Kant reiterates the claim he had made in the first Critique 
that there can be no a priori basis for the use of such a principle of reason; if there is a warrant 
for its use, it must be found within the concept of nature (CJ 360). Kant also reasserts another 
conclusion of the first Critique: he suggests that 'unless we presuppose [the principle of the 
mere mechanism of nature] in our investigation [of nature] we can have no cognition of nature 
at all' (CJ 387). Kant goes on to look for an empirical rather than a metaphysical justification 
for science's (or the theoretical understanding's) regulative use of reason. He does this by 
pursuing another one of Leibniz's insights concerning the difference between organisms and 
mechanisms.3 
Pursuing this distinction, Kant identifies certain phenomena of nature that frustrate a 
mechanical understanding. For, certain objects in nature display an intrinsic purposiveness; this 
type of object we cannot mechanically understand (CJ 388). Kant is adamant that not even a 
blade of grass can be mechanically understood. Rather, we appreciate organic objects with the 
synthetic employment reason. Kant concludes that the success of this employment of reason 
gives us an a posteriori warrant for its continued employment. Kant states: 
faJn organized product of nature is one in which everything is purposive and 
reciprocally also a means. In such a product nothing is gratuitous, purposeless, 
or to be attributed to a blind natural mechanism. (CJ 376) 
Kant continues: 
the example that nature offers us in its organic products justifies us, indeed calls 
upon us, to expect nothing from it and its laws except what is purposive in 
[relation to] the whole. (CJ 379) 
However, this leaves Kant with a problem: namely, how to reconcile 'two wholly 
different kinds of causality' (CJ 422). Kant concludes that 
[t]he possibility of this reconciliation lies in the supersensible substrata of nature, 
about which we cannot determine anything affirmatively, except that it is the 
being itself of which we know merely the appearance. (CJ 422) 
Even though Kant seeks to reconcile the sublime and beautiful understandings, his 
whole project threatens to beg the question against the beautiful understanding. For this drive 
to synthesis is a drive of the sublime rather than the beautiful understanding. Just as we cannot 
imagine Cartwright assenting to Kant's final appeal (above) to the supersensible, for the same 
reason we cannot imagine her taking that first step with Kant. This quarrel is an aesthetic 
disagreement concerning the nature of meaning. As a sublime thinker, Kant wants to subsume 
the beautiful understanding under his own species of understanding. Thus, when he talks of 
science Kant's language (in relation to the approach advocated by the beautiful understanding) 
is ultimately exclusive rather than inclusive. 
7.5 ART AND SCIENCE 
Kant differentiates between scientists and artistic geniuses; and, to some extent, this distinction 
relies on his characterisation of science as a sublime rather than a beautiful enterprise. 
Kant suggests that 'the foremost property of genius must be originality.' He goes on to 
explain that: 
since nonsense too can be original the products of genius must also be models, 
i.e., they must be exemplary; hence they do not arise themselves through 
imitation, still they must serve others for this (CJ 307-308) 
In contrast to the work of geniuses, for Kant, even the greatest scientist is imitative, for it is not 
the scientist who gives the rule; it is nature. Thus, Newton is not originative, while artistic 
geniuses are. Newton, as great as he is, is essentially imitative in his understanding of nature. 
According to this characterization, Kant concludes that what the greatest scientists say about 
nature will be quite transparent to their students (CJ 309). Here, Kant presupposes an 
agreement of taste: namely, that nodding in unison of sublime understandings, rather than the 
locking of horns between the sublime and beautiful understandings. What also follows from 
this construal of the scientist as essentially imitative is Kant's assessment that the progress or 
discoveries of science are inevitable. Kant says of Newton: 
[h]ad the man lived only twice as long he would have been able to build even 
further on his experiences and with time discover as the entire human race will 
not discover in a thousand years. (Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-1783) 29:916) 
Thus, while Kant raises the achievement of Newton above all other scientists, he stops short of 
raising him above the combined achievement of over a thousand years of scientists. Because 
Kant's elevation of Newton is limited, there can only be a difference in degree, rather than a 
difference in kind, between the greatest scientist's immortal works and the achievements of 
much lesser minds (CJ 309); accordingly, there is something transparent about Newton's work. 
Under this conception of the inevitable progress of science, Kant essentially discounts 
the possibility of the beautiful and the sublime understandings offering conflicting 
determinations of nature. Without entertaining the possibility of that kind of aesthetic conflict, 
Kant is able to assert that even the very best of scientists is merely imitative rather than 
exemplary.4 Nature is exemplary in the way that works of artistic genius are exemplary. 
Scientists merely imitate the form of nature. Thus, according to this conception, scientists cease 
to be scientists insofar as they produce something exemplary rather than merely imitative. 
In contrast to the inevitable achievement of science, the exemplary works of genius 
hold a different status: if Homer had never existed for example, then there is nothing inevitable 
about the appearance of his works. There is nothing inevitable about the appearance of 
particular works of genius (just as there is nothing inevitable about the appearance of geniuses). 
For, there is no rule that can be followed in producing works of genius. The genius, according 
to Kant, cannot 
show how his ideas, rich in fancy and yet also in thought, arise and met in his 
mind; the reason is that he himself does not know, and hence also cannot teach it 
to anyone else. (CJ 309) 
This divide between scientists and artists draws Kant to deny that philosophers qua 
philosophers can be artists. Philosophers like scientists are (or ought to be) essentially 
imitative. That is to say, philosophers like scientists ought to tell us something about reality. 
Thus, according to Kant, there is something mutually excluding or opposite about the natures of 
possible works of philosophy and works of art (cf. CJ 308).5 
Regarding Plato, therefore, Kant must make a tough excluding judgement; for from his 
perspective Plato (in relation to any single work) cannot be both a philosopher and artist. It 
turns out that Kant is proscriptive in his judgement: he assesses Plato to be a philosopher, but a 
philosopher we ought not follow. For, according to Kant, Plato failed to make metaphysics a 
science; rather, he 
left the world of sense because it set such narrow limits to our understanding; on 
the wings of ideas, he ventured beyond that world and into the empty space of 
pure understanding. He did not notice that with all his efforts he made no 
headway. He failed to make headway because he had no resting point against 
which-as a foothold as it were-he might brace himself and apply his forces in 
order to set the understanding in motion (CPR B 9). 
Because of Plato's apparent flight of fancy, Kant judges him a fanatic and the father of 
all fanaticism (see CJ p. 241 fn. 16). Pace Kant's evaluation, however, it seems that the very 
point of departure for Plato into what Kant regards as mysticism and fanaticism might count 
instead as his entry into Kant's opposing category of genius. Kant rates Homer a fine artist (i.e., 
a genius) and Plato a fanatical philosopher. He sees something fanciful in the works of Homer 
(CJ 309) thus he considers Homer an artist. However, on detecting something fanciful in the 
works of Plato, Kant judges him fanatical. Why does Kant not cast Homer as the bad scientist 
and Plato as the great artist? 
In at least one sense Kant clearly regards philosophers and scientists above artists (cf. 
CJ 309). His willingness to count Plato a philosopher rather than an artist displays his 
willingness to do justice to Plato and to bring him under the scope of his own critique. From 
Kant's perspective there is something for philosophy to learn in counting Plato a philosopher. 
In contrast regarding Homer as scientist rather than an artist could benefit no one. To be judged 
by Kant as a fanatical philosopher rather than a fanciful artist is a commendation cloaked in 
condemnation. 
Pragmatic considerations aside, Kant's criteria does not seem sufficient for us to 
genuinely arbitrate into which group Plato need to be put. Running Kant's thought experiment 
does not help: the fact that we cannot imagine Plato's dialogues ever appearing without Plato 
may not, of itself, argue for him being a genius rather than a philosopher. For, the lack of 
inevitability that we attach to works of artistic genius may attach equally to works of bad 
science or fanatical philosophy. For, only the greatness (or in Kant's terms, the imitative 
accuracy) of the greatest achievements in science makes their appearance inevitable. 
Kant offers a related and equally unhelpful test: he claims that there cannot be a 
'science of the beautiful'; thus, Kant suggests that if, while treating fine art as a science, 'we 
asked for reasons and proofs we would be put off with tasteful phrases (bans mots), (eJ 305). 
Here Kant essentially invites us to imagine Plato's reaction to a further demand for 'reasons and 
proofs'. The way in which we answer this question for Plato essentially decides how we regard 
Plato's work. However, regardless of how we answer this question, we do not decide whether 
Plato's authorship is philosophical rather than artistic or vice versa. For, if we assume that 
Plato would answer with tasteful phrases, and, in tum, if we conclude that he must therefore be 
an artist rather than a philosopher, then we essentially beg the question against a possible 
artistic form of philosophical expression. If on the other hand, we assume that Plato will 
answer with proofs rather than tasteful phrases, then, in another way, we beg the question 
against the nature of his authorship. Rather than this thought experiment deciding the status of 
Plato as either a philosopher or artist, with it we merely decide whether Plato is a direct or 
indirect communicator (see Kraut chapter). 
Kant lands himself in this bind in relation to Plato because he seems to deny Plato's 
claim that reason cannot be imitated; according to Plato reason can only originate (see Republic 
chapter). Because Kant takes philosophers to be direct communicators, he does not entertain 
the prospect that they can produce something that other people cannot imitate (that is, directly 
understand). More particularly, because Kant takes Plato to be a direct communicator6 he 
straightforwardly assumes that much of Plato's talk is illegitimately about the metaphysical 
content of reason's ideas rather than their mere form. 
At the same time, because Kant separates off the work of the artistic geniuses from the 
domain of philosophical enquiry (which includes the self-created ideals of reason that have an 
essentially practical rather than theoretical application) he mistakenly assumes that artists 
produce work that can only be understood in an imitative way (i.e., in the way scientists 
understand nature). Regardless of whether it concerns the sciences or fine art, Kant therefore 
wrongly supposes that all education must take the form of imitation. 
However, if Kant had recognised Plato's works as a way of resolving the ancient 
quarrel between philosophy and art he would have seen an expression of philosophy as art (or a 
form of education) that demands an originating rather than an imitative understanding. In tum, 
Kant would have seen a far closer connection between himself as practical philosopher and 
Plato's work. Consider, for example, the connection between Kant's discussion of the pure, 
rather than empirical, ideals of reason - i.e. those ideas that reason constructs for itself as 
standards - and what Plato with the dialogues is inviting our understanding to work out. More 
particularly, consider Kant's discussion of the self-legislation of reason and the inevitability of 
our reason conceiving of these commands as from God (see Opus 22:105, 22:116, 22:120, 
21:27,21:30,22:53,22:54, esp. 22:123; see Apology chapter). Here, in this limited practical 
use of reason, Kant is in agreement with Plato that reason is essentially originative and thus 
godlike? 
NOTES 
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Cartwright, a philosopher of science, who, methodologically, falls with Ryle onto the fox 
side of Berlin's species divide, accepts Duhem's distinction between: 
the deep but narrow minds of the French, and the broad but shallow minds of the 
English. The French mind sees things in an elegant, unified way. It takes 
Newton's three laws of motion and turns them into beautiful, abstract 
mathematics of Llagrangian mechanics. The English mind ... is an exact 
contrast. ... It holds a thousand things all at once, without imposing much 
abstract order or organization. (Laws ojPhysics, p. 19) 
In distinguishing between the beautiful and sublime understandings Kant essentially makes 
the same distinction. Like Duhem and Cartwright, Kant also associates these opposite types 
of understandings with different nationalities. However, in contrast to Duhem and 
Cartwright, he suggests that the English possess sublime understandings and the French 
possess beautiful understandings (Observations p.97). 
This apparent disagreement between Kant and Cartwright over which characteristic to 
attribute to which nationality, practically demonstrates something about their genuine core 
agreement. Their disagreement merely shows that the world looks importantly different 
from the perspective of each type of understanding. From the perspectives of both foxes 
and hedgehogs, the world is populated, more or less, with foxes and hedgehogs; however, 
for a fox foxes and hedgehogs look significantly different than they do for a hedgehog. That 
is to say, a person who possesses a sublime understanding, like Kant, will possess quite 
different conceptions of the sublime and the beautiful than will a person who has a beautiful 
understanding (see CJ 346). 
There is perhaps an important difference in how Kant considers the work of the sublime 
understanding in the first and third Critiques. For, in the first Critique he describes the 
sublime understanding pursuing unity 'according to the principle of aggregation'. Here, it 
may appear that the sublime understanding uses the same elements as does the beautiful 
understanding, but merely heads with them in the opposite direction. A more robust 
conception of the sublime understanding would give its work more autonomy. In the third 
Critique, Kant seems to speak to a more robust conception. For in that work he denies that 
it is possible to understand organic bodies (e.g., a blade of grass) as aggregates (that is to 
say, mechanically). Thus, he denies that the sublime understanding pursues unity 
'according to the principle of aggregation'. With this autonomy comes ineffability. 
Leibniz supposes that organicity goes right down: animals are made up out of animals down 
to infinity. Even though nature can be understood mechanically there is nevertheless 
something irreducibly organic about it - that is to say, there is something about nature, we 
cannot get to by mechanical means. 
It may appear that Kuhn and Kant disagree on this point. For, Kuhn asserts that there is 
something exemplary about the work of the greatest scientists. While Kant, on the other 
hand, argues that science is merely imitative. However, this disagreement may merely be 
apparent. Kant speaks as a practitioner under the influence of Newton. While, Kuhn 
standing outside of that particular practice, is able to see exemplification where Kant is able 
to emphasise mere imitation. Kuhn is able to do this because he chooses to emphasise how 
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aesthetic laden the work of scientists is. While Kant does not deny this, he takes it as a 
given or he takes it as unavoidable and thus see no need to discuss its detennining influence. 
Alternatively, the apparent difference between what Kant and Kuhn claim may simply 
come down to the former emphasising the direct communication of the greatest scientists, 
while the latter emphasises the influence of the showing rather than the possible telling. 
Here there is a rich connection between the form of love and the fonn of art. There is 
something unique about the fonn of both love and the work of genius, moreover, they each 
display inner necessity. Thus, an artist (e.g., Don Quixote) can profitably have a muse in the 
same way as an artist can be instructed (in the nature of completed fonn) by considering 
classical works of art. 
Interestingly, for Nietzsche and Kierkegaard love is beyond good and evil. That is to 
say, we cannot make sense of love through the ethical (i.e. Kant's categorical imperative). 
For Kierkegaard, even though there is something divine about love, there is also something 
essentially exception making about it. So too for the artist. Thus, because the artist is outside 
the ethical, because he has to break the received rules in his work, he makes an exception of 
it and thus must proceed with fear and trembling. After the same manner, the lover in 
relation to the beloved is beyond good and evil and must proceed with fear and trembling. 
In not only claiming that Plato is a fanatic but also that he is the father of all fanaticism Kant 
not only shows that he reads Plato as a direct communicator but he shows that he takes his 
cue from the history of philosophy. 
In Kant's ethics if we conceive of him as endorsing merely an imitative view of reason, then 
the categorical imperative turns out to be a merely regulative rule for the understanding 
rather than the constitutive fonn of the understanding. From such a rule-following reading 
of Kant's thinking on ethics many incoherencies follow which do not follow if his work is 
read as merely descriptive (of the constitutive form of a good will) and thus not as 
prescriptive (or merely regulative) of the understanding. 
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